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CHAIRMAN DOUGLAS H. BOSCO:

I would like to welcome everyone

the members who are here.

and

To my far right is Alister

McAlister, who 1s Chairman of the full Finance Insurance and Commerce
Committee, and to my far left is Assemblyman Larry Stirling.
is

This

s first term and he is a very fine member of our Committee, and

Jim Costa, who is not a member of the Committee, but who is the author
of a bill that is one of the reasons we are holding this hearing.

The

eld of creative financing is one that is occupying a great deal of
our thought on this particular subcommittee these days, because of the
fact that we have been deeply immersed in the question of assumable
end

loans, whether we should in Californ

assumability of loans
decisions.

or allow

Obviously,

that type of decision would have far reaching consequences for a
number of people.
The
is one of
as

lity.

ing that has taken place in the last

f

st to us

1

s

Today, our

the Department of Consumer Af

of this issue of loan
th the representative of

who will lay some of the foundation

for the hearing by describing the legal and economic climate in
which the creative financing is f

i

Real Estate is present to discuss the

The Commissioner of
es of that Department's

licensees from the point of view of the regulator.

We plan to hear

from two attorneys, who limit their practice to real property financing,
on the practical aspect of putting together financing to accomplish

a home sale and the legal implications of the participating parties.
Only one of these gentlemen, however, is able to attend ... today
because of the Air Traffic

Controllers strike.

We have a Deputy District Attorney from San Diego, who
will describe for the Committee some

of the schemes he has encountered

in his work with the fraud division of the District Attorney's office
and we have representatives of the Real Estate and lending industries
to give us their perspectives in the way of definitions, issues, and
problems associated with creating financing for borrowers and lenders,
and we have two economists who will describe the economic fall-out,
if you will, of creating financing and its implications for the
future contours of the mortgage market.
We would like to begin this morning by hearing from Dick
Elbrecht, who is the supervising attorney for the Division of Consumer
Services of the Department of Consumer Affairs.
MR. DICK ELBRECHT:

Welcome, Mr. Elbrecht.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

and members of the Committee.

Mr. Chairman

I am appearing here today at the request

Mr. Richard B. Spohn, who is presently on his annual

of our
two-week vacat

with

s

fe and chi

The purpose of this hear
Creative £inane

is to explore creative financing.

is a method of home finance on which buyers and

sellers have begun to rely more heavily as reasonably priced long-term
credit has become unavailable.
In the following testimony, I will share some thoughts on
creative financing.

I will look at it from the viewpoint of the

consumers, both buyers and sellers.

I will also attempt to describe

the larger context in which creative financing is taking place.

I

will also express some concern about whether creative financing, in
- 2 -

the

agrees to make a large balloon payment, is general

table for use in today's market,

the exact source of the

funds needed to make the balloon payment is not known.
As I use the term creative financing, the term does not
include financing by long-term fixed or adjustable rate mortgages,
or graduated payment mortgages, shared appreciation mortgages, or
other traditional or innovative home mortgage instruments which provide

•

long term home finance.

Nor does it include equity loans made to

persons who already own their own homes, borrowing on them to pay
for living expenses, or luxuries, or to consolidate debts and the like.
While some of the same thoughts will apply to each of these
financing mechanisms, creative financing of the purchase of homes
deserves the separate treatment it is being given at these hearings.
~eal

Creative financing of residential
us.

estate has always been with

At no time has long-term lending by financial institutions been

the sole source of home finance.

It has always been supplemented by

some forms of creative financing.

Indeed, prior to the great depression,

was no such thing as long-term, fully amortized, home financing.
Then, mortgage loans usually ran for only five years, and a much

•

smaller percentage of the purchase

ce was financed.

Moreover, unless

payments were quite large, the buyer was faced with a balloon
payment at the end of the five-year term.

If buyers couldn't make
loan or default.

that payment, buyers had to

During

the great depression, many home buyers defaulted when lenders refused
to refinance their mortgages.

It was only with the passage of the

federal Housing Act of 1934, that the long-term, fully amortized,
non-balloon payment home mortgage came into widespread use.
ASSEMBLYMAN ALISTER MCALISTER:
-

3 -

... Mr. Elbrecht.

Didn't

we have in fact during the depress

moratorium legislation on

foreclosures even in some states?
MR. ELBRECHT:

That's correct, and I believe that is also

when our anti-deficiency legislation was adopted here in California.
Since then, long-term, fully amortized home finance has
become the norm with the total horne mortgage debt, financed mainly
by long-term, fully amortized mortgages, increasing dramatically
from $17 billion in 1940, to approximately $300 billion in 1970,
to some $973 billion in 1980.

It is the contrast between the norm

of the 1940's through the 1970's and today's practices that has
given rise to the use of the term creative financing, and it is the
similarity between much of today's creative balloon-payment financing
schemes and the conditions that preceded the great depression that
has given many observers cause for concern.
The Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco reports that
delinquencies of sixty days or longer have increased to about .82
percent of the mortgages held by California's savings and loans, up
from .46 percent one year ago.
de

also has increased.

The number of recorded notices of

For instance, in Santa Clara County, for

the fiscal year ending in June of 1981, approximately 6,100 notices
of de

were recorded, up from 3,800 in 1979 and 3,900 in 1980.
In Los Angeles County, 19,385 default notices were

recorded during the first six months of 1981, compared with 11,167
and 13,194 in 1979 and 1980 respectively.
These statistics show a radical increase in the default
rate and also in the rate of filing of notices of default in connection
with foreclosure proceedings.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Could you give the numbers again.

- 4 -

MR. ELBRECHT:
the

le of

The numbers are on page three of the statement

page.

Exact

s are there and I could repeat

them for you if you would like.
ASSEMBLYMAN LARRY STIRLING:

Is that above or below the

national average?
MR. ELBRECHT:

I don't have that statistic.

I think the

message of these statistics is that there is a change, and, as I
11 indicate here today, this gives rise to concern about the capacity
of home mortgage borrowers to sustain the increases in the payments
that will result upon refinancing of balloon payments in an economic
environment in which interest rates are higher than they presently
are, which is a distinct possibility.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

I understand, I am just trying to

figure out why the California default is half the national average.
MR. ELBRECHT:
one of

Well, we have a strong economy, probably

strongest in the country, and that is something that we

can really be proud of.

We must be aware, take a look at the trends,

s at least keep our own local trends in mind in developing

and
policy.
I

That is the reason we have presented these statistics.
ASSEMBLYMAN JIM COSTA:

Mr. Elbrecht.

What is the common

after a notice of default.
MR. ELBRECHT:

After the recording of the notice of default,

buyer has a period of 90 days in which to reinstate the mortgage
by paying

delinquent payments, plus certain limited expenses;

and

after that 90-day period, the foreclosing creditor can complete the
foreclosure proceeding.
s

Until the actual time of sale, the consumer

11 has the right to redeem by paying the full unpaid balance of

the mortgage, plus all of the foreclosure costs and related charges,
-
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which could become

substantial; but that requires that the

consumer actually obtain a new loan.

The filing of the notice of

default is the commencement of a three-month period in which the
borrower can preserve the existing loan simply by paying the
delinquent payments plus certain limited expenses.
The rate of filing of notices of default doesn't necessarily
reflect the rate of ultimate foreclosure sales, because a lot of
people are, in fact, able to cure by bringing the payments current;
and even when they don't, a lot of them are able to sell the property
during the interim period and realize their equity and become renters
instead of owners.

And some perhaps move to a less expensive home.

The critical issue today is just who is going to refinance,
and at what cost, all of the short-term balloon-payment first, second
and third mortgage loans that have been made and that are now beginning
to become due and that will come due in steadily increasing volume
during the next few months and years.

Will the widespread unavailability

of refinancing during the great depression repeat itself in the 1980's?
Will the cost be more than most people can afford?
question is:

An equally pertinent

Can any buyer today, or tomorrow, reasonably commit

himself or herself to make a short-term balloon payment some three,
four or five years hence?

Can a lender or seller who provides short-

term balloon payment housing credit reasonably expect to be repaid when
the balloon comes due?

Can a realtor properly accept a commission on

a sale in which the parties do not genuinely understand the risks
of a balloon payment which perhaps
Today, very

cannot be refinanced?

ttle thought is being given to the possibility

that when these notes come due, the anticipated opportunities to
refinance at an affordable rate may not materialize.
- 6 -

Clearly, not

financing of home purchase

all short-term balloon payment
transactions should be ques

financing has been with

us for as long as real property has been sold and purchased.

We have

outlined in our statement a whole variety of kinds of creative
financing techniques that have been used in past years.
financing is nothing new.

So creative

It is the term that is new.

It is difficult to find fault with creative financing of
the purchase of a home in which the buyer is assured of receiving
funds needed to make the balloon payment when it is due.
if the

reasonably

For example,

anticipates receiving proceeds from the sale

of other property or a bonus, commission or tax refund, or an inheritance,
or other
buyers

ft, the use of creative financing techniques in which the
igations are linked to the receipt of additional funds may

be most appropriate.

If

buyer intends to sell the house itself

before the balloon payment is due, then aga

, a balloon-payment

mortgage may be appropriate with a reasonable assurance that the
necessary funds

11 be in hand at the time they are needed.

not unreasonable,
co~~itments

It is

most cases, for a purchaser to make

based on those expectations.

In recent years, however,

s have increasingly committed themselves to make purchasemoney balloon payments in the expectation that the source of the
needed to make the balloon payment would be the property itself.
Two premises have become

ined in our thinking.

First,

that the property, every property, will appreciate substantially.
Second, that because of the enhanced value of the property, it will
be pass

le to procure a refinancing loan encompassing both the

rst-lien mortgage and the balloon or balloons, when they become
due.
- 7 -

ASSEMBLYMAN LOUIS PAPAN:

Let me ask you a question.

Where

was the Department on the Wellenkamp decision?
MR. ELBRECHT:
issue today, sir.

We have some statements to make on that

I'm leading into the question of the relevance

of the Wellenkamp decision.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

I'll watch carefully and be sure he does

not ...
MR. ELBRECHT:

We go into it in quite a bit of detail

beginning on page eight or nine.

As we have indicated there, because

of the Wellenkamp decision, the Federal National Mortgage Association
has required that all mortgages that it purchases from lenders in
California must include the lender's option to call the loan after
seven years.

And the fact is that the Wellenkamp decision has meant

that insofar as mortgages are destined for resale on the secondary
market, they are all balloon-payment mortgages.

They are all due in

seven years.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

You were into it in some detail when

we were introducing a bill to reverse it.
MR. ELBRECHT:

I think this is our first statement on

the subject, sir.
MR. PAPAN:

Last year did you oppose the bill being

carried, and I don't know who the author was, that tried to undo
Wellenkamp.
MR. ELBRECHT:
MR. PAPAN:

Honestly, I am not aware of ...

You are laying a lot of groundwork there

and using state funds to reach a lot of people prematurely.
MR. ELBRECHT:

I don't think we were on that issue last

year, I'm not aware that we were, sir.
- 8 -

MR. PAPAN:

I think you were ... the Department of Consumer

Affairs was.
MR. ELBRECHT:

We are making some statements here today.

Two recent changes in the market have given rise to a great
deal of concern.

One is the prediction by housing economists that

the rate of appreciation ln the nominal value of residential real
estate is likely to slow or stop altogether, a prediction that seems
to be coming true in many areas of the state with the softening in
today's real estate market.
The other change is

ation's effect on our financial

institutions, the organizations that act as financial intermediaries
between persons who have money to save and those who wish to borrow,
who have found it difficult to impossible to make long-term home
loans

today's economic environment.

tled, ''Housing Costs:

In the accompanying paper

Past, Present and Future,"

we have

summarized the findings and conclusions of several housing economists
who have analyzed the real estate market, and who foresee, indeed,
assure us that there will be, a significant moderation, if not a

•

the increase in real estate values.

ces

One of these

sts, Professor Douglas P. Diamond, states that as people's
continuing increases in real estate values diminish,
a

component of the current market value of real property,

reflecting expectations of further increases in real estate values,
will no longer be present.

That is why some investors have been

willing to tolerate a negative cash flow on their real property
investments.

While the process is working, it works quite well.

When the balloon payment comes due, the value of the property has
sen to the point where it will support the larger refinancing loan.
- 9 -

The process depends upon continuing real estate appreciation.

And

with the anticipated softening in the market, of which there is
always some evidence, the appreciation which is a prerequisite for
such refinancings may not materialize.
The second premise, that because of the enhanced value
of the property, it will be possible to procure a refinancing loan
encompassing both the first-lien mortgage and the balloon when it
comes due, is also beginning to become unrealistic.

The accompanying

paper, "Interaction of Deposit, Interest Rate, Deregulation and Mortgage
Instrument Design," explains some of the reasons for, and the
consequences of, the drain of savings deposits from our financial
institutions, mainly savings and loan associations, the effect of
which has been to cut off what has been the major source of funds
for use in making and refinancing home loans.

Today, it is difficult

to determine how successful the saving and loan industry will be in
attracting the funds needed to continue making and refinancing home
loans as they have in the past.
One thing is certain, the cost of such refinancing credit,
if it is available at all, will be considerably more than anyone could
have predicted several years ago.

With financial deregulation

proceeding a pace, the home mortgage borrower is in competition with
all other borrowers for funds, including the United States government
and the entire commercial and industrial sectors.

It is not clear

that the individual consumer seeking a refinancing loan will win out
over large corporations garnering funds to purchase other institutions
or the U.S. Treasury in its continuing efforts to refinance the
federal debts.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Just a minute.
- 10 -

There are changes today

pol

that relate to the

the area of hous

normally centered
focused itself

stment capital that has

of money

the

as an increase towards the
MR. ELBRECHT:
has

, and that change

has

ts and T-bills which we see
1 sector for investment capital.

Well, the Reagan administration, I believe,

cated that its policies are going to move in the direction of
li

and

reindus
sector.

the movement of capital funds into
as

i

shed from movement into the housing

s

The money market

lation and the 1

funds are a market response to

ts that savings and loan associations have on

the amounts they can pay depositors.

With federal regulation Q savings

and loans and banks have been limited in what they can pay depositors.
As a re

t of that 1

the

haven't

depositors enough to

sitors within their fold, so a market response to this

phenomenon has been the emergence of the money market mutual funds
which are
of

I

can't say that that has been the result

's pol
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. ELBRECHT:

Regan?

Pres

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
who heads the

You are s

Pres

as opposed to Regan

Department?

MR. ELBRECHT:

It's my understanding that a main thrust

administration's economic policy is to foster and

of the

promote reindustrialization, and, if necessary, at the expense of
hous
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
of

Can you tell me where Mr. Regan, the

Treasury, came from that President Reagan appointed?

MR. ELBRECHT:

I don't know, s
- 11 -

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Merrill Lynch.

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

So he is aoina to feather his bed in

some way, since he came out of an industry that presentlv is takina
funds from all over the country and from corrmunities ...
MR. ELBRECHT:

It is a very controversial question as to

whether money market mutual funds should not be regulated in the same
way that banks and savings and loans •..
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

My question to you is could you possibly

draw an inference as to someone who is involved in consumer affairs to
say that here is a man who came out of a brokerage house that is
presently contributing to the problem.
MR. ELBRECHT:

Let's be political about it.

I think I can be political about it in the

sense that I know that one of the basic, fundamental, economic premises
of the Reagan administration is that the free market should be allowed
to do what it will, and that .•.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

I am asking you a question.

head of the Treasury is a man named Mr. Regan.
of a brokerage house?

The present

Did he not come out

I am not encouraging President Reagan and his

administration to continue the money ...
MR. ELBRECHT:

I supposed you could make an inference that

his past connection with that industry ...
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Let's make the inference, then.

ASSEMBLYr1AN COSTA:

I think that more important than that

in the meetings that I have had, back in Washington in the last four
or five months, there is, I think, a clear change in the intersection
in the middle of the road.

For the first time in thirty years, since

World War II, housing no longer enjoys the priority that it had during
Republican and Democratic administrations alike.

- 12 -

And that investment

capital is not there.

It takes the form in the comments that you are

It takes the form

other fashions which means that we are

going to be more and more dependent on the state levels to try to
create our own sources
MR. ELBRECHT:

investment capital for housing.
That's correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

I think to be ...

Right or wrong, it may be good or bad,

I'm not arguing policy, but nonetheless, it means that money for housing
the

sector is not going to be there.
MR. ELBRECHT:

To be politically even-handed, we should

note that in President Carter's annual report to Congress of this
last year, there was also a suggestion that there should be a
reallocation of the nation's credit resources in the direction of
re

zation, not specifically from housing, but from consumption,

generally, so I would say there is some political bipartisan movement
in that

It is not exclusively the Reagan administration's

policy.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

When was the legislation that

provided for the Regulation Q reform adopted?
MR. ELBRECHT:

In 1980.

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

•

MR. ELBRECHT:

It was introduced previously?

That's correct.

the result of inflation, wh
problems.
financ
funds

And that, in turn, was

is the key to a lot of these

In short, the potential supply of low-cost funds for home
is gone, and there is no reason to believe that these

11 be restored in time or volume or at a cost that will enable

the increasing volume of creatively financed home purchases to be
refinanced on terms like those that have prevailed in the past, even
if real property should continue to appreciate at rates that were
- 13 -

characteristic of the past.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

I think that is very important to know.

That is the opinion of the Department.

That the refinancing is not

going to be there for those who have got themselves in ...
MR. ELBRECHT:
to predict.

It's a question we are raising.

We have many sources of potential credit.

and loan industry is regearing.

It's impossible

The savings

We can see in today's papers that they

are paying larger amounts for certificates of deposit, together with
additional funds to savers which in turn will be lendable to horne
mortgage borrowers and others.

We also have private investors and

second mortgage loan brokers who will continue to be operative in
the field.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

The Department is not making a statement

as to whether or not you believe that refinancing will or will not be
there.

You question ...
MR. ELBRECHT:

We are raising a question of concern that

both sellers and buyers and investors in the horne finance process be
sensitive to the possibility that refinancing may be difficult, or
that refinancing at an affordable cost may be difficult, in the case
of one, two, three, four or five year balloon notes, and that it is
really important that people should go into this kind of transaction
with their eyes open.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

In your research, how much money market

investing was being done by the savings and loans in advance of the
present prices?
MR. ELBRECHT:

I don't have those statistics, sir.

know that there was some.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Do these statistics indicate how
- 14 -

I

of

has fal

as oppo
it's

MR. ELBRECH'I':
has

demand?

len off dramatical

te

lear that housing construction

We have ...

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

How does that impact on the price of

homes in the period of refinancing balloon payments?
MR. ELBRECHT:
meet demand

The unavai

lity of additional homes to

11 itself be a factor that

11 tend to increase real

values.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

So conceivab

the people confronted

with balloon payments could be in a market situation where values
have a built-in factor of appreciation as opposed to leveling off?
MR. ELBRECHT:

There will be forces, as there always are

a market context, going in opposite

rections, and it is a question

of how these will resolve themselves.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
of s

Your statement doesn't go into that

stic, does it?
MR. ELBRECHT:

No, we don't.

would hold.

that would bear on what the
that if

That's one of the factors

s'

inflation and of

real estate

I

shed, then that factor
tant

itself will have an
That is es

on the value of real property.

the message of the two housing economists.

1

ASSEMBLY~~N

the

The main point is

PAPAN:

You have no information about how

and loan industry has

markets themselves

advance of

MR. ELBRECHT:

with respect to money

s period?

We know that

have participated both

as lenders and borrowers.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Do you have any statistics?
- 15 -

These

are the things that I think your department and I think Mr. Spohn .••
There are many people who understand what the statement is, but the
specifics are something the Department should engage in more frequently
because I still have the vast bad taste of their posturing with respect
to Wellenkamp.

You guys are so busy selling something to the public

that just wasn't true.

You've a long way to go as far as I am concerned.

MR. ELBRECHT:

We will do our best to gather some of these

statistics, sir.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
I have too.

I think Mr. Papan's point is one that

Even if people start saving and the savings and loans

are able to attract capital, what is to say that they will use it
for housing?
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. ELBRECHT:

They'll build new buildings.

Well, that's correct.

Part of the economic

deregulation mode is to deregulate on both the liability side and the
asset side, and savings and loans have asked for and have received
powers to engage in a lot of economic activity that doesn't have
anything to do with housing -- consumer loans, trust services and so
on.

It may be that when rates are so high that borrowers can't afford

to enter into mortgages at 16, 17 or 18 percent, the industry will
need these other avenues of investment to simply stay afloat.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Well, I know one thing, and I'll ask this

when representatives of the industry are before us, but some of the
changes in the law that we have been asked to make, at least relative
to state chartered institutions are always put into terms of making
money available for housing.

I think it would be unfortunate if we

made some of the changes and found out that the money wasn't available
for housing anyway.
- 16 -

MR. ELBRECHT:
against that poss

ility.

Well, the

islature should be on guard

It's likely, in fact, that the savings

and loan industry will be branching out into additional areas, and
housing will have a lower priority, at least until inflation is
dealt with -- cured -- and interest rates are back down to the point
where people can afford to enter into home mortgages.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

I have noticed that the recent tax

legislation that was passed apparently contained provisions that are
hoped will encourage the savings and loan industry -- all all savers
certificate.
" ... ins

I'm reading from a Wall Street Journal article.

It says,

tutions could pay 70 percent of the interest rate on one-

year Treasury Bill.
savings certificates.

This would probably attract funds from six-month
Savers could exclude from their taxable income

as much as $1,000 in interest earned on the proposed certificates, or
as much as $2,000 per couple filing j
clear.

returns."

It's not quite

Was this part of the bill that was just passed?
MR. ELBRECHT:

That's correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

What do you think that will do

insofar as attracting money away from the money market funds and
back to the lenders who lend money on residential real estate?
MR. ELBRECHT:

It's very controversial.

I know that some

of the members of the Federal Reserve Board have expressed the view
that it won't have much positive impact on the volume of new savings
going into the savings and loans, that it will primarily result in
shifting from one kind of savings instrument to another.
other hand, only the future will tell.
controversy on the question.

On the

I think there is a lot of

A lot of people at the federal level

opposed it on the ground that it was very costly in terms of the
-
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federal budget, increasing the federal deficit while at the same time
providing relatively marginal benefits to the home purchasers and
the home construction industry.

So, there is some skepticism about

the extent to which that program, which is a very costly federal
program, will actually resolve in additional housing.

But it's

impossible to say ...
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

If I'm not mistaken, I think the

Wall Street Journal, itself editorialized against this •..
MR. ELBRECHT:

That's right, the Wall Street Journal opposed

it, and I believe Mr. Diehl, also, spoke in a recent article that was
reported in the Wall Street Journal indicating that he had some
questions about it's actual impact on the market.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

It seems to me there's a real clash

of opinions here as to the future so far as whether the cost of housing
is going to continue to appreciate.

You've got this fairly new school

of economists who are inclined to think that the appreciation is about
at an end and may even go down and some of those folks in fact even
think that we're going into a depression.

But on the other hand,

we've had kind of a period here of two or three years now in which
there has been relatively little construction.
up demand for housing.

We have a huge pent

We have a lot of the young people who've been

going into apartments or into homes that were too small for them.
We've had relatively little construction.

If you look around a little

bit you still find a lot of homes that contractors built that they
can't sell.

Those fellows are really hurting, but the volume of

construction has gone down.
a dam that's going to burst.

At some point this is going to be like
I mean you've got all these flood waters.

I recognize all the deflationary factors, but there are still people
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who have to l

in
househo

is

s

houses.

is

The total number of

at a fairly good clip, not

because of population increase so much as due to the smaller
households.

s means that housing is still going to keep appreciating

rather than depreciating.
MR. ELBRECHT:

Well, this pent-up demand is surely a demand,

but to make it an effective demand requires that the people who demand

•

have

wherewithal to make the payments on the mortgages.

And that

is probably the major constraint -- the financial capacity of the
people who are demanding the housing.
there.

So, assuredly, the demand is

Whether it will be an effective demand, whether it can be

translated into an effective demand through available credit as a
cost people can afford, is the great unknown question.

That in turn

will depend upon dealing with inflation and getting interest rates
down.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

I mean all this money that's going

to go apparently into reindustrialization, is, I guess, supposed to
make the economy go, and people are going to be working for these
es and so forth, but these people are going to live somewhere.

•

There is a s
to ei

live

ficant number of them
a tent or

MR. ELBRECHT:

aren't going to be satisfied

an apartment house.

That's right, there is going to be an enormous

demand for housing, of a kind that we haven't seen.
is real

The challenge

to develop and create housing and provide housing finance

of the kind that will enable people to actually realize their demand
and acquire housing.

And there's a tension there that will be a

challenge for the state and for the housing sector to meet.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

The estimatesare 300,000 units a year
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for the next five years in California.

Last year we built 144,000

units.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Can I ask you a very easy question?

Tell me what usury is?
MR. ELBRECHT:

Usury refers to a law that limits the

interest or finance charge or service charge that a creditor can
impose.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. ELBRECHT:

Absent the law, what is usury?

Nothing.

Usury refers to a legal restriction,

it does not refer to simply a moral or an ethical •.•
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Let me ask you sir, historically,

because I always like to take you away from your statement.
Spohn were here I'd enjoy it a little more.

If Mr.

How did we arrive at a

limit one time of 10 percent and anything above that as being usurious?
MR. ELBRECHT:

Well, people believed that if you pass a

law that limits the amount the creditor can charge, it will cost less
for the credit.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. ELBRECHT:

People believe?

Let's talk in facts.

And in fact, legal rate ceilings, depending

upon the market, do limit what the creditor can charge.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

This originated •••

What is your opinion of this, since

you're heading a department on presumed salary, what is a usurious
rate in number?

Forget there is no law now because we've lifted the

lid.
MR. ELBRECHT:

Inflation really wrecks all systems of legal

restraint on interest rates, because of the disorientation.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Let me ask you, in the event they

can't lend the money, what do you think will happen to the interest
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are 1

rates or

?

MR. ELBRECHT

If there are interest rate ceilings, which
the home

of course there aren't
we've el

rate

, not on

1

and loans, but also

area.

With Prop.

2

the banks and savings

loans made or arranged by mortgage loan

brokers.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

•

Let's get back to the first one.

the interest rates should be

do you

What

law, so that we can say

is no longer usurious?
MR. ELBRECHT:

In general,

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. ELBRECHT:
rate compe

e

a competitive ...

Not general, I want speci

cs.

In a competitive market where there is
and that in turn prevents ...

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

I don't want to listen to this, what

opinion ... do you have any opinions at all besides what you
want ... to give us textbook answers.
MR. ELBRECHT:

This is a very definite opinion ...

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. ELBRECHT:

Give me a number at the end .

... where there is competition, effective

on rates, you don't need rate ceilings.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. ELBRECHT:

G

me a number now!

Zero, you don't need any law at all.

There's

rate competition, so that lenders compete among ...

ef

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
percent 1

s

10

t that we have in law, is that what you're telling me?
as it was?

some

Then you supported lifting the

I don't want to lose sight of the fact that at

these interest rates are usurious.

I presume that with

of statement that you've read very well that you have some
- 21 -

yourse f.

op

r-1R. ELBRECHT :

I

we

sed some questions about

rate ceil

el
As far as

ten

we

mortgage loan brokers.

ceil

, that was obviously too low and

a change.
ASSEMBLYr-ffiN PAPAN:
and I'm

I'm go

to

to get a figure from

to d

MR. ELBRECHT:

I'm going to try to answer your question,

s

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

What,

your opinion is a usurious

rate?
MR. ELBRECHT:

If ...

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

I'm

you money, when would you

it and not call me ... what were money lenders called in the old

1
?

MR. ELBRECHT:

Charlatans?

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
. ELBRECHT:
that uncons

This is go

MR. ELBRECHT:

kes your conscience as being

Do

any at all?

What is the ...

lings.
MR. ELBRECHT:

I would say

s.

On a refinancing of a

loan or ...
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

st --

evasive, but a rate

What is a rate that is unconscionable?

It just s

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

second

to

le.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

or

Loan sharks is a common word.

ref inane

No, don't say ... I'm asking you in a

and the terms.
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ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

(Inaudible)

He's going around in circles here.

I

just want one figure in his mind that maybe we should reduce into
law to stop all of this.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

But there are a lot of people that

are loaning out on seconds, so there might be a ...
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Y0u want to make that distinction and

get to the primary lender, fine.
MR. ELBRECHT:

If there is no inflation, 18 percent sounds

pretty high.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. ELBRECHT:

On a second?

Well, you asked me for a single figure.

If we're talking about a noninflationary environment, 18 percent is
a good rate ceiling.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

That's a good ceiling?

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Isn't that the Unruh Act ceiling

on .•.
MR. ELBRECHT:

Which, however, you don't need if there is

a competitive ...
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

What's wrong with 12 percent?

obvious that lifting that ceiling is causing us havoc.
has to lend within certain perimeters I think,

It's

If everybody

I think we'll

eliminate some of property and when we do set the law.
MR. ELBRECHT:

The problem with a 12 percent rate ceiling

is that if inflation is 15 percent, the lender has a negative return
and lenders aren't going to lend.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

The way they reacted to that was

prepaid interest which was in the form of a loan fee.
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MR. ELBRECHT:

Well, that's funny business that should

perhaps be ...
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. ELBRECHT:

What do you mean, funny business?

That's interest in another guise.

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

That's their reaction to the inflation.

They'll get some prepaid interest in advance.

Let me ask you, do you

support us setting into law a limit as to what you can lend?
MR. ELBRECHT:

In the real estate market today, no!

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
have here!

How could you say that?

Look what we

I'm saying that ...
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

How does that help us?

When we had it at 10 percent it didn't

affect the lending institutions, and we put 10 percent on it because
at some point in time people felt that if it was in an excess of 10
percent it was usurious.

Elbrecht?

Now somewhere we have lost that concept.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Could I ask a question here, Mr.

Before we passed Prop.

2

second mortgages could only be

at 10 percent, right?
MR. ELBRECHT:

That's correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Well, who in the world in their

right mind would finance a second mortgage today at 10 percent.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Mr. McAlister, if we proceeded, sir,

to limit the 10 percent to everybody or go to 12 percent and lend ...
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Who would do that?

We do it in law.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Well, so what?

I mean you'll

put your money in Eurodollars ...
UNKNOWN VOICE:

In Reagan dollars!
-
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(Laughter)

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

There's a million places to invest

your money if you're going to put that kind of limitations on it.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Placing that limitation on it, I think,

would cause a situation to evolve where most people would not proceed
to seek the higher interest.
MR. ELBRECHT:

There is no doubt that rate ceilings do have

some impact on the market in most cases.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

No question, and when we lifted the

ceiling this is what we got.
MR. ELBRECHT:

There has certainly been a trend in the last

few years of simply letting interest rates go wherever they will, and
assuredly, when we experience some of the twenty and thirty percent
rates that we're going to be hearing about when it comes to refinancing
the ballon-payment mortgages that we're talking about here today, we
are going to wonder whether that was really a wise decision.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Let me tell you sir, I envision that

a lot of lenders in our country that were very solid institutions are
being threatened by the fact that we opened a situation up here by
lifting that arbitrary limit that wehad.

•

Greed has set in.

that money lenders were considered very greedy people.

You know

And I think

that it's time we reexamine what we've done to ourselves and find
another arbitrary level that begins to bring some sanity to this
business of lending money or paying for money, at least in this
state, and maybe nationally, maybe that would be the answer.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Now, if you do that what do you

think these people who are lending this money are going to do with
their money?

I mean think that if inflation is above the level that

you said, what are they going to do with their money?
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ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
other outlets.

Probably put it into property or find

But the cost of money ...

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Buy gold, maybe?

Gold?

Paintings,

precious art, antiques, old books?
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

There will be some of that, but there

won't be the kind of chaos that we have now.
MR. ELBRECHT:

The first order of business is dealing with

inflation, and a lot of the other problems will be resolved almost
automatically if we get inflation down to a zero level.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

You don't think these high interest

rates are inflationary?
MR. ELBRECHT:

They are inflationary;

but they are a result

of inflation.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
the cost of money gets

If borrowing stops for any reason and

so prohibitive the chances are that you'll

find a leveling off and possibly a drop in the cost of money.

Can

we afford to buy that kind of risk or do we have to act now to impose
an arbitrary limit to what you can receive and what you charge for
the cost of money?
MR. ELBRECHT:

If you do establish limits, creditors will

go elsewhere to make their investments.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. ELBRECHT:

I've heard that argument.

I don't want to argue too strongly against

ceilings because we do support them in certain cases.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. ELBRECHT:
consumer credit area.

Have all states lifted the limits?

Several states have deregulated in the

Federal legislation has deregulated rate

ceilings in real estate finance across the board.
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ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

But the loosening up of what was once

an accepted level has caused us to have the kind of situation that
none of us wants.

And I think we as a governmental body, Mr. Chairman,

should reexamine and probably encourage the federal level of government
to proceed at least for a period of time to set an arbitrary limit to
the cost of money.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER)

e

Lou, you're talking about a national

phenomenon, of course, you're not talking just about the State of
California phenomenon.

I don't think that the passage of Prop.

2

has had anything to do with the basic problem that we're talking about.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

You know, but if there is an interest,

Mr. McAlister, in the kind of situation that we have, and there is
a national interest, I don't know that the money lenders -- I mean
the lending institutions of our country, all of them would be in
agreement on this point.

But I can tell you my concern is for the

source of money that went into homes that came from savings and loans
that presently are in some serious trouble and conceivably could cause
a greater harm.

Hopefully that does not occur, but there have been

some pretty shaky ones across the country.

1

It's time that we set

an arbitrary limit, and if everybody has to live within those limits
you'd be surprised how things would change.
MR. ELBRECHT:

Actually, the U.S. Savings and Loan League

is involved in litigation at the federal level to prevent the
Deregulation Committee from proceeding as fast as it has wanted to
proceed.

So, actually, the U.S. Savings and Loans League is in at

least in some agreement with some of the things that you've said,
Mr. Papan.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

You call it deregulation and I call
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it tolerating usury.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

I recall the two principal exponents

of the usury concept in history were the medieval church and people
like Ayatollah Khomeini.

And in the Moslem countries, of course, I

think they largely engage in a hypocritical device to avoid ..•
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Did you ever try to find a house in

Moslem country?
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

The closest I ever came to a Moslem

country was when I visited Israel and briefly touched base in Lebanon.
But I think they largely engage in hypocritical ways of charging
interest without calling it interest, but those are the areas.

The

medievel church has long ago changed its views on that.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
them.

Now they are right in with the rest of

(Laughter)
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Well that was before the Protestant

Reformation, Catholicism and the emphasis that the church, both
Protestant and Catholic, eventually came to place upon capitalism,
the work ethic, and so forth.

I think you've got to go back around

the year 1400 or 1500 to get into the strong anti-usury feelings.
There is a feature here though that I would like to explore for just
a moment.

There are those who say, and I'm not defending this, that

the high interest rates are partially off-set by the fact they are
deductible.

If you are in, for instance, the 30 percent bracket,

the 15 percent interest is of course, is equivalent to only 10 and
a half percent because you're deducting four and a half of those
15 points on your federal taxes plus of course whatever state taxes
would exist.
MR. ELBRECHT:

By all means, our federal and state tax

-
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policies have fostered higher interest rates than would otherwise be
the case as the result of the deductibility of interest and the
includability in gross income of interest income.

Both of those

policies working together have assuredly increased the prevailing
interest rates, and that is a matter of government policy at both
the federal and state level.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Could I ask you to summarize the balance

of your testimony because I would like to try to keep on schedule and
we do have a copy of ...
MR. ELBRECHT:

Well, maybe I should move into the Wellenkamp

issue because Mr. Papan specifically wanted me to do that.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

And I'll ask Mr. Papan to summarize his

remarks as well.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

And then close with Mr. Elbrecht's

summary.
MR. ELBRECHT:

Now that real estate values are beginning

to stabilize, at least in real inflation-corrected terms, and with
the risks of creative financing better understood, it may be the
time to begin focusing more carefully on the design of tomorrow's
home finance process.

That includes the design of alternative

mortgage instruments, as well as the exploration of new sources of
finance.
One design feature of the home finance process that is
of critical importance, and that is a particular need of careful
scientific analysis, is the actual term or duration of the home
mortgage loan.

As noted above, financial institutions have begun

to make short-term first mortgage loans with balloon payments due
in some three to five years.

They have done this, they have said,
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because of the extraordinary risk of future interest rate increases
which they were unwilling to sustain.

At least three factors have

played a role in their decision to utilize a form of lending that
was the norm before the great depression.

One is their perception

of the inadequacy of the present limits on interest rate changes in
adjustable rate mortgages.

The second, is the absence of a secondary

market for adjustable rate mortgages.

The third, is the ruling in

the Wellenkamp decision that makes it impossible to limit the term
of the mortgage to the duration of the borrower's ownership of the
property.
All these issues must be addressed scientifically and
competently in order to provide financial institutions with the
legal context and opportunity that will enable them to participate
in the long-term home finance process and to do what they can to help
meet the home purchase credit needs of those consumers who do not
already own their own homes as well as those who are faced with a
balloon.

During the past several weeks the national secondary market

adjustable rate mortgages has been opened for the first time.

And

it can be anticipated that legislation will be adopted in California
that will allow California chartered institutions and home mortgage
borrowers to participate in the new adjustable rate secondary market.
The remaining issue is the term or duration of tomorrow's
mortgages, and the effect of the Wellenkamp decision on the future
home finance process.

This has become one of the most controversial

questions this session.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. ELBRECHT:
UNKNOWN VOICE:

I think we are aware of that.

At the outset ...
Some of us more than others.
-
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(Laughter)

ASSEMBLYr1AN COSTA:
MR. ELBRECHT:

That's correct!

It is important to make a distinction between

the design of mortgage instruments for use tomorrow, and the rights and
obligations of lenders and home mortgage borrowers under mortgages made
yesterday and in past years.

The subject that we wish to address is

mortgage instrument design, the crafting of tomorrow's home finance
process.

There is a mutuality of interest among lenders and consumers

in formulating workable rules that will allow homes to be built,
purchased, financed, and occupied.

Unless workable rules are fashioned,

tomorrow's consumers, our children and others, and ourselves when we
move, will not be served.
The issue concerns assumability of mortgages.

If the

mortgage is assumable, a subsequent buyer can purchase the property
without having to procure a new first mortgage loan.

The buyer can

assume or purchase the property subject to the existing mortgage,
paying the difference between the loan balance and the agreed purchase
price to the seller, either in cash or by means of second-lien note
or deed of trust or a combination.

The entire unpaid balance under

a mortgage that contains a legally enforceable due-on-sale clause
is due upon any sale of the property.
There are basically two ways in which a mortgage may be
assumable by the purchaser.

The mortgage itself may have no due-on-

sale clause, and in that event, the duration of the mortgage will
depend on the term of the loan, whether one year or five, ten, twenty
or thirty years or longer.

In that kind of a mortgage, a sale will

not result in a termination or acceleration of the loan.

And a new

buyer will be able to assume or purchase the property subject to
such mortgage.
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A mortgage may also be assumable even if there is a due-onsale clause declaring that it is not.

The due-on-sale clause may be

legally unenforceable in the context of an ordinary sale of the
property -- if the mortgage is made by an institutional lender to an
ordinary purchaser.

That is roughly the present California rule as

articulated by the California Supreme Court in the case of Wellenkamp
vs. Bank of America.

That rule in effect says that all mortgages are

assumable.
In deciding whether the present California rule should
remain in effect -- that is, whether California law should require
that in the future all newly made home mortgages must be assumable
by subsequent buyers -- it is important to identify the relative
importance and true value of assumability to the buyer who procures
and pays for such a mortgage, and then to assess the costs that are
likely borne by such buyer in exchange for the assumability feature.
Like most benefits that the law requires one private individual or
firm to confer on another, the consumer benefits from what is

r~quired,

but the consumer, or consumers generally, usually pay a little more
as a result, or the property or service to which the benefit is
attached is no longer provided in the market.
In the case of mortgage assumability, the homeowner who
is able to procure an assumable loan clearly has something of value
because of that fact.

Other things being equal, an assumable loan

is a better loan from the consumer standpoint than a loan that is
not assumable.

But in exchange for the assumability feature there

are costs and burdens which the person who procures and pays for an
assumable loan must beat and in the future may be required to bear
to a much greater extent than before.
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In short there is no free lunch.

tant then to idcnti

It is

these costs and burdens,

and to attempt to measure their weight before reaching a decision on
whether California law should continue to require that mortgages must
be assumable.

There are a variety of other mortgage contract terms

in addition to assumability that are of equal and probably greater
importance to the ordinary consumer.
One obvious term is the actual cost of the mortgage, the
mortgage contract interest rate.

Indeed, the interest rate is probably

the most important mortgage contract term of all, because it in turn
determines the amount of the monthly payments, or, in some proposed
mortgages, the amount of the owner's net proceeds following sale.
Another important mortgage contract term is the duration
of the mortgage.

Mortgages can be of any term, whether one year, five,

ten, twenty or more.

If the duration is only five years instead of

thirty years, the buyer who assumes an assumable mortgage will only
enjoy the benefit of the mortgage until the expiration of the five
year term.

Assumability does not mandate that the mortgage remain

effect beyond its stated term, only that it is not due upon sale.
Another important mortgage contract term is the possibility

I

of, and especially the limits on, interest rate variability.

A buyer

who procures or assumes a mortgage whose interest rate floats with
the market without limits in effect commits himself or herself to pay
current market interest rates all the time.

And a buyer from such a

person will gain nothing from assumability other than an assured source
of credit.
The interest rate adjustability clause, if present, may be
more important than the initial interest rate itself.
A buyer who values assumability can expect to pay something
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for the assumability option

terms of either initial interest rate,

or a shorter loan term, or a greater range of variability in the
interest rate with perhaps no limits at all, or some combination of
~ach

of these.

That is because the assumability feature increases

the lender's risk, and lenders will seek compensation for the extra
risk or require some sort of a hedge against the losses that may
result.

Another possibility is that lenders will conclude that it

is simply too risky to make home loans and will withdraw from the
market.
Assumability increases the lender's risk because few
purchasers remain owners for as long as thirty years.
frequently -- on the average about every five years.

People move
Prior to the

Wellenkamp decision, California mortgages had an average life of some
seven to twelve years.

Hence, while the buyer has an option to remain

owner under the same loan for as long as thirty years, the fact that
the loans were due on sale meant that the average maturity of the
home mortgage loans in a lender's portfolio was considerably less.
That in turn reduced the lender's overall risk.
By increasing the probable average duration of home mortgages
from seven to twelve years, to fifteen or twenty years or more,
assumability as mandated by the Wellenkamp decision has radically
increased the lender's risk that increases in market interest rates
will lower the relative yield on its mortgage loan portfolio to the
point where it will not have funds sufficient to pay competitive rates
to its depositors.

If and when that happens, depositors withdraw

their funds.
Looking to the future, it appears that lenders, to protect
themselves, will attempt to compensate for and hedge against the
-
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risks resulting from the assumability of home mortgages,
which is now mandated

the Well

decision, and at times will

withdraw from the long-term home finance market.
One possible, indeed likely, response to a continuation
of legally mandated assumability in California, will be somewhat
higher interest rates.

Lenders and investors in the secondary market

will seek a higher return, if they can, in exchange for the greater
sk.

A more likely, indeed certain, response by lenders to a

continuation of mandated assumability in California will be shorter
loan terms -- for example, three-year to five-year roll-over mortgages
without a provision for refinancing.
Another equally probable response to a continuation of
legal

mandated assurnability in California will be a greater

proliferation of adjustable rate mortgages in which there is little
or no

res~raint

on changes in the contract interest rate.

If mortgages

continue to be assumable, lenders will not feel secure against major
long-term changes in market interest rates unless the mortgages provide
interest rates will float with the market.

Lenders will be

more hesitant about making fixed rate mortgages, or adjustable rate
mortgages with reasonable caps on changes in the interest rate.
assurnabil

is mandated, uncapped adjus

If

le rate mortgages are

more likely to become norm in tomorrow's home finance market.
Consumer interests have consistently opposed mortgages
with little or no restraint on changes in the contract interest rate.
It would be tragic and ironic if, in an attempt to preserve assurnability,
more important issue of interest rate variability, and the
importance of limits thereon, were forgotten.
From the perspective of the individual horne mortgage borrower,
-
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the buyers main interest is in the procurements of the credit needed
to purchase and own a home at a cost that is affordable in both the
short and long term.

If the loan is good for only five years, or

if i t costs more it should, or if the cost could increase dramatically
as a result of changing economic conditions, those are features most
consumers would deem worth avoiding even at the cost of losing the
assumability feature.

Few consumers, we feel, would want to preserve

assumability at all costs.
While the right and opportunity to sell one's home is
important, it must be considered along with the right to own and
live in one's home without confronting the need to refinance after
five or seven years or to risk having to pay extraordinary increases
in the interest rate.

While both are important, it seems clear that

the principal focus should be on the design of a mortgage instrument
that is affordable during the period when the owner is living in the
~

house.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

In your statement so far, you have not

stated if that particular lender wanted to stay on the loan and
increase the amount as an option he would have at the market place,
rather than be penalized for extending the same loan to a new buyer.
MR. ELBRECHT:

Well, our recommendations on Page 19 are

that instead of making the entire unpaid balance due upon sale,
perhaps the mortgage should give the new buyer an option to take over
the existing loan, and should give the lender the option to increase
the interest rate upon transfer to the lender's then current mortgage
contract interest rate.

That is one of the suggestions we proffered

to the committee.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Sort of a blending?
-
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MR. ELBRECHT:
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

That's correct.
I think that your testimony is almost

over now, but the thing that I am really interested in and perhaps
your department could develop or maybe some of the other witnesses
is this, and I think this is probably the basic question that the
co~~ittee

has to look at.

st of all, for the average person

that assumes a loan, what is the average assumable part of that loan,
like is it 40 percent of the whole purchase price on an average 50
percent

we know that it is only some percentage of what the total

cost is.

And then, what happens to the average consumer in the market

place on the rest of that credit?

What do they have to pay for the

rest of that credit, because what I'd like to know, is are we better
off ending assumability of loans and requiring the people to get new
loans at X amount of interest from the savings and loan or bank or
mortgage broker, and would an average person be better off doing that
than assuming the loan and having to get very expensive interest and
maybe being worse off in the end financ
MR. ELBRECHT:
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
you know,

Well, what we wou

commend to the Legislature ...

I would like to know the facts on that,

is happening, factual

us is more or less
but

ly.

theory behind all

e what you have given
s,

and that is valuable,

is something that the committee is pretty much aware of.
MR. ELBRECHT:

Right.

Well, the consumer who assumes a

loan will typically execute a second mortgage as part of a creative
financing type of arrangement to pay the difference, and perhaps add
some additional cash in the transaction.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

We are not suggesting ...

Lending out at the higher interest rate

at the expense of someone else, is that what you are saying?
-
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MR. ELBRECHT:

I say, this is what consumers are doing

today.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Most secondary financing is at a higher

interest rate, so that people who are advancing that money are
strongly supportive of the continuation of that Wellenkamp decision.
Nobody is benevolent enough to say in view of the fact that there is
a big first on it, and the seller who owns that property adds a
premium to the sales price to that house, because he's got a great
first loan, and then the broker -- the real estate broker

who

enjoys six percent of the $200 thousand level, he's going to squawk
about doing anything that would modify that schedule or anything that
would modify that assumability of an existing loan.

And in many

instances, finds a secondary market that goes somewhere between 18
and 21 percent as a convenience to the prospective purchaser of that
house.

These terms, I think, should always be clarified.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Well, the public is under the impression

that assumable loans are a good thing because you get into a new
house easier and you pay less interest, but what I am asking is, in
fact is that true.

Could it not be true that the average person

really gets bilked by this type of a situation because although they
may have a lower interest assumable, they end up by necessity getting
a much higher interest loan to make up the difference and, therefore,
are really worse off than they would be if we ended assumable loans.
MR. ELBRECHT:

In many cases, the seller who owns property

with an assumable loan will be, in taking back the secondary financing,
charging a higher rate •..
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

. .. and in addition ... the seller will

charge more for the home to begin with because it has an assumable loan .••
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MR. ELBRECHT:
Chairman.

I want to c ari

one point though, Mr.

We are not suggesting that the rights and obligations of

the lenders or borrowers under mortgages that have already been made
We are talking about crafting mortgages for use in the
future.

We are talking about tomorrow's mortgages.

We are talking

about mortgage instrument design, and our suggestions to the
Legislature that that assumability not be part of the home finance
process refers to new mortgages that are made tomorrow.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Talking about the future is something we

would all like to have the luxury of, but we have to deal with an
existing problem that, at least in large part, deals with what has
happened in the past.
ASSEMBLYMAN RICHARD ROBINSON:
point.

I think the chairman has a key

You are suggesting the, that the Wellenkamp decision be in

effect for all existing loans?
MR. ELBRECHT:
s

Our concern is this, Mr. Robinson, that the debate over the

past, over

s of homeowners, borrowers, and lenders, and
made

•

We don't have any position on that point,

the 1940's, 1950's, 1960's and 1970's not interfere

the enormously important process of crafting the home finance
process tomorrow ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
stion.
provision.

. .. (Inaudible) by even that

Most of that paper includes a due on sale clause
I think we are talking about contract rights, that the

on sale provision is included within most of those contracts.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

You cannot look at the future without

the past because these are ongoing instruments that include both.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
-

Mr. Chairman, as I understand it,
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though, I mean their recommendation is that we not tamper with the
past, that we change, in effect, repeal Wellenkamp for the future,
that we allow the new buyer to assume the mortgage.
what you might call an administrative assumption.

However, that's
I mean, he is

going to get the rates updated to what the rates are now.

You are

going to limit the cost of assumption to just administrative costs.
That, I suppose largely, is kind of a political judgment.

It is

virtually impossible to affect the past anyway.
MR. ELBRECHT:

That is the focus of the controversy

surrounding the Wellenkamp decision.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Members of the Legislature, among

others, are keenly aware of the controversy that this has aroused
and the fact that it is very difficult politically to take something
away from people that they have.

Vested interests of any kind are

almost impregnable.
MR. ELBRECHT:

Actually, sir, this statement is a plea not

to let that controversy prevent the Legislature from acting
constructively in terms of crafting tomorrow's finance process.
And our department has concluded that for tomorrow, assumability is
not in the interests of the consumers, and therefore that's why we
are suggesting that the Legislature consider modifying the Wellenkamp
decision prospectively only.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
there.

You are walking a very narrow line

You are talking about hundreds of billions of dollars that

are tied up in this paper.

That has been a windfall.

That money is

not going to be freed, and so therefore we are not going to resolve
the housing problem.

You talk about interest rates, and I disagree

with Mr. Papan's assumption, but you are certainly talking about the
-
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of

that are ava

being

you haven t

for the
so

Without that

ng.

You might mislead

s that there is go

a lot of these

that money is not

lable

to be money

lable because it's tied up.

I

mean, you have to understand the whole ..
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

... the pra

a

homeowners are

1 side being that present

on the young who are trying to find

homes.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
subs

the young

zed

Present homeowners are being

s who are successful in finding homes.

I were just

Mr.
around e

notes.

percent.

and
who goes out

We are be

buys a

is no question ... I have been

at some homes myself

, and I can see what assumability

can be a

I have to say that as

and selling homes.
li

assumable at
course, as

e

, that frank

If you have an $80 or $10

deal.

a much bigger factor insofar

ng a $2 0 or $250 thousand house with a
and as

$30 or $ 0

However,

the loan is, that you can assume ...

If you are talk

•

become

t to the

as

subsidized by the young

at 16, 17 and 18 percent ...

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

does, and how

We both have old mortgages

or
has gone

doesn't mean a

mortgage that is

percent that means a great deal.

But of

, one would suppose that assumability

becomes less and less important on those old loans, at least if you
assume

continuation of

then,

all of these recess

ng
res

I mean if you double the value

1

economists say is not
e the value of existing

If you were to

how important is it to anybody

s even by 30 or 40

-

4

that there be assumability ...
MR. ELBRECHT:

Surely, the old assumable loans are going

to become less and less important as real property continues to
appreciate in nominal terms, and also as creative financing, perhaps
when people begin to look at it a little more carefully, isn't as
readily available as it has been in the last two or three years.

As

a result of some of the cautions that we are expressing here today, if
the people take account of them I think that people will be a little
more careful either as lenders or borrowers, in utilizing three-year,
four-year, five-year balloon-payment notes.

I think that as Mr. McAlister

has indicated, the Wellenkamp issue, in terms of mortgages already in
existence, is going to recede in importance.

Many of those loans will

be repaid when owners procure new financing, new financing under either
new fixed-rate mortgages or adjustable-rate mortgages made by lenders
tomorrow.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Mr. Elbrecht, I would like to thank you for

your testimony •.•
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
Mr. Chairman.

Let me ask him just for the record, too,

Did not Consumer Affairs come out against the Foran bill

that would have modified the Wellenkamp decision?
MR. ELBRECHT:
the Wellenkamp decision.

We opposed it.

The Foran bill did not modify

I am not aware that we were ever involved in

the Wellenkamp issue prior to today.

We did oppose the Foran bill on

the ground that it was premature and I think events have indicated that
it was.

It is not an instrument that would have been usable in the

secondary market ..•
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Has it grown to maturity in the opinion

of the Department now?
-
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of the consumers
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MR. ELBRECHT:

We would 1

of
our

those consumers?

We were

other witnesses

the payments, that

s and the Department's suggestions?

s

out there, what are

and to

people that have these balloons

that aren t able to

come due on

to have to take
of Consumer

do next year

do

aren't

we all know what

forward to these hearings,
s

We would be very delighted to

to utilize these hearings as factual

We have several

s, and I would like to

listen to the other witnesses today before proposing specific action.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
have we gone to thirty year loans?

Could I just ask a question?

Why

If you look at your tables on

paying off loans, you only pay about 15 percent a month more on a
loan of a given amount, on a fifteen year loan, than you do on a
thirty year loan, and yet you pay enormously more interest over that
thirty year loan.

Why have we done this?

MR. ELBRECHT:

These are simply steps to try to reduce the

monthly payment, and, of course, as you move from twenty to twenty-five
years, the reduction in the monthly payment becomes less, and as you
move to thirty years, it becomes even less, and if you are talking
about increasing the loan term from thirty to forty years, it results
in a miniscule reduction in the monthly payments.

Now we are talking

about negative amortization.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Mr. McAlister is leaving the impression

that it is totally ridiculous ... fifteen, maybe eighteen years ago, most
mortgages were seventeen years, and with the increase in the value of
property, they went to twenty years, twenty-five years, to thirty years.
I think we are fast approaching the time to lift the restriction to
something longer, because most buyers are concerned with the amount
of the monthly payment.

Any attempt to read a deed of trust that

lawyers drew up, most people would never understand.

The basics of it

is -- what does it cost me per month to move into that house?
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Look at your tables.

You extend

it beyond thirty years, you haven't reduced the payments enough to
make a bit of difference.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
not amortizing.

But the inflation offsets what you are

Those people buying houses with thirty and thirty-five
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them

year loans, if

more than

that

ive

s ago, the appreciation on

f s

he is not being credited

on
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
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ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

of course.

, we had a real traffic

At one

a new house, and we
I

can borrow more money?

up

were

I

of new houses.
l
s

we have on the cost of money,
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suf
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to be
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It

a

ASSEMBLYMAN

I

-
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cure ...
lly understand.

I think

your testimony has been essentially sound this morning.

The question

I keep asking is what about those balloon payments which are going to
start popping this year and next year?

Is there going to be a need

for foreclosure moratoriums and that sort of thing, and what is it
you are proposing, and your answer is ...
MR. ELBRECHT:

We haven't addressed that yet, but one

possibility would be a provision of law that would allow the homeowner
borrower to continue the existing payments at the then current interest
rate when the balloon comes due.

In effect, the holder of the balloon

payment mortgage would not have the right to foreclose, but would have
a right to a continuation of the existing payments -- perhaps at the
same interest rate, or perhaps at an interest rate that reflected the
current economic conditions.
your question.

That is simply an off-hand answer to

There are other possibilities, I am sure, too.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

My understanding that since the

primary thrust of the hearing is to really get down on the negative
possibilities of creative financing,

I would appreciate it if the

rest of the witnesses, rather than relitigating and redebating the
theories of rent control and interest control would focus in on the
short term, near term, and the long term solutions to ...
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

You take the practical approach to what

do we do right now.
MR. ELBRECHT:
general context.

We were asked to try to describe the

That is why we have avoided proposing specific

solutions.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

I think, though, that it would be a good

thing if your Department could develop some specific recommendations
on that because we know it is a freight train coming down the track and
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, that are being sold
today, we've assumed

that all creative financing involves a sale, but indeed most of
the ads that we see and the emphasis that we see, is on refinancing,
what the economists call monitizing one's equity -- get your money
out of your house by borrowing against it and then somehow you will
be able to pay it back.

And to be facetious for a minute, if any

member of the committee ever wanted to make three years go by very
quickly, the way to do it is to take out a three year second.

That

due date comes by awful fast.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
office.

Sort of like having a two-year term of

Those two years go by very quickly, too.
MR. FRANK:

I hadn't looked at it that way.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Chairmans of Boards have only

one-year terms.
MR. FRANK:

That's very true.

The whole aspect of creative financing rests on two
financial foundations.

One is the assumability of the old mortgage,

the so-called Wellenkamp decision, and the second is the premise that
within a short period of time, all of the indebtedness can be recast
into a new first.

That is the basic flaw that I think we have to deal

with here today, because I think that is a supposition that isn't
going to come about.

I suggest and see that Assemblyman McAlister

has today's Wall Street Journal ... there are three articles in there
that bear on the work of this committee.
article on creative financing.

One is an excellent

Second is an article that indicates

that the largest federal savings and loan association in the United
States will lose $80 million this year, which after hearing from the
realtors and other people about the greed of lending institutions,
hardly squares with greed.

And lastly, we see on the affirmation
-
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ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
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house.
MR. FRANK:
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is go
two cho
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is that

s
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, and therefore,
-
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will be fewer funds available

for mortgage lending;

or, they will be permitted to lend on any sort

of instrument and we will make higher yields on home mortgages and
we will be able to attract funds.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Mr. Frank, let me ask you sir, were you

lending in the money markets instead of real estate at any point in
the last five years and to what extent.
MR. FRANK:

No.

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Were any of the savings and loans doing

that?
MR. FRANK:

There were one or two ...

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Taking it in at five percent and putting

it out on the money market ...
MR. FRANK:

I understand.

There are 178 savings and loans

in California and I would say that one or two were doing that.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. FRANK:

That's all?

Yes, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

You are lending it in the money market.

A lot of them ...
MR. FRANK:
were arbitraging.

We are what we call arbitraging.

Some people

There were very few.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. FRANK:

... money into the money market?

They were doing it.

Well, that's what some people say.

say, well you are being a sucker to lend on mortgages.

Some people

We think that's

our function.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Well what you are saying, if President

Reagan's decontrols come through, that is probably what your industry
will do.
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MR.

FR~NK:

Yes.

We

to

1

Yes.

I

is

very regrettable.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Let me ask you, sir.

Have any of the

savings and loans proceeded to package the low interest bearing loans
and accept an offset in order to get it up to a level where a pro
purchaser would accept those in order to better improve your positions
and allow you the chance of capturing

a

MR. FRANK:

s higher interest?

There has been very

reason is that it is

of that and the

sting but a technical one, and that is

when we sell assets at a loss, we take the loss all at the time of
sale.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

How you measure the loss?

If the life

of that loan were five or seven years, you got the highest interest
rate in that period.

Is that computed

the loss?

MR. FRANK:

No.

ASSEMBLY~AN

PAPAN:

MR. FRANK:

Because we are at the mercy of regulators and

Why?

accountants.
ASSEMBLY~illN

PAPAN:

So you are saying government is hampering

your ability to respond to these market conditions.
MR. FRANK:

We have been, I

particularly asking

for four years now, that when you have a loss, on the sale of an asset,
you should be able to amortize that loss over the remaining life of
the asset had you continued to hold it.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Let me ask you the other questions.

Is there any effort by any of the savings and loans to end up as tenants
in the buildings they own so that we can again capture the money and
the cost connected with the buildings that institutions are putting up?
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MR. FRANK:

Yes, I

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

r of

MR. FRANK:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYM&~

PAPAN:

s and

general.

They are proceeding to do that?

They are beginning to market some of

back leases?

MR. FRANK:
here

is

Yes.

I can think of one

institution

the Bay Area that has sold something on the order of ten or

twelve

llion dollars of headquarters buildings, if you will, this

calendar year.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

How big a portion of the problem

is that, Lou?
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

I imagine they have billions tied up

real property that they are using in the course of business.
MR. FRANK:

It's a trade-off of course.

building, you have to rent
your funds.

back.

When you sell a

And then you pay more, but then you

It really is not helpful in the overall scheme

of things.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

We

, in some instances, the price

that you paid for the construction of those buildings, you are going
to make a prof

on it?

MR. FRANK:

Right.

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Okay, let me ask you this.

Your REOs

as affecting citizens, and that's a matter of public record, has that
seen an increase, and to what extent would you say for yourself and
in

the industry.
MR. FRANK:

Yes, the problem of bad assets is -- I don't

want to overstate it too much, but it is basically zero.

We have

not completed a foreclosure on any type of property in four years and
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a

I look at

ho

is not a

true
is

we

lions

we

of savers

ASSEMBLY~~N

PAPAN:

about impos

how do you

Another
over a

, as an academic que
f

excess of ten.

MR. FRANK:
for

Do you have a figure

mind and would you on

A well-run savings and loan, or indeed bank

matter would 1

to make at the end of the year one percent

more on its funds than the funds cost us.
success.

That's our measure of

on assets that's doing very

If we can make one

Very few institutions and hardly any banks and relatively very

few savings and loans did
1, one
you can stop
you

, some

-- if everybody had to live on that, what would your

that

we

period of

say we had laws of usury saying that

level that we once
was

want, need, deserve and

rate on

the

I

low yielding

last year.

, plus expenses more than

So we have to charge,
money cost us, if

money costing us more, I'm all for that.

But if

to put usury on one side of the balance sheet and say to
won't pay you the highest

the saver, "Well if this
rate, then call up Merrill Lynch,"
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

it won't work.

Let me ask you, sir.

Lending

whether they be banks or savings and loans, enjoyed in law, a limit
as to what you could pay depositors.

Did that come about as a result

of a kind of power that they wielded at one time?
MR. FRANK:

That's very difficult to say.

I think .that

helped, but I also think that there is a perception which a lot of
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le

s

1

funds is what

problems of the

led to

1920's and early 1930's.

You have

to take your choice.
ASSEMBLY~~N

PAPAN:

Sir, is there an effort by the savings

and loan industry that you know of, as well as the banks, in this
state and country, to try to get a handle on something that's gotten
loose, that conceivably is going to jeopardize the lending institutions,
depositors' money, and cause the kind of crisis that we have with
respect to the ability to borrow in your respective communities.
MR. FRANK:

Well, the banks are clearly thirsting for an

environment in which they can pay as much for money as they have to.
Eighty to ninety percent of bank's loans now are variable.

In effect

a prime rate loan is a variable loan, so banks are wildly enthusiastic
about taking off all interest rate limits.

Savings and loans which

traditionally lent on fixed rate long-term assets say that we need
some help, so there's a real dichotomy, but that horse is out of
the barn.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Does your savings and loan sell

U.S. bonds?
MR. FRANK:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Is there a built-in interest on those

U.S. bonds?
MR. FRANK:

U.S. Savings Bond?

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. FRANK:

Right.

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Would you consider them the worst

investment going?
MR. FRANK:

They are certainly not the best.
-
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AS
you

Let

to cash those

i

to s

MR. FRANK:

I

on

so.

A

certainly would be
in early.

You must

one

frustrated

is

and on the

if

?

ill advised to buy one if you wanted to
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

a

to

all

can for you,

, the same government, ours, is trying to

u.s.

slip it to the people that are buying
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

bonds.

It's a gross

inconsist~ncy,

it's

inconsistencies.

The

we shouldn't tolerate.
MR. FRANK:

are a lot

st inconsistency I see, and I even see
you don't mind

saying so, a lack

that the borrower pays with what

in the committee if

understanding of the amount
saver earns.

They are inextricably

linked and there's no way of getting around linkage.
to our saver over the long haul what
and if the saver knows, as he knows

s

the more money you make, that af

borrower is

We can only pay
lling to pay,

now, that the shorter you
the coloration of our

business.

I

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

You were locked into long term turnover

for the most part five to seven years?
MR. FRANK:

Well, we wish they were five to seven years.

ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:

Are you afraid that your industry is

going to be absorbed now that there have been some new federal regulations
that I haven't had a chance to examine.

Within the next four years is

it not possible that many of the savings and loans that we have will
be absorbed by these large banking institutions for survival?
MR. FRANK:

You see, what I think is one of two things
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11

, and both

what

11

committee is looking into.

bad

the point of view of

Either we'

be absorbed by large

1 banks or we'll become large commercial banks, one or the
We're being told unequivocally by this administration, we want
to be banks.
morning,

11

Indeed, our regulator, as the Journal said this

I want my members to be banks."

Whether or not we're

absorbed is a matter only, I suppose, of concern to us and our
stockholders, but from a public policy point of view we will no longer
have an institution that's confined to making mortgage loans.

I make

speeches to builders and I use to make them to realtors before Mr.
11

s and I tangled.
ASSEMBLYMAN PAPAN:
MR. FRANK:

You're not alone.

Thank you, and I always say two things.

make mortgage loans for two reasons:

We

one, because it's the right,

decent, the human, the American thing to do, and two, because we're
not permitted to make any other loans (Laughter).
s in the financial cycle when
loans.

economic sense to make

Every Western country has a lender that's confined

to making mortgage loans.
that.

isn't

There are many

This country, this year, is going to

I think it's a great error, and it's a particularly

great error for those people who have short-term seconds, thirds and
fourths that they're blithely thinking that they're going to refinance,
because they're not.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

What do you think on that point, Mr.

Frank, is going to happen in terms of the same question that I put
to Mr. Elbrecht?

In '79 when the market got tight and the sort of

arrangements of creative financing that we've been discussing began
taking place with the two and three year balloon date, those loans
-
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were is
'82 and

7

83.

se

81

s the

sture of our

come up
MR. FRANK:

to

to
se loans refinanced?

1,

one of two things.

we'll say that we don't have the
say

to be expens

s

ASSEMBLY!4AN COSTA:
MR. FRANK:
to o

Well

'81,

IS

because
How

s are expensive.
sive?

today

two and a half year

case, or we'll

are authoriz
accounts at the compounded rate

of 17.4

That's what we pay the saver today.

to be able to

thee

light

And we'd 1

11, etc., so you have to add

on to that, and when you

something on to that it gets

to be such a high interest rate that ...
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

are you talking about, guesstimation?

Twenty percent?
MR. FRANK:
ASSEMBLY~~N

to 20
COSTA:

T~at

MR. FRANK:

costs

?

If these rates

don't seem to be a big factor
what

would be the cost of refinancing,

of a new

ef

which is monstrous.

the state.

which is a po

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

the way they are.

Points

Most institutions charge

to a point and a half.

Let me ask you one other question, and

I'll let you-- I know you're probably famil

with

--a program

that Fanny Mae is currently undertaking, which in effect allows them
a chance to upgrade their portfolios by wrapping around the old
existing loans with a new one to blend in the two rates between the
old and the new ...
MR. FRANK:

Right.
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COSTA:

ASSEMBLY~illN

's applicable

1

is.

Do you

s situation or would provide any relief?

MR. FRANK:
rate would make a
was

..• on a

Yes I do.

I think a blended rate or melded

of sense, particularly if the entire mortgage

on a new

, which goes without saying.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Yes I

And with that new instrument, would

you -- the Department of Consumer Affairs indicated that we should
eliminate the Wellenkamp decision prospectively, in other words,
future.

And this sort of blended rate ••• if we establish that

sion in California, allow that to occur on those new loans ...
MR. FRANK:
for all concerned.

I think it would probably be the best solution

It wouldn't be a very happy solution for anybody

concerned but it probably would be the

st one.

We would make less

on our money than we could if we lent at a market rate and the borrower
might be temporarily better served by keeping the old first mortgage.
But I

, really, we have an obligation --we've got hundreds of
, if not in the low mi

ions of people who have balloons

coming up, and we've got to figure out a way to serve those people.
We're part of

s community.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Do you think a blended rate offers that

opportunity to refinance those loans and would give a new loan, as
well, at the same time.
MR. FRANK:

I understand.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

That's ending the -- or hopefully ending

the situation that we're currently in.
MR. FRANK:
that I'm talking about.

I think it would defuse that ticking time bomb
It's not the happiest of solutions but it's
-
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ASSEMBLYMAN
what

STER:

of

of

I mean

are you

, halfway in

between?
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
is 80

of

the

1

Mae program is,

down on

the current:.

trust

rates

loan.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

How do you determine what is the

s
MR. FRANK:

s.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

. FRANK:
as that
what

now.

Mae has a

Well,

Western

I guess

is.

1

that

a program

st answer I can give you is

re

at 12 1/2.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

You mean if

old rate was

and the new is 16, they go to 12 1/2?
MR. FRANK:

That's right, they re just saying to a group

of loans which I think average less than 10, that whatever you
refinance will beat 12 1/2.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. FRANK:

And the 12 1/2 is a variable?

Yes, then it'll be variable.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

So you'll take your fixed rate,
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percent loan convert to a 12 1/2
MR. FRANK:

That's right!

rate.
That's part of the consideration

for the lender is to change the form of the note.

As I say it's not

a very happy situation.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Mr. Frank, do you agree that there's

a concept known as reindustrialization going on, and it's been a
conscious national policy to divert money into cost plus loans?
MR. FRANK:

I absolutely do!

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. FRANK:

Absolutely!

So it's a conscious policy.
There is nothing but dry eyes

in Washington at the lack of hammers hitting nails.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

What percentage of the total monthly

borrowing that's going on in the total economy, what percent of the
borrowing is being done by the Feds or the Federal Government, half,
a quarter?
MR. FRANK:

Well, let's think for a minute

the corporate

calendar is about $25 billion, the federal government is running a
of $60 odd billion.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

You're talking per year or per

month?
MR. FRANK:

Per year was your question.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Twenty-five billion dollars for

commercial?
MR. FRANK:

For a corporate, right!

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. FRANK:

Sixty billion dollars for the Feds?

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

The Feds are borrowing two-thirds

of the capital available ...
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ASSEMBLY~~N

$25

st

on

Is

$25 • excuse me Mr. Frank

cal

Is

a l

of

is

1

s

s?

to

No.
bonds

's

market.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

So

s

MR. FFANK:
doesn'

count
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

?

MR. FRANK:

s.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

So

New corporate bonds.
total borrowing of the money

would go to
sort of

and

1

MR. FRANK:

lls
are

Now if you just take just

there are many other sources.
, and

•

I mean you've

se two

I

state

l

've got

s

The

are easi

're

Brothers and I'll be

to

of Salomon
some.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

What I'm just

to

out is

who is draining down the available mortgage .•. who's draining down
the available lending capacity?
MR. FRANK:

Well,

me -- I hate to bring up an extraneous

point, I hope it's not extraneous and that is this.

You have competition

the mortgage market between people seeking to refinance and
seeking to buy a home.

And unfortunately in this country the
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more money you

the

you're

, the more Uncle Sam

towards your housing cost, which is fairly zany, I think.

So,

if somebody is in a high bracket and they want to refinance, take
money out of their home, they can do so more easily than a young
, because a young couple is only paying 30 percent marginal
tax rate whereas the other person is paying 50 to 70 and so they can
afford it more.

So you have competition even within the pool of

money between people refinancing and people buying a home
the first time, and I'm concerned about the latter.

I think we

need to do something about that, but not on a state level;

it's a

1 matter.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Just one more thing, sir, from

industry's point of view should the balloons start to pop in excess
of

amount -- would a moratorium on your foreclosures be supportable
the industry?
MR. FRANK:

Well, I don't want you to be misled.

The problem

foreclosures for first mortgage lenders is nil because our mortgages
are at

low balances and even those mortgages where the person

isn't making the payment, the second, thirds and fourths are making
the payments for him or her.

So we have no problem and don't visualize,

can't possibly visualize any problem.

I mean, my own institution, we've

got 60 thousand loans and they probably have an average balance of
40 to 45 thousand dollars.

So you're not going to have any institu-

tional foreclosures on first mortgages at all no matter how many
balloons pop.

What you're going to have is investors in these seconds,

thirds and fourths getting brutalized, and many of them are people that
should have never been in them in the first place.

And you're going

to get homeowners who are going to be dispossessed, but ...
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
then

would you

would you

st

're not directly affected,
committee do or what kind of

would be appropriate from a consumer protection point

of view for both those lenders and those borrowers that are going to
be

ed on, or could possibly be foreclosed on?
MR. FRANK:

I really don't know!

I just wondered if I could just add thirty seconds of some
specific statistics which might be helpful to you and that is the cost
of the Wellenkamp to us.
month.
have

We have about 15 million assumptions every

We have about two and a half billion loans and if we didn't
, we would have additional income somewhere around $20 million

a year, and of course it builds up each and every year.

If we had

$20 million more in income we could pay one percent more on all of
our savings, which would be that much more attractive and which would
bring in that much more

new savings, which would mean that much

more money going out on the mortgage market.

And so we hear some

of these theoreticians saying and the realtors, I'm sorry to say,
saying

short-term Wellenkamp doesn't

our abi

to bring

anybody, but it saps

new money, and it really does cost us a lot

of money, and the less money we bring in the more we have to charge
for what we have.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Is there any comparison on that one

point in those states that have not had Wellenkamp, because there is
only ten that have had a sort of a nullification of a due-on-sale
clause?
MR. FRANK:

I don't know, Mr. Costa.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

I don't know of any.

Mr. McAlister.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

What were those figures again on
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as

?

MR. FRANK:

We

15

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

of loans assumed per

fteen million dollars worth of

loans •..
MR. FRANK:

So that would

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
MR. FRANK:

11

$180

a year.

That's your company?

Just ours, so

would be about six to seven

our portfolio every year that instead of being paid off
is assumed.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
possibi

On

int you raised earlier

of most of your institutions either being

by or becoming banks, isn't

more or less inevitable?

mean with the current economic phi
il

iod of time, with the increased emphasis on

a
1

and

almost

peop e.

I

mean

I

and

and

't

even

more

are diver

fied.

accepting

They loan to all kinds of

one basket in essence.

Sir, I don't want to

would be excellent for my

--

everybody else's

t that be to your benefit

You've got all your eggs
MR. FRANK:

competition, isn't

enterprise
I

se,
fit?

that I think is going to

you in anyway.

s

and for me personal

my stockholders to have a wide open range.

I just don't

it's in the interest of public policy to go away from having
specialized lenders.

Almost two-thirds of all the people in this

country own their own homes and they do it because two-thirds of
them

loans from savings and loans which weren't permitted to

make any other kind of loan.

I think from a public policy point of
- 64 -

s an error,
can stem the
won't be very

is go

, and I don't think we

It'll be fine for the institutions.

It just

for the home buyers.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
be

to

Well at least the loans that would

, I mean assuming if there still are going to be any home loans,

I mean they would be made by ... they'd be spread out over a host of
financial

tutions that didn't have all their eggs in one basket.
MR. FRANK:

CONOCO today.

But sir, just take today.

Dupont is buying

They need to borrow seven billion dollars, and they're

lling to pay at today's rate at 21 l/2.percent for that money
because they

they can leverage it.

There is no home buyer that

can afford the 21 1/2 percent, so the home buyer is going to be outbid.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
process of deregulation.

But deregulation •.. we're in the

You're going to have to pay more money to

get your money and I mean you're not •.. I don't think we can go back
to where we were five years ago.
MR. FRANK:

I agree totally.

happen under this administration.

•

We cannot, and it won't

We will be totally deregulated,

and it'll be fine for the institutions.

It'll just be horrible for

homebuilders and realtors and homeowners.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
well on formal testimony.

Mr. Frank, you were going along quite
It isn't written, but do you have further

testimony?
MR. FRANK:

No sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

I know that.

Mr. Robinson.

No, I mean

this is very fast, and I just wanted to be sure you got out what
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to.
MR. FRANK:

You're

kind,

I've been here longer

I should
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
1

of que

I want to go back to Mr. Stirling's

that went to who was

a major factor in this s
go

I
, and

that

's where are the

would you say or do you know that money

market funds have had on

institutions in California, probably

and savings

both

loans?

You're competing, are you not,

se other types of innovative checking accounts for your
s

s, and your depos
MR. FRANK:

s trans

into housing?

It's pretty

to do it for California but

's easy to see what the
a

A bank is losing

at the

st cost.

flow of funds are.

's low cost savings and buying them back

In other words,

1 CD's to the money

market funds, so they're just dis

themselves.

's not true for savings and loans
s to
of

They don't

savers.

The average increase per week of money

in the last year to year and a half has been over two
dollars a week.

1

and large.

But

so their experiencing a change

stment by

market

Take

stments.

And money market funds

In round terms.

a variety of

about 40 percent goes into CDs, about

20 percent goes into commercial paper and bankers acceptances, and
the remainder goes into a treasury and agency securities of shortterm.

They have an average maturity of somewhere around 23 days,

money market funds.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Their yield, what would you say

the average yield of the major money market funds are, Mr. Frank?
- 66 -

MR. FRANK:
about --

Well the

s

money

funds makes

f a point, so after costs I guess they'd

make about a

But of course .••

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
I'm looking at it from

Then no, that's not what I'm saying.

standpoint of the investor, a deposit with

you or a passbook account with you as against the attractiveness of
23 days

rollover in money market funds.
MR. FRANK:

Right.

He's getting the advantages of an

inverse yeild curve where the shorter the maturity the higher the
yie

, and

's taking the risk that the yield curve will change and

that he won't be able to lock in funds that are a higher rate for
a longer period of time.

It's a trade-off, and thus far the trade-off

has been to the advantage of the person who's stayed short.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

But even the large ones, such as

Merrill Lynch's, are they not yielding better than 17 percent?
MR. FRANK:
to 17 3/4 percent.

Yes, most of them are yielding about 17 1/2

As I say a two and a half year account today is

yielding on a compounded basis on 17.4, and I think that we'll start
to see a substantial inflow into those accounts -- the rates came

•

out yesterday -work, and that

people who think that the Reagan program will
st rates will come down and so on.

In 1975,

when the yield curve changed from being inverse to being positive
the money market funds lost 40 percent of their funds in a six month
period, because they could no longer pay the higher rate.

And without

any malice I wouldn't mind seeing that happen again.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

But would it be fair, and this is

my last question, be fair to say that that is a bigger problem in
today's housing market and availability of funds in the housing market
-
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Ca i

stment is more

?

than
MR. FRANK:
t.

I can't ... I'd 1

to

They are inextricably

now when we can
s,

you but I
Let's just take two years

1 pay anything we want to

a bank will make a deal

almost any

Dupont at 21 1/2 percent

two points off for expenses and profit and bid 19.
on
po

And even

new money, if we lend at 16, 17 or 18 percent and take two
s off we'll only be able to bid 14 or 16.
may

which institution

There isn't much doubt

get the most funds and so the

are
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Along those 1

Dupont loans, for

s, just one quick question.

, it seems to me that these corporate

take-overs that are happening now probably have an adverse affect on
st rate.

Are those short-term

MR. FRANK:
or

loans, though?

They vary.

they call revolvers

or both, and many of them are
When you

some are

of indebtedness, some f

and seven years,
a bank, that's a

a 1

, some variable, some short, some

, some non-prepayable, some prepayable.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

a

So that could

affect

money availability I would think.
MR. FRANK:

Oh, I'm sure of it.

I would think that savings

loans would lend us here in California something on the order of
$15 to $18 billion, and the Dupont loan alone is half of that.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. FRANK:

What'd you loan last year?

I believe around $25 to $28 billion.

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Are there further questions?
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ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Just one.

off from what Mr.

and Mr. Bosco stated, I m

of the Housing Committee.

Obviously my concern is to try to provide
housing for the citizens of this state.

goal of attainable
From your comments and from

comments I've had with officials of

stration it's extreme

clear to me that there is a fundamental

, that housing no longer

has

terms of investment capital, and of course it's
to make

average person understand the necessity of investment

when you're trying to explain to them how they can get into
house when they need to get into that house.
and
My

And public awareness

is difficult at best on these sorts of complex issues.
stion to you is since

s is really, when the train's going

this way, I mean it's real clear to everybody, what do we do in
California, particularly, on those things that in the Legislature
we have a chance to do -- to try to still provide some investment
capital for housing?

The creative

ing issue aside, how about

the new constructions, the stimulation of that building that is
necessary?

's some

about

Cal

Mae Program and other

I mean what's your industry see as any salvation

•

or hope besides becoming banks?
MR. FRANK:

Well, as I say, I'm the Chairman of the state's

Housing Finance Agency, I'm just as vitally concerned as you are.
Frankly, all of these suggestions ..• ! just dread saying this.

In

the light of today's interest rates and today's deregulation climate,
we are rearranging the furniture on the deck of the Titanic.
kidding ourselves.

We're

We're gimmicking around with all these things.

You cannot provide housing for people when the prime rate is 20 1/2.
You just can't.

And we can fool around, and we can do a little bit
-
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here, and there, but you can't.
done,

The other thing that I wish we'd

I wish we'd had free floating rates on mortgages as they do in

England and Canada.

If everybody in California paid the same rate

on mortgages today, old and new, the mortgage rate would be 12 1/2.
But unfortunately we've got people who are living next door to each
other, one person's got six and the other's got 18, and the only
difference between them, other than that, is that the one paid
three times as much for the house as the other.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

It's really unfair.

Mr. Frank, I'm going to get back to the

question I asked earlier of the other witness.
there really are no guarantees.

From what you say

The facts all point to the possibility

if more money were made available to banks and savings and loans,
they probably wouldn't get into the housing market, at least now.
MR. FRANK:

Well, we're seeing the all savers bill which

Assemblyman McAlister mentioned does carry with it a requirement to
75 percent of the net increase into housing.

That was something

some of us got the housing industry to tack on as a rider so at
our theory being if you have a tax incentive for savings it
should be directed into a specialized purpose.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
MR. FRANK:

But absent that type of tax incentive?

We've got another three and a half years ahead

of us of this administration's anti-housing bias.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Now let me ask you another question, and

I don't want to throw a curve, but I think it's important to this
Committee's deliberations.

If we did repeal the Wellenkamp decision,

I'm positive it would be a benefit to the savings and loans, but
would it be a benefit to homeowners and potential homeowners in
California?

Would the savings that you .•• or the additional income
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that

that you get as a result

ly show up in the form of

more housing, cheaper housing or whatever?
MR. FRANK:

I think you have to put strings on it from a

public policy point of view.

From my own institution's point of view

I d rather not, but I think you have to have strings on it.

And I

think this melded rate or blended rate that Assemblyman Costa spoke

•

of makes the most sense.

It assures that the refinance money will be

available, and it will be available at lower than market rate, yet
the institution gets a pick up in its income and a change in instrument.
I think it makes a lot of sense.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

But only in exchange for keeping it in

the housing.
MR. FRANK:

Right, right.

Oh yes, I think given a choice

right now with this pressure to pay interest rates to savers, an
institution given its choice will go to the highest rate investment
that it can make.

It'll have to.

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

It's interesting because other members of

the savings and loans industry, and I don't think they were trying to
be dishonest with us by any means, but, in all the testimony that we have
had on the Wellenkamp repealer, not only this year, but the last couple
of years, it was always put in terms

of more money for housing and

yet, nowhere did anyone suggest in the industry that what probably is
going to happen is that money will go elsewhere.
MR. FRANK:

But we are experiencing a rate of change in

regulation here that is phenomenal.

I am testifying this morning

about today's Wall Street Journal, and the Reagan administration
this morning came out in favor of deregulation of savings and loans.
To give the other witnesses the benefit of the doubt, there have been
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ever

s

f

as

have, as

se rates would stay up

as

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

have.
Well, Mr. Frank, isn't it true

as a condition of your state
of
of

assets

, you are required to have
ing?

So if

testimony was

basis of existing state law, it

mean no other

it to go.
MR. FRANK:

I'm not aware of that 80 percent regulation.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

MR. FRANK:

It's not regulation,

's a statutory

The Internal Revenue Service charges more taxes

below a certain level, but when you are not making any
, that's not much of a threat.
CHAI&V~N

BOSCO:

Thank you very much.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
were to decl
that

to

Would -- if the federal government

, say $40 to $50

ss than

a major impact on this

MR. FRANK:

It is

poss

is, is

cture?
, As

lyman, that

what we are reacting to is incredible mismanagement of the financial
s of

s country for the last

months to right
we are on

years, and it takes more
are

reputable people that

right track, and we are going to have stability,

we are going to have a positive yield curve, and just wait and see,
and yes, the medicine is bitter but it will cure, and we've all heard
se things a hundred times.
that could happen.

I think there's a darn good chance

I don't know how soon, but I think, I do

we are on the right track.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

The federal borrowing is still up.
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ROBINSON:

is go

to f

the

appropr
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
cuts, the fact

In

te of Reagan's valid budget

that the federal budget is higher this coming next

three years than

ever has been in the past and therefore the

of the federal borrowing encroachment of
credit is go

available

to be higher.

MR. FRANK:

Plus their interest rate assumptions.

For

every one percent of interest rate that they are off, it's another
$10

llion a year in the debt service, so right now, they are

estimating 10 1/2 percent and they are paying an average of 13 1/2
so there

$30 billion that is not in the budget.

change and I

they do.

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

But things can

Thank you very much.
Thank you very much, Mr. Frank.

We will take one more witness and then have lunch.

Mr.

Burton Fehrman who is an attorney whose practice is limited to
real estate and business matters and is editor of the Real Property
News

shed by the State Bar of California.

Thank you, Mr.

Fehrman for being here with us.
MR. BURTON FOHRMAN:

Thank you very much.

theory statistics -- I have none
practical.
years.

Rather than talk

those, I am only talking real wor

My practice is in Riverside and I have been there seventeen

I think that I have a good feeling for what is going on at the

grass roots level.

In addition, I have an opportunity as editor of

the State Bar realty publication to look at the situation on a larger
plane than just Riverside.

One of the reasons I believe that I was

asked to speak today is that a little over a year ago, I wrote an
article about creative financing.

-

In the Summer 1980 issue of the
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News, we

a

s

ex tens

dealing

we are
we are

't

talking about.

We

great accuracy

of the problems that exist today.

We

I

in
of

a

a copy of

Fall 1980 issue

with a lot
s.

believe

I

with

we

The reason I wrote the article is that suddenly I had
to me
I

ta

about

s great new thing

creative

was curious as to what the heck they were talking about.

the more I

more I talked to people, I found out

was absolutely nothing new.

People were do

ing up old devices,

real estate instrument, in order to provide short-term

, because I believe, as Mr
on a time bomb.
in

If there is no

near future,
on the bomb.
it or

starts to
losures.

Frank does, that we are
financing

bomb is go
Depending on

to go off.

Wellenkamp

you do with

it go on, that

'~

11 determine when the

will, in my opinion, be large scale
11 be drops

is going to foreclose.

pr

s

somebody along

That is the line of lenders, take

the properties over and try to market them for what they can to get
of them.
I believe that if you want to look to what you can do for
average person, you better start looking at what went on in the
depression era in terms of moratoriums, and other legislation that
was enacted to protect the average guy.
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Now when I talk about

at

s

,

I

seller
major

of

is

in

bomb

second trust

fth, tenth

trust

to go o

my

is another major real estate

much

s of the '60s.

of

what

get the

le issue by
it if

I

that are working on articles dealing with
is to

's a

11

I

than

have a

That

out to people.

self and I would 1

want,

I d 1

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

to

to

But

I'd be

to

a moment ..•

certainly isn't outs

the scope

of del
MR. FOHRMAN:
seller

show you how
to

bigger problem and I

more

invo

And

one example of one trans

that I am aware of
of the entire scope of

is a

the
ide and

order to

problem is and how many people are involved,

It's repre

It's

to stick with the

because I
are a

'd 1

Okay, but I

t some condominiums

has a very

st rate construction loan.

eking away at something like 24 percent.

The bank is on

s

back to sell those condos right now, and the longer he holds out the
worse shape he is going to be in.

He obviously wants to sell without

any conditions, but he can't find buyers who will not impose conditions
on their sale, or excuse me on their purchase.
permanent financing commitment.
that.

He has a 17 percent

The buyers are not willing to pay

So what is the builder doing?
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In order to move these condos

that he doesn't

he

of four
13

a condo

interest rate,

for three years.

years, it goes to the 17 percent.
to absorb the four percent.
today's market.

of is sel

to

He

of

s

s go

for $165,000.

At

He's digging

one form of

Now the condo

I'm

The people are putting down $35,000.

're getting financing on the first trust deed, and the seller
is

back a balloon

one enters the picture.
down the

, due

three years.

They are a retired couple.
1

Couple number

They own a small

newer, larger condominiums.

their condominium ten years ago

$39,000, their first

loan is down to $20,000, the market value today is $165,000.

trust

are tired of living in a small condo, they feel that they
to move into a bigger one, so
the

have placed their condo on

for $165,000, hoping to get $35,000 as a down payment so
can

turn go buy the new, big condo.

to buy the new, big condo,
sting condo.

When

was

on the sale of

The builder didn't like

ice because he has no other customers.

their

, but he had no

So these people put their

condo on the market at $165,000.
My friend, who is couple number two, is in a situation
where their children are grown.

They have all left the house.

They

are sitting in a big house and they're tired of taking care of it,
so they want to move into a condo.

It just happens in this particular

case that their house is worth $165,000.

Now they know they need

$35,000 to buy the little condo, so they are looking for a $35,000
And in order to make their deal work they are going to
-
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have

to

to

i

an a

I

can

not
So

trust

the

between

f

purchased
the same deal.

house,
a $25,000 first, they're

They're

to have $35,000 down;

number

Couple number three is coming

out to Riverside from Orange County because
Orange County.

need the big house.

They can't afford

All of

This is real life.

is

I'm talking about a situation

in Orange County, so they
of program.

these escrows are contingent upon one

on today.

three is selling to,

who

are squeezed out of

They have three little kids and they

house on some simi

are selling

somebody

I don't know
Orange

time home buyer.

who's stepping up, maybe they're the

I

they'll

fference.
Enter

the market

in the market.

back at 13 percent.

$45,000,

carry the

way

old $20,000, the $35,000

two, who have the

of

S

to carry back an al

down payment is all and they will carry

•

must

But

you can see what is happening, we are creating a domino effect.
each

of these escrows are contingent
to close.

All

they are all going

They all provide for sellers to carry back financing

with a three year balloon.

What's going to happen at the end of

three years, I don't know.

Everybody is banking on the fact that

there will be financing available and they can all refinance.

But

at the end of three years, if it's not there, we are going to have
a ripple effect all the way down the line.
number one domino.

What we have is the

In my case, I haven't gone beyond Orange County.
-
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two
we

a

of

Now

sures.

s time bomb is

to begin.

t

one

This one is

It's going to go on

years.

We don't

what will
MCALISTER:

ASSEMBLY~~N

there is nothing written down
must

Can I

ect here.

heaven that says

Of course,

everything

that there must be a savings and loan to come in and make that

loan at the end of three years.
to

11

s

mean that if all the sellers are

continue to carry the paper,
in

s

I

it can go on.

In fact,

interest to do that rather than to start

, isn't it?
MR. FOHRMAN:

That's right.

is one of the possibili

leads to -- earlier there was a question as to why aren't

In

a lot of foreclosures.
of reasons.

var

are not a lot of foreclosures for

One of them is

are enough
other, as
11

acco~~odate

are caught

, that

as

above

have

them.

Another thing
se peop

people are trying to work

, however, is that some of

s

order to meet

are going out and

are borrowing money for another year.

obligation

Earlier there was some

humor about a two year time limit or three year time limit.

Well

se people are going out today and borrowing money at 24 percent
paying 15 points to buy one more year's life.
not seeing some of those foreclosures.

That's why your

Another reason is that some

of those people who are on the other side, not seller financing,
but purchased a third, fourth, or fifth in order to save themselves
-
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are
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
no real

you described

for that

years the bui

has so

s

, if you assume in three

out his condos and he has released himself
, there is no real reason

him to not

and •••

MR.

8

FOHR~N:

That s

And

may set the ripple

out ...
ASSEMBLY~iliN

ROBINSON:

You have an emotional vender

You don't have everyone really in the same position.
very well need that money for
MR.
away

FOH~illN:

bank,

That

s next project.

That's right, or he might need it to square

'cause the bank may have advanced him money based

year pay-offs and he has nowhere to go.

upon those

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

's where the ripple starts as

well as stops.
MR. FOHRMAN:

That's

, and everybody down the line is

awful prospect of, which house do I protect, do
I

•

I'm in or do I protect the old house where

house

I had a lot of equity.

my own foreclosure and go back to

Do I

to work out of the problem.

my own house or do I try and do

Now that's going to be the emotional crisis that each of these people
will have to face.

In my particular situation, they all have such

big equities that my guess is that they are going to have to go back
and try and protect their old equities on the old houses.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Do you have any idea how wide-spread

you think these sort of circumstances are?
MR. FOHRMAN:

I think that we are talking about millions
-
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are

0

s.

CHAIRMAN

In Cal

MR. FOHRMAN:

In California.

Let me just ... I said I didn't

Maybe

some statistics, I have one.

to an

a

and he attended a
about how many

lions is too great.

of escrow associations

of escrow off

and

talked

, how many closings they had had

, as a group they had 150 closings.

I

them

the

Do you know how many there

were creatively financed by the means of all-inclusive trust deeds.
150.
i

All of them.

So I think that the point I'm trying to make

that everybody who has been selling a house in recent years, in

some fashion, is caught up in
the borrower.

the problem;

the seller, the buyer

We have to keep that in mind because what has

happened is that we have a lot of peop

out there advising people

to go into these quote "creatively financed deals" who don't understand
sks inherent in them, and there are many,
I'll try to deal
The
that

a couple of them in a moment.

if you were in

buyer

, you have the

's a purchase-money obligation and you are protected

-deficiency

by the

sks connected

slation.

The seller is not necessarily

protected, and we have situations where we have layers now of these
all-inclusive trust deeds.

I had somebody come to me recently

to purchase a home and the title situation was there was an
original first trust deed.

In the days before Wellenkamp, the people

tried to avoid the due on sale clause, so they entered into an installment
sale contract, a real estate installment sale contract.

That's level

number one.

Then when that person sold, they took back an all-inclusive

trust deed.

The property had been resold four times.
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We have three

of a

real estate

lment

contract.

no

I

terms

who is real

is at
The

who

on

ses

totem po

of him,

are all at

to

of

sk.

ses to pay

And

five

lender.

reason

are at risk, is that

trust deeds don't correspond in terms

.

are ahead of

come

the

promises to

s of these a

some

It's like a

person

person
And

sk.

due dates.

, let s say

some

I

It's a whole

s

.

three year
sh-mash.

le

'

And

we have a three
, the guy on the five

year is making

s payments on a

monthly basis, the man below

him suddenly has a balloon
pay.

The

llow who is

payments to pay

igation that he is to
the

now is making his regular

off.

loon says, "I can't, and even

llow
~f

s the three year

I could I don't own the property.

can't go out

I'm not
on

end says, "I

't want to hear about that.
in

my
to
Now what happens?

owner of

s ahead of me.

I've

s contract it says your
off."

Well, he can't.

What happens is somewhere along the line a

closure is going to begin, the buyer on the
the anti-deficiency legislation.

1 end is protected by

No matter what happens he is home

free, but the seller who relied upon whoever it was that told him to
go into the all-inclusive trust deed situation, he has no protection,
he is totally liable on that contract to his buyer.
perform and the buyer loses

If he can't

s home, he's going to sue the seller.
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se

is

around and says,

to an attorney and
because
you of the

do I sue?"

attorney is going to tell him,

broker did not proper

sks.
In

He's going to
11

You sue the

advise you, did not warn

11

article that I wrote, I

cted that the greatest

was going to come out of creative financing, was creative
1

and that's exact .•. This is going to be a relief act

attorneys.

I think that personally we've got to get out of Wellenkamp,

but we can't cut it off right now.
the answer.

I think the blended rate may be

We have to get these people out of the cycle.

a host of problems that have to be dealt with.
one

There are

Wellenkamp is only

of it.
We have to deal with the problems of all these all-inclusive

trust deeds, and what happens with the terms that don't track each

There is even a problem if the terms do track each other.
Let me point that out.
at $25,000 at s

Where you have an old first trust deed loan

percent interest, and the sel

carries back a

new all-inclusive trust deed that wraps around it for $75,000 at
13 percent interest in most cases it will provide for, let's say,
20 year amortization, or some other figure, all due and payable in
years.

What is happening is that the amortization level on

the $75,000, very little principal is being paid on that.

Where

you have the old $25,000 loan at six percent, it's an old loan.
A lot of principal is being paid on it.

Where we originally started

out with a 25/75 gap or $50,000, that gap is widening.

Nobody can

tell me who's getting the benefit of that principal reduction.

Is

the new seller/lender creative financer that is going to reap the
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that is
on

trust

It

In terms of legi
you

the payments

sn't been dealt

, I tried to

with.

about the things

do to try and work at handling some of the very practical
lems that are out there.

of

One of them is

land sale contracts out

can do about

•

ly

, there is nothing that

se, but for the last 15 years every article, every

author of every book that has dealt with
po

are still a lot

particular problem

out that they are a terrible risk, and if nothing else I

would l

a commit tee to

a look at that problem and eliminate

them out once and for all.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

These are contracts under which the buyer

does not receive
MR.

FOH&~N:

vs Lassen.

Does not receive title.

It began with

I thought they were dead for a long period of

when the Supreme Court had the Tucker vs. Lassen case that gave
the opportunity of avoiding due on sale on land sale contracts,
theysprang back.
1 using them.

•

They are sti

out there.

People are

The reasons don't exist to use them anymore, but

there is a tremendous danger, and
has title, the buyer does not.

me point out why.

Many of

The seller

se are not recorded.

What

happens if the seller dies, if there's a tax lien against the seller,
a judgment lien against the seller, the seller goes into bankruptcy?
There's a whole host of problems for that particular buyer, and
there's no good way to protect against it.

Even if the buyer is

successful, brings a law suit and is sustained, he is wiped out,
because we are talking about people with average homes.

Whatever

happens to the seller's title, as a practical matter, the buyer is
- 83 -

ously damaged.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

If the contract is recorded though,

those problems don't exist, do they?
MR. FOHRMAN:
creates a problem.

Well, maybe.

It's an impediment.

device that doesn't need to be.
long ago.
it.

Legal title still remains.

It

It's an outmoded, outworn

And it should have been wiped out

In the '60's there was some legislation that dealt with

It didn't go far enough, and I personally would like to see it

cleaned up once and for all.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
the Wellenkamp decision then.
MR. FOHRMAN:

It doesn't need to exist because of
It would be obsolete.

That's right.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

If Wellenkamp were wiped out, of course .•.

I guess if we wanted to fully address the problem, we'd either have to
decide to permit contracts of sale or to wipe them out along with
Wellenkamp.

Didn't the bill we were considering wipe out Tucker vs.

Lassen as well as?
MR. FOHRMAN:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

You mean that if you wipe out Tucker

vs. Lassen, you have to wipe out the land sale contract along with
it, because if you wipe out Wellenkamp and you don't deal with land
sale contracts, they'll be back full blown.
technical problems dealing with them.

There are a lot of other

They're just as bad from the

seller's viewpoint as they are from the buyer's.

The only point

I'm making is that we have a lot of unsophisticated buyers and sellers
who are being advised by people who have no concept of the risk inherent
in some of these devices.

We have the blind leading the blind, and

we need to try to get that cleaned up.
-
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is

on the all-inclusive trust deeds,

are a whole host of problems

to be dealt with, and

one of the reasons I'm zeroing in on all-inclusives, is that they,
opinion, are the most prevalent from of seller financing today.
there can be
f

amortizations.

slower than

under

lation

I

what happens under

If the all-inclusive amortizes faster or
, that has to be dealt with.

What happens,

and I think it is a real big problem, if the seller doesn't follow
through on his comiT,itment to make the payments?

In land sale contracts

there is legislation dealing with what you can and can't do with the
money.

There 1 s nothing on all-inclusive trust deeds.

I think that

there are situations where the money is not being properly applied.
The sellers are in a pinch themselves.

They start using the money.

The buyers may not find out about

until the foreclosure begins.

I think that needs to be addressed.

Frankly, I think there are two

ways of doing it.

One, you allow the seller to keep collecting and

post criminal penalties in the event that the funds are misapplied,
treating them as trust funds.

The other pass

lity is that you

require all-inclusives to be deposited with some financial institution
to do the collecting and then the

sbursing of the funds.

The reason

that it is such a problem, is that many properties today have a series
of all-inclusives and we have this chain letter that I described
earlier.

There's great risk to the ultimate purchaser in this chain

of money floating down between people.
on the wrap around merry-go-round.

Again, I refer to this article

It talks about how many problem

areas there are and I think there needs to be some legislation warning
people, just like this subordination legislation that we have that
warns right on the trust deed saying, look folks, this is a dangerous
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, you'd better real

under

is, because you are as

be

you do whatever

all kinds of responsibilities.

I

that there has to be a mandate that the terms must be consistent
so that the wrap around at a minimum is meeting
underneath and

s the same

payment obligations

of penalty clauses, the same type of

fire insurance requirements, all those things, because we are not
just dealing
var
to

th payments.

Trust deeds have all kinds of provisions

in that fine print that nobody ever reads, require the owner
a lot of different things.

And the all inclusive has to track

that where you could get a default along the way for some reason other
than the nonpayment

money.

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Especially in cases

tax liens which

would take priority over other recorded liens.
MR. FOHRMAN:

There is a whole host of things, and I'm not

trying to repeat what is in the article, just to bring it to your
attention.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
art

Do we have a copy of this gentleman's

le, do we somewhere?
UNKNOWN VOICE:

We have one of them and we will get the

one.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
sclosure bill.

I have a copy of both with my

You can get them tomorrow.

MR. FOHRMAN:

In terms of Wellenkamp it's a two-edged

sword when I talked about -- it's the fuse on the time bomb.

If

Wellenkamp is -- if the due on sale clause is enforceable you can
stop many real estate sales right now.

You can kill the home market.

If it's not enforceable then you're going to have these creative
financing situations going on and we're just putting offthe inevitable.
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The s

about earlier where the builder, that was

I

correctly pointed out by Mr. Robinson, where the builder pulls the
plug, we're then going to have the series of foreclosures down the
Now that example dealt with three years from now.

I think

that a lot of these deals began two years ago and that a lot of
them are going to start coming due within the next year.

I believe

that you have to give serious consideration to some type of moratorium
legislation dealing with this.

I personally believe that the long

range effect of Wellenkamp is that the average person's a lot worse
off because it's going to come back and haunt the average person who
carried back one of these trust deeds without understanding 'it

~t

all.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Let me ask a question.

This

moratorium, doesn't it take one of the few disincentives to this type
of financing away?

If we enact a moratorium, one of the things that

could stop this or at least slow it down is the type of information
that's out amongst the general public in the experience of their
neighbors.

I think you take one of the big checks that are built-in

cally in a free system away the minute you enact a moratorium.
MR. FOHRMAN:

I agree with you.

The problem is that you

have hundreds of thousands of people that have no idea what they are
doing.

They didn't understand that and they're going to be led to

slaughter in this situation.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

They didn't understand what they

were doing, and in a lot of cases they were represented by licensed
realtors in the State of California.
MR. FOHRMAN:

What's the .••

Who did not understand it themselves.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
-

And I understand that.
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What is

current state of

on errors and omission litigation

affecting realtors?
MR. FOHRMAN:

I think we're going to have the biggest

of litigation against realtors the state has ever seen.

I

have realtors who are calling indicating that they have real
concern that they're getting ripples from people that say, you didn't
tell me this and such and I'm now faced with this situation as the
balloon comes due, or the multiple layers of all inclusive trust
deeds that didn't correspond in terms.
feet is.

I don't know what the ultimate

I believe that the brokers have a serious problem.

There

was a recent case of Wyatt vs. Union Mortgage which dealt with the
abil

of a loan broker for failure to disclose the risks connected

with the second trust deed loan.

It dealt with a lot of other issues,

but in that case the mortgage broker was held liable.

I think it's

just a very short jump from Wyatt vs. Union Mortgage to imposing the
same liability on the average broker for not advising people as to
what they were getting into on the all inclusive trust deeds.
not being unduly critical of the brokers.

And I'm

There are many attorneys

who have used all inclusive ...
ASSEMBLY~~N

ROBINSON:

MR. FOHRMAN:

Is that involving civil fraud?

Yes, there was some fraud involved •••

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

But you are separating the two

different issues.
MR. FOHRMAN:

Right.

Right.

I think that it shows the

liability aspect of the broker for failure to advise quite apart
from fraud, and I think that same thing is going to be transferred
over in these situations.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Mr. Fehrman do you think that it will be
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s or
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to act, of
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you say that is.
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ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. FOHRMAN:

se.
... these trans

Yes, I

"Look, there's a keen

are the

average buyer and seller has

purchased one or two homes in

don't know how to do it.

do.

that

ones that are giving the

to these people to tell them

of

to do.

li

and they are

They want to buy this

So that particular realtor is saying,
called an
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1-inclusive trust deed, and

's a piece of cake.

Three years from now, we all know the money

market can't last as it is right now.

It's going to break at some

point, so sometime in the next three years you go out there and refinance
it."

A lot of people are buying that.

They don't understand what

the problem is.
Now, I've already talked about all-inclusives and land
sale contracts, but those are only some of the devices that are being
used.

There are other things that are out there that you don't see as

much of but they also come within the realm of creative financing and
if you're going to deal with legislation you're going to have to touch
on those.
You see leases with options.
to get around the due on sale.

It is another way of trying

There are various types of .•. well,

various types of seller carry backs.

No matter what they call them

they all basically involve the seller carrying back something.

Now

many of these, we're talking about the fact that there's nothing
creative about creative financing other than the name.
ar

I saw an

le recently that some hairbrained scheme for creative financing.

The interesting thing about that particular device, and I don't
remerr~er

what it was because it was so hairbrained I didn't pay

much attention to it;

but somebody wrote a response in the next

issue on this article that I read pointing out a 800 year old case
in England that dealt with that very concept.

There's nothing new,

and that's the danger in trying to deal with some legislation that
is going to deal across the board with creative financing.

You have

all the normal methods of real estate finance that have been abused,
perhaps, in this situation.

And if you do something, you have to

be careful.
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lem
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s
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led

st

c rate of return

out of

1

loan

scover when

have -- just let me

out of 11 that I dealt with

the last two weeks.

,000

a second trust

had no

situation.

es of situations where .••

I've seen a

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Is

s commercial property or

what kind?

MR. FOHRMAN:
another one exactly

s was commerc
on a

property, but I also
And the people not

only were led to believe that they had a second, they actually wound
up having a third, and both the second and the third exceeded the
market value of the property.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Well, one question that I have is

I

mean this problem has always been inherent in second trust deeds and
in fact a number of instruments like them.

Is there evidence that the

problem is getting worse now?
MR. FOHRMAN:
Prop.

2

I think the problem is much worse.

After

we had a lot of people jump into the market as mortgage

loan brokers and there are very little restraints on what these
people did or could do.

I think there has been tremendous fraud

practiced, I think that ..•
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Like Universal and Atlas Trust.

MR. FOHRMAN:

We're talking about dozens of these

Yes.

companies.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

I think one thing that we didn't pay

enough attention to in this committee when we dealt with Prop. 2
is that in addition to getting rid of usury, it really expanded the
number of people that are going to be out there making these types
of transactions.
MR. FOHRMAN:

Frankly there is nothing they can do about

all the fraudulent transactions that have already occurred, but I
think the door needs to be closed.

I think that you need to take a

close look at what requirements you need to impose on people that
are going to be doing this.

I'm one attorney in one small city.

I

had 11 phone calls in two weeks and they all are very similar experiences
right down the line.

We are talking about some people whose life

savings are being wiped out in these situations and that's ..• I've
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seller has -an all

He goes to sell

sell on anything other

trust
, and

a four or five year balloon.

he
had a
he can
So he

goes and carries back an all-inclusive trust deed that has a f
year balloon.

s buyer is making

and then the under
says, "Pay

off."

s regular monthly payments,

loan comes due in three years.
Sel

The buyer

says, "I can't pay it off, and even if
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I wanted to, I don't have

to the

negotiate the financing.''

The buyer says, "I'm not going to pay a

penny towards the refinancing.
the points," and he can't.
got a small house.

I can't go out and

It's all up to you.

You pick up all

We're talking about the average guy that's

He cannot do it.

So now he winds up getting sued

by his buyer because the buyer is put at risk.

He's going to either

have to go out and get the financing, bear the cost of it or he isn't
able to get the financing, and he gets foreclosed out.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

So the seller is liable because

this previous trust deed becomes due, and the buyer who wasn't
cipating this, conceivably might have discovered it had he checked
the records, but he presumably isn't told all this and ..•
MR. FOHRMAN:

We're talking about unsophisticated people

who do not check the records.

They don't even ... when they get that

title policy they don't even understand what that title policy does.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

They don't have lawyers advising

them and in a good many cases now I guess now
some cases you wouldn't have a realtor involved.

there -- well in
You may just have

private parties.
MR. FOHRMAN:

Sometimes, sometimes.

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Well, unless you read A through X in

the title policy exemptions you wouldn't know what the title policy
does, and I don't think anybody does.
MR. FOHRMAN:

Well, it might not even show there.

First

of all the title company is not aware of the provisions of the
promissory note.

And the provisions we're talking about only show

up in the promissory note.

There are very few buyers who are

sophisticated enough to request copies of the prior notes.
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on these matters.

s
You try to

s, and the fact of the matter is
are no dead bodies yet.
's becoming that way and I believe
t's a phraseology that we use

I

1 increase next year

the political arena, but there

aren't the dead bodies, the foreclosures, yet to the degree that
people feel that this is a problem, that, hey, I'd better watch out.
You know, the warning signals aren't there yet.
lures or mergers of

There haven't been

s and loans statewide, and so
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average

person doesn't foresee

s as a problem.

They have to move, their

jobs are transferred, or they want to get into a better home.

They're

saying, "Hey Legislature, you're not doing anything to give me low
interest rates and this is my only avenue to get into this home,
because I have to move, or my job's been transferred, or we want to
sell our large home and move into a different location, or whatever.
So the fact of the matter is Dick's point about the dead bodies and the
moratorium is extremely important.
Any changes that we make in this area or that you discussed
or offered as options, which all seem to make sense, seem to be areas
that we're going to have to deal with.

Any changes we are going to make

are going to require making these changes palatable in the political
arena.

And I'm talking about all the interested players in the arena.

I'm talking about the players being not only the lending institutions,
but the realtors which are an extremely large force within this
stage, and the builders, subsidized housing groups, the whole potpourri
of the players of the housing chain.
and

Unless you create that awareness

sensitivity, and unless maybe we have some dead bodies, and

the people actually say, "Hey, this is terrible," then we're not going
to see the changes that you outlined or some of the other changes in
this area.
MR. FOHRMAN:

If I could stick with your dead body analogy

for a moment, I think the real policy question is are you going to
build a big morgue or are you going to give these poor unsuspecting
people some first aid before they get slaughtered.

We are talking

about people who have no idea of what they are facing.

They were

led down the primrose path, and is it fair to those folks?
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

I want to thank you for abandoning your
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to
the call of duty.
would like to talk
it's lunch
Gil

I

that was

and

we

And I think if you would be will
you more about

lation.

And although

now I'm sure everyone will want to return for Mr.

s response later

We

us.

s afternoon.

It should be very intere

11 return at 2:15 this afternoon.
MR. SAMSON:

What I want to talk about is the manner in

which an unscrupulous person, and I'm going to focus on the real
estate broker,

licensee, that has come to my attention

is

s unscrupulous scheme using creative financing
I have

a written statement, and I have handed it out to the

members of the committee because it contains certain exhibits, and
even though I'
I

1

be

without referring to my statement verbatim

have to refer to

clear.

exhibits to make my testimony somewhat

I have, by the way, eight years of experience with real estate

s both civil and criminal.

I receive a lot of publicity from

that activity, so I get a lot of phone calls.

Like Mr. Fohrman was

, he averages 11 a week. I average three or four a day.

I

so

do a lot of public speaking at brokerage houses, multiple listing
s, I got Grubb and Ellis coming up in a couple of weeks.

I

talked to the Escondido Multiple
are

I've

sting last Thursday, so my remarks

upon current information that I received from the industry

out there doing it.

And my remarks that I am going to make are based

on a very small minority of the people in the industry.
really can't see the forest for the trees.
good and they're trying their best.

Overall

They think they are doing

But the scheme that I'm going

to describe is the unscrupulous person who's taking advantage of
the fact that the public is now educated to taking paper.
- 97 -

Because

they know they have to take back paper, they're accustomed to it.
There's a book out by Mr. Robert G. Allen, Nothing Down.
Perhaps you've read about it.

It's very persuasive.

In fact, there

are clubs being formed in San Diego called RAND groups, which stands
for Robert Allen Nothing Down investment clubs where they try to
implement this theory of getting into property for absolutely nothing
down and perhaps a negative price being paid back.
The way the scheme works is that the buyer, when he comes
into the transaction, refinances the equity and gives part of that
equity back to the seller as his down payment.

The points that he has

to pay, and right now it's about 16 points, can only be accomplished
by increase in the sales price.

Now in the standard legitimate

transaction, under RAND, you would increase the sales price only
by that amount of money, the amount of points you had to pay to get
the money for the down payment.

The problem that's going to result

is that the property will now be over encumbered.

You've got some

more loans to pay, and if you're speculating for investment purposes,
it's doubtful whether or not you can provide enough cash for the negative
cash flow that's going to be created.

And that seller may have to take

the property back that's now been over encumbered.

And it's pretty

widespread.
What I've done, if you'll look on my statement, attached
to it are some exhibits.

I've got exhibit lA and lB.

I point them

out because these were submitted by licensed real estate brokers.
Both properties were in Vista, a city in north San Diego County.

One

is typewritten and one is handwritten, but the language is identical.
These two brokers are 40 miles apart.

So the scheme is pervasive.

Now these were brought to my attention just in June, and I'll credit
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It was a sel

the
11

sa

we have here.

two reasons.

One,

broker.

What do you think?"

And that bothers me.

I was appalled

You can see

document it says by the state he is a licensed real estate
But you have to look at the term.
ROBINSON:

•

called me

puts the seller at risk and in jeopardy,

but it's done by licensees.
there on

's agent

And that's required by existing

law.
MR. SAMSON:
do
noL
~

1

sclosure.

Actually there is no regulation or law.

as a matter of practice so they can't be sued for
I don't think you'll find it written down any place.

an interesting fact, but I don't think you can.

3

I

But everybody

s it just to avoid the problem of having this thing fall apart in
1 litigation, have it come back that it was a failure to disclose
the fact that they would quote the expert in this transaction.

In

the first one that you see here, you will note that there's a $15,000
down payment

(B).

The language that's curious here, "buyer to

assume subject to,n is really funny language because you do one or
the other.

•

You'll note that both offers use that same language .

But the important thing is (c) , that buyer is to obtain a new second
trust deed not to exceed 75% of the appraised value.
where the problem lies.

And here is

Because that will go through a mortgage loan

broker ••• I'm going to talk about them.

By the way I was listening

to Mr. Fehrman -- I don't want to get ahead of myself, but if
you want to hear a horror story ..• I'm personally coordinating the
complaints on Universal Financial, and I think the worst is yet to
come.

It's really a

terrible

problem that we are facing.

But with this at hand, let's look at this, in fact, in the
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st
ref

the property is on

$99,000, we're going to

that for 75 percent or $75,000

which we'll take the

$15,000 down payment, and the mortgage loan broker
existing first encumbrance

1 of course

leaving some cash.

is not really going to generate a lot of cash for

Now this

s particular

should this transaction unwind that seller's going to have
to

back this piece of property with a brand new encumbrance

and some new payments that he didn't think he was going to have to
come back on.
The rest of it you'll note under paragraphs E and F is a
rd and fourth trust deed.
se

The third will be some payments back to

and the fourth is interest only compounded note payments

all due and payable in three years which is going to generate one big
balloon -- three years of interest compounded over that period of
t:i,.me!
The second one bothers me though, because if you will note
here you have a very low first mortgage.

By the way this offer was

, as we've heard throughout this morning, by a very unsophisticated
seller, doesn't speak very good English, a Mexican family.

The offer

is for $78,500 with $20,000 down, buyer to assume "subject to" the
sting VA for $9,500 -- and with that low down watch what happens
when you refinance the second -- buyer to obtain a new loan and second
trust deed, not to exceed 75 percent of the appraised value, $49,000,
of which the loan broker would probably exclude $9,000 still leaving
$40,000 of which $20,000 only goes to the seller.
has $20,000 cash in this transaction.

That buyer now

Now in this particular one,

this particular broker says he does several of these a week, and he
expects to use that cash to help maintain the negative cash flow and
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hope for an equity build-up so that he can sell this property in a
couple of years at a profit.

A couple of problems if there is no

equity build-up, if prices don't continue to go up, he can walk away
from this deal and as we've heard he'll probably have 580B purchase
money protection, which I want to speak to in a few minutes.

And

then once again you have the third and fourth trust deeds that are
created to over-encumber the property, and the fourth or fifth trust
deed,

which is interest only with a balloon payment to compound at

the end of three years.

Now those are technically, strictly legal,

no problem deals, but they put the seller at a great deal of risk,
and I think that something should be done in this area.
Now let me show you a truly unscrupulous transaction which
is presently being litigated.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Wait a minute.

If you say something

should be done, what do you suggest?
MR. SAMSON:

In the typical transaction, the buyer never

sees the seller's escrow closing statement and vice-versa, the
seller never sees the buyer's closing statement.

The seller does

not know in some cases how much cash is being disbursed to the buyer.
I would recommend that in these creative financing schemes, like

•

the ones I'm describing, where a cash or a credit is being disbursed
to a buyer, that it be done only with the explicit approval of the
seller, that he initial that buyer's closing statement, and further
where over-encumbrance is occurring, and this next example I show
you is pretty bad, that where the property is being over-encumbered
by a new loan that the seller be required to inspect the buyer's
financial statement and approve that loan package.
that new finance that is corning down.
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In other words,

The seller should be aware

that the buyer is paying 16 points and some other costs to get that
cash to make the down payment, and take some cash out.

He should

be alerted to that.
By the way, many of these deals are done through brokers
exempt escrow.

I'm recommending that the Financial Code Section

17006 (d) be repealed.
their own escrows.

That you not allow real estate brokers to handle

In eight years of prosecution, most of the really

bad transactions that I have had to prosecute have been done through
a brokers exempt escrow.

If brokers want to do their escrows let them

incorporate under the Financial Code.
escrow company.

Let them operate like any other

From what I have seen it's very, very difficult for

the employee of the broker, the escrow officer working in the same
office just a desk apart, to have any independent judgment when it
comes time to close that transaction.

They're an employee of that

broker and that broker is an agent of one of the principals -- borrower,
lender, buyer, seller -- and he has a strong inclination to make that
deal go through.

So my recommendation is that that should be repealed

and that if brokers want to operate escrows, let them incorporate and
do it like anybody else.
Also, another recommendation would be that Code of Civil
Procedure 580(b),

which provides purchase money protection, be

amended so that it applies only to owner-occupied property.

These

transactions I'm showing you, these people did not move in or intend
to move in.

They were buying for investment purposes.

I don't

believe that 580(b) protection should be afforded to them.

I might

point out that when you get to creative financing schemes such as
these, it's entirely probable that if the matter were litigated
that under the 1972 Spangler case, a California Supreme Court case,
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it's doubtful that 580(b} protection would be afforded, but it would
have to be litigated.

I think perhaps the statute should explicitly

spell out that that type of purchase money protection should be limited
to the owner-occupied, single family residence.
On Exhibit 2 .•.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
ask you a question?

Before we go over there, can I just

Maybe I'm just missing something, but I'm trying

to add up these various figures on these two purchase contracts.
•

Well,

I'm thinking you just take one of them.
MR. SAMSON:

Well, they add up to a lot more than the

purchase price.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Yeah, they add up to more than the

purchase price.
MR. SAMSON:

Over-encumbered.

So two triggering events,

over-encumbering the property from the purchase price and the fact
that cash goes to the buyer not the seller.

Those are the two

triggering events when the proposals I make that independent escrows
be used, that purchase money protection be denied, and that the seller
approve that explicitly with an examination of the buyer's financial
statement.

Those are the triggering events where those things should

be .•.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

I mean, if the seller looks at

this just on the face of it, might it not occur to him that while
there's a first that's going to be assumed ••. that of course is not the
seller -- that's presumably the bank -- then there would be a second
from somebody else, then he's got a third and a fourth •..
MR. SAMSON:

Right.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

So he might never get paid.
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MR. SAMSON:

That's exactly right, and if he doesn't get

paid and takes his property back he's got a big mortgage that he
didn't know about.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Why would the buyer or the seller, excuse

me, the buyer gets cash from the-- just ..•
MR. SAMSON:

That's the way the transaction works because

the seller doesn't understand it.

That's why, and that's the whole

thing.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

(Inaudible) ... that he does get cash from

this transaction •..
MR. SAMSON:

From the refinance .

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

... as if he were borrowing it from a bank

or something.
MR. SAMSON:

The buyer gets it from mortgage loan brokers.

I'm going to speak to that issue, private money, equity, hard money
lenders.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Of course the only reason those

people were loaned money when it exceeds the value of the property,
is that they're getting a second, I mean instead of a third or fourth.
MR. SAMSON:

The hard money equity lender's security does

not exceed the value of the property, it's the paper that goes back
to the seller, that exceeds the value of the property.
lender is very secure.

The equity

He can come in and take this property over

at a distressed price and be quite happy.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Do you think that the sellers who

will do this are ill-informed sellers?
MR. SAMSON:

Yes.

to the brokerage industry.

In these two cases, and I'll give credit
It was a seller's agent that called
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to my attention.

But if five or more of these are occurring a week,

there's a lot that I don't know about.
is not

alerting

Either the seller's agent

someone or it's a for sale by owner only with no

help of a real estate agent.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

And then the buyer figures that

eventually he's going to get cash out of it which he'll use to maintain
the property, and then eventually the property appreciates and so he
sells, and everybody is presumably happy, but if it doesn't happen
he just kind of walks away from it.
MR. SAMSON:

That's right and he may claim purchase money

protection, but he may be able to claim that until litigation occurs,
and under Spangler he may lose.

It's doubtful.

That's why I'm

talking about 580(b).
But at the close of escrow, this buyer gets the cash for
the down payment and maybe some in-pocket too.

And the lower the

existing first encumbrance, the more cash he getsto walk away with.
In the second example, the handwritten one, he gets $20,000 cash,
probably $15,000 after he pays his points.

But when he closed

escrow, he takes $15,000, pays $5,000 to the loan broker, and gives
$20,000 to the seller, and he's sitting with $15,000 cash and

•

claiming no personal liability for that transaction.

If that seller

takes back the property, he may not be able to afford that newly
created second.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Okay.

On the first example, do

you know what the second trust deed was for?
MR. SAMSON:

Well, they always go 75 or 85 percent of

the appraised value.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Okay, well if you went 75 percent,
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and I assume that the property must be appraised at ...
MR. SAMSON:

At the offering price.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
way I

figure it.

(Inaudible).

This one breaks even.

Well it would be more than that the

He's got a first of $53,900.

If he gets a 75 percent

second, that's $75,000, so that's $125,000 he's got there.

Then you

get .••
MR. SAMSON:

No, you subtract out the existing first.

The

loan broker that makes the loan up to 75 percent would subtract out
the existing first and give you a net amount.
enough cash with the buyer that's buying in.

But this still increases
It goes through a loan

broker.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

So it goes to $75,000 after you get

to that line.
MR. SAMSON:

Right.

They'll give some to the seller for

his down payment, give some to the loan broker for his points, and then
use whatever's left for whatever purpose.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
they wouldn't loan,$75,000.

What you mean

s case, is that

They would loan $75,000, but they would

use that to pay off the first?
MR.

S&~SON:

No, they would leave the f

just take that out of the amount.

They'd say, "We'll go 75 percent,

but we'll cut out any existing first.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

st, they would

You take care of that yourself.

So, so they would give him then

$21,000.
MR. SAMSON:

Something on that nature, yes, which provides

the down payments and the points and the cost.

buyer

gets

in for absolutely no money of his own at risk.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Why does
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have two different

notes on Items D and E?
MR. SAMSON:

Well it increases the price to the seller

and makes it more attractive.

One he's going to make payments on,

one he's not.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. SAMSON:

Oh I see.

One will gallop along with interest only to

be accumulated and compounded and due in three years, and that is a
lot of danger, and we've been hearing in terms of balloon payments •

•

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Okay and now you're saying that

he's protected under 580(b).
MR. SAMSON:

The buyer's protected.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. SAMSON:

The buyer is.

He will certainly claim it.

What I'm saying

under the case law he may not be able to, but unless you litigate
that, he will certainly walk away from it.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Okay and so the seller forecloses

under Item E of his contract and he has to pick up the $75,000 ...
MR. SAMSON:

Well it would be a second trust deed for

$21,000, yes.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

So not only is he out whatever

payments it takes to catch up on the first at the time of foreclosure,
but he is also out the $21,000 for the mortgage broker.
MR. SAMSON:

Exactly, and if he can't afford to do it,

that investor that the loan broker put in there, he'll take over the
property, which is what I foresee happening for the average person
who doesn't have that kind of cash to feed one of these things.
Let me give another little note that shows ...
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

How widespread do you think this is
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in San Diego County?
MR. SAMSON:

Well, if they have RAND Clubs, I don't know.

I'm just now starting to get these, in the last three or four months.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

I'm sorry, I wasn't here earlier.

What

do you mean by RAND Clubs?
MR. SAMSON:

RAND stands for Robert Allen Nothing Down

Investment Clubs.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
UNKNOWN VOICE:

Oh, okay.

I think it's something you ought to read,

Jim.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
their meetings.

No, I've read it.

I went to one of

It was very interesting.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
on creative financing.

How much did you buy Jim?

I was giving a speech on the abuses

I was not very popular -- I was in the wrong

place.
MR. SAMSON:

I think it is relatively widespread because

I stopped in to the Department of Real Estate yesterday just to chat
and they had five deals from this same broker that I just told you
about that had been referred into them from all over the country.

So

he's running around doing it a lot.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Do you think this is exclusive only

by RAND Clubs or ..•
MR. SAMSON:
into it.

No, no I think a lot of people are getting

The word is out and people are seeing it and using it and

starting to run with it.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

What are the means, investigative means,

that you use to determine these sort of abuses in
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financ

?

MR. SAMSON:

Well as you said earlier this morning, I don't

get to it until they are dead bodies.

That's the unfortunate -- I'm

seeing something at the very front right now that I don't normally
see until the foreclosure occurs and then we have to go back and try
to figure out who did what to who.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. SAMSON:

Do you use the County Assessor's Office?

Yes, we do use -- we use any recorded document.

Usually there's a warm body corning into the office and saying, "Look

•

what's happened to me."

And then we go back and restructure the

deal from whatever escrow records or recorded documents or whatever.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
we

Some of my friends are telling me that

are really dealing with a few isolated cases, that this really

isn't the norm, and that the situation is not as widespread as I
sometimes convey, and that maybe I'm really making a mountain out of a
molehill.

And that's really part of my concern.

a handle on how widespread this is.

I'm trying to get

Your office, the District

Attorney's office of San Diego, has been one of the few district
attorneys offices statewide that has really taken a lead in this
area.
MR. SAMSON:

Well as I said earlier, and you have already

pointed it out, we don't find out until it is too late.

I'm not

going to find out how many of these deals have been going on right
now until the seller finds out he has been had.
years down stream.

That could be three

It could be a year away.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

But can you make any estimation of

how much of a problem you think this may be in San Diego County?
MR. SAMSON:

I think it will affect five percent to ten

percent of the market.
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Do you think that the escrow being

at arms length from the broker would have a preventive effect on this?
MR. SAMSON:

I think so.

In my prosecution I have found

that the escrow officers who are acting as a dual agency in between
two principals take every conceivable precaution to protect themselves
and if they see something they don't understand they're very quick
to rewrite it or to talk about it or to make sure that the principals
understand.

Take due on sale clauses.

They have a standard little

clause they've put in there to make sure you know what you're doing
about this and it goes right into the instructions.
problem.

There is a further

When people read, they do know what they are reading.

I don't know how we are ever going to overcome that.

And

The average

person just doesn't understand what he reads, and he relies upon
someone who tells him what's in there, typically the real estate
broker.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Mr. Gillies, could you comment on

that proposal when you testify?
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

I think there's been some -- this

gentleman said something very significant.

You

this problem

exists in five percent to ten percent of the sales in San Diego County.
MR. SAMSON:

I have no basis for making that opinion.

I

haven't done any research, except what's coming at me now.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

You mean the deals of the kind that

we're looking at here in these exhibits.
MR. SAMSON:

Yes.

I get that feeling, yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

How could this

res

on

any kind of scientific basis so that we could determine the truth
in that?
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MR. SAMSON:

Well you could go through all the closings

that have been recorded.

That's another problem too that's going on

that I'm sure you're aware of, the masked sale where holding escrows
are being used and nothing is being recorded.

If anything has been

recorded you could just contact the principals, contact the seller and
get his copy of his escrow instructions and it would be very quick,
but some of this staff is not recorded.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Isn't it very difficult to determine

that though really?
MR. SAMSON:

Determine what?

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. SAMSON:

How widespread this is.

It is very difficult.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

I mean, okay for the principals, it's

very hard to find the principals.
MR. SAMSON:

One thing that I can say is that I know that,

like these RAND Clubs, they're very eager.

They salivate over this,

and so it's picking up.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
what they get.
abuses.

I think the RAND Clubs are asking for

I mean if that is the worse example, I guess, of the

I'm more concerned about average people, potential buyers

of homes or people who need to sell their homes, average realtors.
They are forced into these situations, not necessarily because they
think it's, you know, the panacea or the best thing since sliced
bread.

But because the market's so damn tight and things are so

difficult in the housing situation today in not only California, but
nationwide, they view this as the last resort, the only means to
the end, so to speak.

They go forth with this hoping that, you know,

housing will continue to appreciate at 11 percent to 14 percent per
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and betting on that, not the best sort of fiscal prudence that one
might normally operate under.

They are thinking that this is a way

to get by not knowing that, in fact, it is really full of pitfalls
and that this sort of contract is not one that the average consumer
ought to be involved in.

I'm more concerned, I guess, about the

widespread level in that area.
MR. SAMSON:
about that.

Well I think Mr. Fohrman has already talked

His remarks this morning addressed that problem, and as

I listened to him, he seemed to think it was quite widespread in terms
of this domino effect from one person relaying upon another on this
creative financing.

I've been focusing on what I consider the abuse

of the creative financing.

Creative financing, as he pointed out, is

perfectly legitimate if everybody understandswhat they are getting
into.

If you are betting that the equity will be there and prices

will rise, well I see nothing wrong in speculation, as long as we all
deal at arms length with open honest information.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. SAMSON:

No.

Is that occurring today, do you think?
It does I think to a limited degree where

you have educated real estate agents who go over
their clients.

carefully with

The problem is that most agents that I ta

to, and

I think they have good intentions, but they really believe that
there is going to be at least a ten percent increase in prices each
year, even now.

And I don't know if that's the case.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

And you think they are promoting these
st

transfers of sales based upon those assumptions even with
laid intentions?
MR. SAMSON:
intent.

Yes.

I don't think they have any evil

I think they're involved in a si
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and being

a salesman, they always have a positive attitude in any event.

Most

of the ones I've talked to, you know, they really think they are
doing the best thing possible.
that are being created;

They really can't see the problems

Mr. Fehrman described that.

can't see these problems.

Maybe the appreciation will take place

and the problems will not occur.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

They really

I don't know.

Okay, could we go ahead and move on then

in terms of ••.
MR. SAMSON:

Let me just talk about Exhibit

II because

this points out the really unscrupulous transaction that can occur.
And by the way, I have more in my brief case, but I figured these
would be the easiest to talk about.
You will note this one here.

This, by the way, was free

and clear property, and the actual offer, I don't want to complicate
it

more than it was, it was only $85,000 and both sides agreed to

pump it up to $97,000 because it would look better on a loan document.
But as written here, the offer was for $97,900, a $60,000 first will
be created and the seller will take back a $59,000 second right there.
You start off with $85,000 sales price, but your closing end is on

•

$119,000 right off the bat, which is a part of the transaction .
Now to really show you how this works, I direct your
attention to the closing escrow statement, 2(D), for the seller.

At

the top it shows that $13,000, which was a wash transaction to raise
the price, the important thing is of course the broker gets $5,000
commission, the seller gets $19,000 at the very bottom.
cash that the seller got plus his note.

That's his

If you take a look at the

page 2(E), which is the buyer's closing statement that the seller
would never see, you find that the loan broker down here under new
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loan charges, the lender's commission was $7,000 and the buyer in
this case walked away with $29,800.

Now if I had $30 000 in hand,

I don't know if I would stay around to see what would happen.
take my profit.

And this is occurring.

I'd

This particular case is

subject to litigation and you know there are going to be a lot of
people that will be sued in this.

I don't know what the end result

will be, but here again you've got a year or two of litigation plus
a lot of legal expense that's going to

involved.

I don't know that

the seller would have initialed that disbursement, and if he did
maybe he had an incompetent transaction, but what I'm saying is that
I would suggest that the seller have to initial that disbursement to
his buyer.

That the seller explicitly approve that as well as the

loan package.

What are the terms of this loan package?

We don't

know whether it's a one or two year transaction, we don't know the
rate of interest and the points being paid.
one that should approve something like this.

But the seller is the
I think that is fairly

easy to implement.
Okay, finally one other thing, you know, I don't have a
lot to say in terms of the mortgage brokering abuse, I got into this
early in the year because of Universal Financial, which is probably
the worst of all examples, and I included, by the way, Exhibit 3
which is an appraisal that was furnished to an investor in Universal
Financial on a commercial piece of property, and what they did was
take a residential, single page document, type in the word commercial,
and simply plug in a figure.

This is so blatantly bad that it

doesn't require further comment, and I think that Universal Financial
speaks for itself.

We've talked enough about that.

Let me show you the next one on Exhibit 4 (A),
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(B), and

(C) because here's what I'm running into with mortgage brokers. They,
by the way, fund the transaction that I described to you.
the money comes from.

That's where

From these overencumbered properties, where

the buyer walks away with the cash.

Exhibit 4 (A) is a document

prepared by a mortgage company with a CIMBA (California Indepedent
Mortgage Brokers Association) logo at the top, which would indicate
a fairly good company of some standards.

And this is a brochure

handed to investors which I think if you were to operate your business
in this fashion, I would not have anything to say.
good as you can do it.

This is about as

These two pages lay out how it should be done.

In the middle of the page it says we use strict underwriting principles
including independent fee appraisers.

That is not the case.

This

investor who put in about three loans, this particular one was $6,500,
and I just got this last week when the investor came in.

He had been

reading about things in the paper regarding their documents and was
concerned about the bad publicity.

The brokerage business asked

for the appraisal and was told it was confidential.

1

When pressed

it was produced and if you look at 4 (C), it's a year and a half old
and it's in-house.
appraisal.

It was not a

appraisal, it was an in-house

What I would suggest then with loan brokers is independent

fee appraisals be required and that independent

escrows be required.

They're doing their own appraisals and escrows.
Perhaps the Department of Real Estate should think about
a special license for loan brokers just as they do for security
dealers, that they have a special endorsement and pass a special test.
Right now, my perception of much of the loan brokerage that is going
on is that it is being done by amateurs, a lot of which is the
result of Prop

that allowed them to advertise fantastic rates,
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and anybody with a real estate brokers license could get into the
business.

And that's exactly what Mr. Burton in San Bernardino did.

He collected a $100,000,000 in one year, and said he had no place
to put it and started using it himself, and I

you are going

to see more of that.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

You said require a special license

for loan brokers, require independent fee appraisers ...
MR. SAMSON:

And independent escrows .

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. SAMSON:

... and independent escrows.

And I think there's a part of that, if you

really get into details, I haven't got into any detailed aspect of
it, but it might not hurt to have capital requirements for loan
brokers, to make some kind of a net worth statement mandatory.

I

don't care what the figure is, $25,000 or something, but perhaps
they should have some basis, some substantial financial basis of
their own at stake here.

I don't think that's a horrendous requirement.

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
MR. SAMSON:

At least posting some

of bond or ...

A bond or simply a net worth statement

certified by a C.P.A. that they are worth so much money
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Aren't they required to have some sort

of a reserve?
MR. SAMSON:

Not a loan broker.

Anybody with a real estate

license can broker a loan.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

It doesn't have to require some sort

of reserve to protect the ...
MR. SAMSON:

No, nothing.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR.

Sk~SON:

Absolutely nothing.

Would you advocate that?

Wouldn't hurt.
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I

there are a lot

ways to go about it including an annual reporting system.

For instance

the HUD Reports by certain mortgage brokers and bankers that operate
as agent for S & L's, or on secondary markets, they file certain
statements that I don't think would be a burden to the industry.

That

if they had to file these with either the Department of Corporations
or Real Estate, simply in terms of the number of loans they're servicing
and the foreclosures or delinquincy rates, at least then there would
be some regulatory agency that would have an early warning sign

8

that maybe something is going wrong with this particular brokerage.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Well thank you very much Mr. Samson.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, I missed a

point here that you covered prior to the mortgage brokers problems
that lie in with that.

You said the seller should be required to

know certain things prior to financing potential buyers into the .•.
MR. SAMSON:

In the typical, traditional, historical real

estate transaction the seller never sees the buyer's statement and
the buyer never sees the seller's closing statement.

I simply said

that whenever there is going to be cash or credit and you have this
over encumbrance over the sales price, where the buyer is taking
cash out, the seller should approve that disbursement of cash.

t

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

What you're saying, in effect is that

the seller ought to at least have some confidence that the buyer
be able to meet somewhat the same qualifications that he had to
meet when they originally were extended the loan.
MR. SAMSON:

Essentially, yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

And that is

is that not part of

the problem that we are dealing with today as it relates to the
Wellenkamp decision, in that on transfers of these sort of sales
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when the due on sale clause was in effect the lending institutions
could determine whether or not that buyer could meet those qualifications
prior to extending the loan, whether or not you bumped
interest rate.

up at a new

In extending the loan again, they were attempting to

insure that the potential buyer meet the same sort of qualification
standards that the original person who received the loan did.

Is

that correct?
MR. SAMSON:

I believe that to be true, yes.

I think that

under the present system borrowers and buyers are not being properly
qualified.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

And that is one of the -- therein lies

one of the problems under the Wellenkamp decision, and that is the
sellers have really no ability to check or determine whether or not
those potential buyers or those people who are assuming their loans
can meet the same qualification standards that they had to meet.
MR. SAMSON:

Yes.

But I also see that as part of the

second trust deed hard equity market that the loan brokers don't have
to qualify on the borrowers either.
equity in the property.

They're simply looking at the

In fact I've talked to some where they

didn't even get a financial statement or run a TRW.
made the loan.

They simple

And there was a second trust deed on a new sub-division

and the borrower didn't make a single payment.

And when I asked the

broker, he says, "No, we didn't ask for any financial statement
because we looked at the equity in the real estate."

And that equity,

by the way, was not there.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. SAMSON:

Everybody's betting on the apprec

That's right.

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Thank you very
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I

you

being here and also your work.

Our next witness is Sherman J. Maisel

who's an economist and Professor of Business Administration at the
University of California Berkeley.
MR. SHERMAN J. MAISEL:
Chairman.

Did I pronouse your name correctly?
You're correct.

Thank you Mr.

I'll briefly go over my conclusions which agree with others

earlier and then give a little economic background so that you can
stop me at any time.

I know you're rushed for time.

One, I think

there is a necessity that buyers be protected against their own
•

ignorance, but my experience in trying to draft the regulation under
Truth-in-Lending shows that this won't do much good.

What you really

have to come to is some sort of a half a page very clear statement
that has non-legal language.

Perhaps the last recommendation of at

least initialing the both sides of the disbursements would make sense.
Secondly, probably buyers should probably be partially
protected against foreclosure if they continue to make monthly payments
in accordance with initial contracts.

I think something is going to

have to be done about foreclosures under balloon payments.

This would

indicate either some form or moratorium or get a lawyer to protect ...
perhaps strict foreclosure rather than sales under deed of trust with
the protection of the court using their equity powers.
Third, it seems to be clear that there is a need to make
certain that payments go against the underlying debt, and that right
to the title are clear so that there ought to be legislation in that
area.
Fourth, in terms of the second mortgage problem, again
I'm not clear why there is the difficulty of criminal proceedings
when we see the type of ads we see which would apparently, to me
at least, not be authorized under most corporation laws.
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I'm not

clear what the problem is of the law, but it seems to be clear that
on the face of it there is some need for legislation.

is

wrong with it.
Having said that let me go into the

a bit.

I

think in any type of consumer protection there is a tremendous need
to balance the need for the protection against the need for the lending.
In other words, you have to look very carefully at why

s is occurring.

One obvious point is that prospective borrowers can't
other types of borrowing, and therefore they are us
financing.

for
creative

There is a shortage of funds in lending institutions so

that there is a need of another source of funds in the market.

Buyers

and sellers find it easier to come to terms if they can bargain over
the financing rather than over the price, in other words, the seller
kids himself that he's getting a higher price.

He's not willing to

take a lower price, and therefore it becomes eas
to buy.

for the

In terms of other things, investors are speculators al

to use maximum leverage to control the largest amount of
with available funds.

se are very log

It seems to me all of

reasons, and therefore you have to be very careful
legislation to make sure that you don't make

too diff

t for

this type of creative finance to continue, because I think it is a
necessity.
Now in terms of the economics, it seems to be clear that
many people are making incorrect assumptions about future interest
rates, money availability and housing prices.

In

underlying theory of most of these deals is wrong.

seem to

assume mortgage interest rates will be lower and

be

to refinance sometime

the next three
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s

not what

the experts think.

You can buy a Ginnie Mae contract in the market

three and one-half years from now for only two and one-half points
above current Ginnie Mae rates.

What that means is that the mortgage

market as a whole is betting that interest rates won't fall by as
much as one percent over the next three and one-half years.

And

anybody who thinks the mortgage market is wrong, they'll take bets
up to $20-$30 million overnight without any difficulties, so that
it just seems to me that if people want to gamble it would be

•

cheaper for them to gamble in the organized market or in Reno rather
than taking this sort of risk they are taking.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Your statement then is that you don't

believe interest rates .•.
MR. MAISEL:

I'm saying that most financial firms in the

United States do not believe it because they are in the future's
market.

They are selling contracts three and a half years out at

interest rates at less than one percent under today.

And if money

firms felt the opposite that market wouldn't be being made.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. MAISEL:
compared to 14 percent.

1

Today's interest being?

Today's -- these are interest rates at 15 percent
In other words the rate three and a half

years from now is only about a 14 percent.
ASSEMBLY!4AN COSTA:

I'm glad you told me.

I have a wager

with a known lobbyist in Sacramento on whether interest rates would
drop below 12 percent or not.
MR. MAISEL:

Well, they may, but if you want to hedge your

bet you could easily hedge your bet in one of the best organized
markets in the country.
ASSEM BLYMAN COSTA:

I have a steak dinner on it.
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CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

I just wished

'd get reapportionment

settled soon so that we can all move and buy our
poor sales.

Go ahead.

Talk about

(Laughter)

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

... some real

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

financing.

There seem to be a number of

condominiums for sale in Riverside.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
MR. MAISEL:

I didn't think it would be that bad.

The second part is that people don't realize

how volatile mortgage interest rates are.

If you look at the last

three years of Ginnie Mae contracts, they fluctuated by over 30 percent,
which means that interest rates of the last three years have fluctuated
by over 50 percent.

This is what has happened to the main mortgage

market over the last three years.

There's been over 50 percent

fluctuation from nigh to low and all that we can say though is that
the price that rules today is what the majority of the market, or
the average of the market thinks.

In other words,

cture is

that there is a market now for loans to be made three years

now.

That market price has to be the middle of what the average person
in the market thinks.

Those who think the market

ce is wrong

should be buying or selling ...
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. MAISEL:
percent.
same.

And that price is?

That price, I'll say, is a 1

over 14

It's also bad for U.S. government bonds, it s roughly the

The market applies to U.S. government bonds of 20 years or

to Ginnie Mae mortgages.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Is that a general

f

?

Has

it been accurate in the last ten years?
MR. MAISEL:

No, what is accurate is
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cannot show

that anybody could have used any other information to beat the market,
but the market turns out to be wrong.
around the average.

The fluctuations are wide

But there is no way of saying I want to be

average in beating the market.

That's more than a rule of thumb.

There's several hundred studies that show this is the case.

What

the market reflects on any day is an average of what people think.
It turns out a year from now we'll know the market was wrong.

You

couldn't have had 50 percent fluctuations in the market if the
market was right.

So people will be wrong, but there's no way of

saying I know that the market is going to be wrong.

You can bet

aginst the market but you have to assume that what the market is
saying today is the average of what everybody who was in this market
thinks.

And this, as I say is most of the large institutions in the

country.

Most of the large banks, most of the large mortgage firms

and so on.
The third point along the same line is that there is no
reason to assume that housing prices will continue to rise as they
have in the past faster than the average interest rate.

In other

words, if we look at the housing market historically we know two
types of things.

•

One, when housing prices have gone up much faster

than the inflation rate for a period, they tend to go up slower
than the inflation rate.

During the last ten years they have tended

to go up much faster than the inflation rate primarily because there
were negative real interest rates after taxes in the market so that
anybody buying in that market was getting a subsidy from the U.S.
government to buy the house.

This tended to drive up housing prices.

Again what we would have to assume then, if we look at history, is
that over the next ten years what should prevail is the rate of
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inflation less some, instead of plus some.

In

words

housing

prices should go up slightly less or somewhat less

rate of

inflation, so that anybody who is betting that they

go

than the rate of inflation is simply projecting the trends of the last
ten years which are not correct, historically.
And the fourth point is that there's no reason to assume
that institutions will have more money.

Again if you bet that

institutions will be able to do this as Tony

sa

you're going against the whole philosophyof

s
stration

s

which, in effect, is trying to see that money goes for other purposes
out of the housing market.

So there is no good reason it seems to me

to bet against the President.

He's been very ef

points legislatively, and in other ways.

making his

I wouldn't suggest that

anybody bet against him ..
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

You agree with all the statements

have been made this morning.
MR. MAISEL:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Dr. Maisel, your assumpt

is there's a fixed universe of capital in the
pie is simply being split.

States

Isn't it possible

because of
to the

free floating interest rates that capital might
United States and therefore, increase the universe

e.

And,

therefore increase the supply for home mortgages eventual
MR. MAISEL:

I don't think the orders of magnitude are ...

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Is the capital

commercial and governmental sector such

it

the
ilter

to the home mortgage market.
MR. MAISEL:

It can, but the
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is is

other

In other words, the tax bill

e

s

extremely profitable

to make capital investments this ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
invest in home mortgages.
now, the all-lenders, al
MR. MAISEL:

It

so

s

What is the
savers

that is just being considered

11?

No, if you're ta

an existing certificate

about the special saving

the new certi

cate and you get ...
five or 80 percent of that

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
is earmarked for home construction or
MR. MAISEL:

profitable to

loans.

No.

of the bill that passed

is that it says that for the next year savings and loans can issue
savings certificates in which investors have to pay only 70 percent
of the rate they would otherwise have to pay so that somebody in the
40 percent or higher tax bracket

a tax
s

money into that as opposed to
don't think that

s real

amount

cates, but I

to very much.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

to my

interest rates

don't think that f

putting his

1

question.

You

cause capital to immigrate

into the United States?
MR. MAISEL:

As I say, I don't -- no, because the rates

in other countries have to

ust, or

regulations of
se, you begin to get very

other countries have to adjust.

large transfers through the money markets
drive the exchange rate against

We've had it already.

You

se other currencies down and the

farther you drive them down the more

lt you make the transfer

of money, so that the orders of magnitude compared to the amount of
new money we lend in this country every year, I don't think they're
important.
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. MAISEL:

Thank you.

Mr. Chairman I would

answer questions.

I could go on, but I know you're pressed for
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

A bas

ques

be, given the

fact that even though California's ten percent or

f

the gross national product of this country, are

of
pol

that are implementable by the State Legis

ies

do anything

to militate against this depreciation of

or

housing availability in California?
MR. MAISEL:

As I say I think

are.

position, my first action would be to try to
taking creative financing.
it continues.

Because I

If I were

your

e who are

ct
it is a necess

It seems to me that the first cr

that
is to make

sure that they are aware fully of what they are

s into.

Secondly,
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

We can do

How

pro

you take care of the problem that -- of those who

j

in?
MR. MAISEL:

It seems to me that you have

s question of

some kind of moratorium over foreclosures

s.

seems to me, as a minimum, you have to

It

ist that

to

make payments as they were agreed to,
were no payments agreed to.

were j

We had cases

c

where,
, so you're

in effect, you funded the interest rates

made no

going to be in difficulties doing it,

seems to me you can't

a complete morator

po

or you d go into

morning that you are creating problems.
we are

a s

But it does seem to me

want

where you
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s

s

of moratoriums.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Mr. Robinson.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Doctor, you mentioned something at

lunch that I want to bring out.

Is

your professional opinion that

the existing system, and by that I mean prior to the deregulation move
in Washington starting with the last administration, were we allocating
a certain component of credit to the housing market, and would the
end result of deregulation, the repeal of Reg Q and what have you, be
to remove that credit allocation, so that there was no special pool
of money for the housing market.
MR. MAISEL:

As I told you earlier, my opinion is that we

were allocating credit, that it was successful by probably lowering
mortgage rates somewhere between one-half a percent or one percent
under what they otherwise would have been.

But as high interest

rates have come along, as the deregulation has come along over
last six or seven years, that one-half to one percent has been
disappearing and
opinion.

may have disappeared completely.

I would also say

the average person in the field would

probably not have agreed that
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
appreciate your testimony.
defense.

was

Thank you

large.
much, Professor.

We

We will now have Doug Gillies for the

Oh, excuse me Mr. Gillies.

who has to leave by four o'clock.
he's here.

That's my

Apparently we have one witness

Maybe we'll take him first, if

Ken Rosen, who's the Chairman of the Center for Real

Estate and Urban Economics, University of California, Berkeley.
MR. KEN ROSEN:
front here.

Thank you very much

putting me up

It's going to be hard to match Sherman Maisel's

excellent performance.

But ...
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CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

You think

's bad

if you had to

follow Mr. Gillies!
MR. ROSEN:

Basically my test

is

little

bit different than some of the other things

I'd

like to talk about the restructuring of the hous

system

f

and put creative financing in that context,

you

have to look at the overall dramatic changes

are occurr

mortgage market and what effects

have on

for the next five or six years.
What I'd like to talk about f

st is to look at extens

creative financing and how much is going on re

to,

s say,

the past, then talk about the changing sources of
And lastly, give you a potential solution to

s and

existing lower rate mortgages and second or
sellers or other credit companies to the
assume

g
of the house.

is a similar definition probably not

by
So I

arne but

te similar.
These estimates come from bas

source

of data.

The Department of Housing and Urban Deve

out data on

new mortgage originations that are being

And then one can
the

calculate the absolute value of activity
number of home transactions times the pr
to value ratio.

age loan

s the

So by comparing the two you can tel

many

so

sort

mortgages are being assumed, dollar amount, and
seller financing must be going on.

So what

s means

s
lve

essentially at least half of all exi
s assumption of mortgages or seller
least

f, at a

f

a very
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At

In terms of net

extens

to Table 2, it shows there's

a

extension by traditional lenders.
restructuring of the market.

, if you want to turn
c decl

And

s real

in net mortgage
confirms

s

Commercial banks, savings and loans

share of the mortgage market used to be about 65 percent
there's a net credit extens

that's

1978,

to about 44 percent in

1980 and this is partly because they haven't been able to attract
the deposits because of money market mutual funds and o
like this, partly because of the i

things

lity of the present or

the previous sets of instruments.

And

place of that has risen

up another type of creative financing which is different than
seller financing we're talking about or assumable mortgages and
that's mortgage pools, whereby f
then sold on a secondary market.
through security.

t mortgages are pooled up and
And this is a Ginnie Mae pass

Some of you may be

Callie Mae

program that people are working on here.
about the primary source of credit

se pools are now just

terms of net mortgage extensions

nationwide.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

•

That's the

MR. ROSEN:

ect of our hearing tomorrow.

I just wanted to let you know that that's

the change of structure you are
ASSEMBLYr1AN ROBINSON:
MR. ROSEN:

These are national figures now.

These are all national figures.

California

s sort of information.

Lastly let

numbers are not available on

me give you what I think is the seller and lender's problem.
basically there are really two separate problems.
we have a profitability crisis.

And,

For lenders,

That is, lenders stuck with these

old mortgages which they've made from one to five years ago, are
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stuck with mortgages that are far

low

they are now having to fund the l

li

we have a prof

lity crisis for

and loans in California are los

cases and

s

rates.

lenders.

So

al

vast

same

thing is true of commercial banks who ho

these,

financing problem, if there is a problem as
affordability of housing

first

that many lenders are facing

of

home

the market.

t'

I ' l l try to do it quickly.
Basically, as you realize, the la
seen a dramatic restructuring of the hous

o

years has
tern

California and throughout the country.

is

really a function of the interaction of
market

deregulation effort on the part of the
conditions have

volati

ized by
short

st rates,

long term

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. ROSEN:

Dr. Rosen.

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
would just tell us that you

th al

s

f you

lt rather than

ease.
MR. ROSEN:
of

depos

Bas
s

side

preceding very rapidly.

is

s

It means that

anyone
s and

1 banks have to pay

70 percent of their
wi

s

more

anticipated two years ago.
loans and commerc

ly,

sit accounts.

the Treasury
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luctuate

where basically the asset side of the savings and loans and commercial
banks also has to be

And at

new mortgages were

level

the

commercial banks which give
asset side for new mortgages,

ally

move completely with market rates.

So we're

al freedom on the
rate

s

a situation now,

rates or nearly completely flexible

rates on the deposit side for
the asset side.

ng

s and loans and also for

basically es

where we have completely

s

1

titutions -- on

Now what this has done, this

is really what you have to look at

lation environment,

terms of why creative financing

is occurring.
Creative financing

lf, just to

of

you some

how much has occurred, my estimate is that, if you want to turn on
page 4 of the testimony, there 1 s an estimate of how much has occurred.

15 percent of transactions

Traditionally in 1970 through '78
on existing homes involved

By

f

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
definition on creative

Doctor, you're using the same
been used by our previous

that

witnesses.
MR. ROSEN:

Well, I'm not sure since I wasn't here.

I'll

tell you what my definition

This is basically assumptions of

mortgages, these old mortgages.

At

terrible problem, an affordabili

same
crisis.

mortgage rates you have buyers unable to
Someone trying to buy a

the

has a

Because of these high
ify for new mortgages.

now cannot qualify for a 17 or 18

percent mortgage rate or 16 percent mortgage rate.

So you've got

a terrible situation for both the lenders and borrowers.

And it

seems to me that there has to be a solution other than creative
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financing to this problem.

And so what I propose

this testimony is a solution.

And the so

I

st page of
ve been

for six years and finally, one month ago the

on

1 Home Loan

Board was authorized to this solution.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

MR. ROSEN:

Congratulations.

Now let me tell you what

is.

I think that a number of lenders have started to

these

and borrowers are overwhelmingly posi

The

who are making them, there is one in Cali

and one

s

New Jersey

and others are thinking about it, have overwhe
this new mortgage.

And basically the

a dual-interest rate mortgage.

And

s

is

A dual-

called
And

st rate

what that instrument does is set two different interest rates.
a short term

an accrual interest rate set which is bas
rate plus some premium.

That interest rate

varied every six months and

can be

lS

's a var

So

le

that can

payment rate which the borrower pays

set at a

present

of different levels, but is usually set
probably 300-500 basis points below the

rate

can be set on a graduated basis.

be set

That it

at 10 or 11 percent today but then it would go up one

rate
et s say
a year
rate

Or a

might very well most likely fall in that
of this, the difference between

11 or

The second rate is a

on the accrual amount on the loan outs

until it reaches that market rate.

t

to a treasury

's usually

an intermediate treasury security.

There's

e

per

accrual rate and the

rate, which may be positive as it is now or

be

added or subtracted

ng

out
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, is

I call the dual-interest rate
called the graduated

, a vari

of this is something

adjustable rate

what the Federal Home Loan

Board

And

author zed.

is used in Canada and a number of other countries

is

s instrument
successful

and is used in England
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Is

a

rollover

ch turns

over in five years?
MR. ROSEN:

A

an rollover

But they also have this

f

adjus

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. ROSEN:

It can

rate mortgage.

one,

or five years?

s is not a rollover

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
amortization?

s a

To

is

It seems to me

current economic environment

with that scheme you're going to
MR. ROSEN:

have four;

amortiz

If rates

first year you would

neg a

are now,
sis

500

and it

s;

second, you

But of course rates will not s

where they are now.
ASSEMBLYMAN

TA:

Where are

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
then.

You

go
sagree

the last

tness

Your colleagues?
MR. ROSEN:

No, I'm not

talking about the futures market

at all with him.
terms of

rates, but the

short term treasury bill rate,

is

a very sharp decline

bill rate on

They expect the treasury

the
11 rate to

He's

accrual rate, they have

on

future's market.

order of 11 to 12

percent ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
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bel

administration.

MR. ROSEN:

No, no it's the same market.

the same market except for treasury bills.
with the changes in

I

's

And

am s

regulations that

is
asset

and liabilities side you've got to change

to

make it more palatable for the lender and
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

We under

what

are you making toward the interest rates
ASSEMBLYM~N

ROBINSON:

I want to

s.

wou

happen if this instrument has been
MR. ROSEN:
simulation.

Okay, I would suggest

They have done simulations.

would probably not have

do a

I

sugge

more defaults on

s

that you

trument than

any other instrument.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
I'm worr

about is

No, I

\vhat

't

negative

MR. ROSEN:

You have

z

but

1

would

the

So, what you would have ... you

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

s

So what

i

a

appreciation of mortgage documents.
MR. ROSEN:
a SAM.

If you have an

s not

But if you had an upward trend

short side, and if you
could very well end up
appreciation mortgage.
not indexed.

But

s

not graduate
th something
It's not
that.

's something 1

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

The

- 13

closely like this shared apprec
MR. ROSEN:

No it isn t.

on the property value
same sort of thing.

f.
And

Because

But

iation depends

the

would have the

the borrower.

borrower has to

realize that he would not
otherwise.

So there

as much as
to

it turns out, it's

sure statement.

to be a

with borrowers.

It's been offered

Loan

is the largest savings

s has been offered

And what I'm emphasizing to

i

you, is that the state ought to bas

authorize

this

1

would

because I think
financing.

New Jersey which

1

by San Diego Federal

However,

because

c

Lenders would want to

s new mortgage.

one of their low rate old mortgages

Borrowers

can

would want to parti
market and buy a house.

s

to 10 or 20 percent to

it work out.

the
on in

trument is not

zat

situation where

i

this break even for the borrower
Sherman Maisel, that

had, let's say, a

If

occurred at

a

you generally

trade

percent a year
per year to make
colleague,

And I agree

roughly at the

hous

inflation rate over the next ten

And as

as I'm aware this is not now authorized
to make

for California or state
authorized for federally chartered
going to see this as a popu

both the borrower

I think can

one it's the only instrument
and the lender.

than the present

's more

So this instrument, while

I think you're

st

instrument whi
35 -

It is

may

iminate the

need for much of the creative financing.

And we

cons

s

creative financing as well.
ASSEMBLY~iliN

ROBINSON:

do the funds come from?

I guess my f

st que

is

The total amount of

where
ints

s

and below in California chartered savings and
very substantial.

is

Where is the money coming

in lieu of creative financing?

s

f

Where is the

of

from?
MR. ROSEN:

There are two aspects

f

One is the assumption of the old rate
extension of a mortgage by the seller.
there 1 s really no

is an
of the mortgage

On the as

very

fference in the amount of

little difference in the amount of money.
still have to occur to some extent if

seller f
don't

f

have that sort of money but ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
creative financ

is

Do

agree

for

from the Wel
------'"-

the dollars of funds available to
lender?
MR. ROSEN:
Wellenkamp decis
mortgage.

I

I think that's es

an o

makes it very desirable to as

think there is an incorrect

sellers that they would rather take that
their price.

correct, that

In essence,

on

rate
of

paper than lower

a free

are rational there shouldn't be very
give some back at 12

rate is

on a

17 percent, you're giving that person a subs
whatever
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three

s or

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

I know,

I'm just trying to

understand where the money is going to come from.
buyer that right now is

to use creat

of that dual situation, how
MR

ROSEN:

this instrument.

rel

s

prospective
f

ing because

some of

I'll tell you

with

is no

,

s instrument is done

If

pressure?

there will be
credit today

a secondary market and as I

1 National Mortgage

is coming from that secondary market.

s agreed to purchase this

Association, on much effort on my
mortgage.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

•

MR. ROSEN:

At

discount rate?

About a half ... S

is an organized market that

from a fixed payment mortgage.

and

already discounts this type of
points.

I think this

sis discount

sis to 60

I would 1

tes

75 basis

's by 50

a look

to

at carefully, and see if
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Could I
, it's

rate interest mortgage as I
graduated payment
MR. ROSEN:

?

a form

a

?

It

feature with

s

feature is what the

the variable rate

, a borrower who

borrower must have in order to get into
cannot quali

The

ini

for the 16 or 17

1

But because of

can afford higher payments.

inflation after five years a
most

Probably 10 to 11 percent is
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

time buyers can afford.

You're in effect working toward a

goal which is about five years ahead, and presumably gets higher by
then.
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MR. ROSEN:

What inflation has

is

mortgage

interest rates, but it does not take into account

that incomes

se roughly half to one

the

present fixed payment
the lender.

rate

So the

is

borrower

The lenders understand that.

so

that, I think in many cases, because

lly

tilts their payment stream so
up front and it bas

st

ly skews

it very difficult to qualify.

and makes
And that's

think, helps both borrowers and

s

I

market,

accepts it, but it does look
from both sides,

s these

s.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

You weren'

s

Mae is

essence this is really the blended rate
currently

Is
MR. ROSEN:

not correct?

The

is

market

see i

s.

Mae is

rate
But what

f

s is

get
e

a dif
st of all.

It's a new

ASSEf4BLYMAN COSTA:

On

a

a new

new loan, doesn t that
MR. ROSEN:

form

b

It

But

't

payment.

is a

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
rate

you

ust it so once

You
t

on a

terms

what Tony Frank
s

is

or

between

le
of

- 138 . . ,

to

ground, to allow an interest rate

a

this point in time, blending the two rates
Afu~

it the vehicle of an

, at

cou

ng

and then

or VRM so that

re

current trends of the
MR. ROSEN:

s

I

s sound s

considers this a dif

Mae

lar.

they have a purchase

program for this one

program.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Do you

advantages over their blended rate

s instrument has

question I have is, do you bel
mechanism or the

ss the second

trument, and I
dual

rate

to

st rate

a prospective due on

sale clause within it?
MR. ROSEN:

Basically you can come

sort

dual rate rhetoric

believe

You

are

I

no due on s
Because

s instrument
f

reason you need due on sale is because

rate.

rates.

were flat you wouldn't need due on sale
on

perceive you not needing

If the trend

But in
I

The on

One is

two

we have had a tremendous up

I

under this
.interest

rate.

or not.

LUHLL·~nation

f

on where

rate and where
very similar.

are technical.

i

I

s instrument,

't

will

require it.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. ROSEN:

How about prepayment penalties.

I

this instrument there

probably would be a small prepayment
costs in early years, but I would
would drop to a very small amount
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ty to cover transaction
prepayment penalty
or four or five years.

You have to cover some transact
that's the reason you wou
the lender's go

want one.

to

In

co

s and I

s

rates

the

basi

going to get below market rates for a

, but

will be going up to market rates as
ASSEMBLY~1AN

STIRLING:

s income rise .

Dr. Rosen, is

to

ratio test in your instrument?
MR. ROSEN:

There isn't one.

one

on so that you don't want to be in a si
negative amortization over 100 percent.
assumptions on the economy
the

g

rea

even if

go up on

lation rate on average and you start

loan

between let's say between 80 and 90 you're
any problem

half

value

not

to

most cases as long as you

Again, you're always going to have cases of
any

one is real

I

more subject to

or not

than the pre

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
I

As

term,

concern

se is a good

what you

no more

t's

cons stent
over

rate and that sort of

with the b
long term that

owing

could end

to

store and not have a way out of it.
MR. ROSEN:
is not likely.

the vast

that

I

want to

One

go over 95 percent or 98 percent or

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. ROSEN:

I

you cou
0

not
va
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once
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the cases

't
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?

so.
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as

market conditions that are likely, I would say that the number of
cases you have that would violate any restriction like that would be
very small unless there was actual

So I think you wouldn't

have that as a real problem.
I think the other thing to say about this is it's very
essential that consumers understand this instrument.

And as long

as they understand that they may not build up equity as fast, I think
there shouldn't be any problem with consumer acceptance.

And again

initial experiments, talking to people both in San Diego and in New
Jersey, public acceptance is just overwhelming.

They just have

tremendous numbers of people who want this lower initial rate and are
willing to take the variable rate feature with it.
been some suggestion that the full var
accepted by consumers.

As you know

there~s

le rate mortgage will not be

This is a way to get, I think, the consumer

benefit and the lender benefit.

And again we'll have to see if lenders

and consumers like it, but it seems to me we ought to try for this
sort of thing.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

You're not suggesting any caps on

interest rates then on either one of the rates.
MR. ROSEN:

I think ...

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

The cap you suggested is the prudent

one that is normally enforced by the federal, various regulatory
agencies that they can't lend more than 100 percent of the values.
MR. ROSEN:

That's right, basically that.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

I guess the reason I raised it is

because I remember the time in San Diego when Aerospace moved out,
and people had to walk away from their homes ...
MR. ROSEN:

Yes, but that was with a fixed payment mortgage.
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This could add a small amount extra risk,
to the process.

's no

But the amount is very small.

about during any sort of normal period.

about that,

We're really talking

Now's

you have ever had, and we're talking about a
of five percent.

amortization

But the present situation just won

more than a year or two.

period

most

last for

It's also much less comp

these creative financing schemes, and

ss

1

to

ect I

consumers' misunderstanding.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Is there an

increase in home values in the non-sunbe
states?

between the

states versus the sunbelt

Does a house appreciate as fast

downtown Akron,

Ohio as it does in San Diego?
MR. ROSEN:

Well, in the last five years Cali

house

prices have gone up basically two and three times faster than other
parts of the country.

But I think that was

to two circumstances.

One, we had a tremendous immigration of people
country as we had a

the rest of the
late 70's.

strong employment

The second, we had a set of lenders' cont
the state where building was very diff
in demand without the supply

ing

s pro i
, so you
s driven

So

s is not true in other

up 1n California relative to other places.
sunbe

states.

's

It is not true in Texas

it's not true in Florida and it is true

p

to bui

s such as Washington,

D.C. and certain parts of New Jersey where they do

lending

restrictions, so I think the blame is on land use.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

one ob

Let me g

and you tell me whether it seems right or not.
with a lot of people

past, the
2 -

that

I

to you
scussed this

subsidized housing construction and employment in this country.
public didn't really win on that.

The

The trade unions won, the savings

and loans won, the realtor won, but the public did not win.

By and

large the more money made available the more it was absorbed in
labor agreements and mortgage points and in the amount charged by the
realtor to sell it.
MR. ROSEN:

Do you believe this?
No, I don't think that's true.

I think that

if anyone has absorbed this rise in prices it's been land cost.

The

only major component of housing other than mortgage financing that
has risen in price dramatically has been land.

It's not labor;

it's

not construction materials; it's land because basically local public
policies have restricted the growth of activity.

In terms of what

I think might happen in the future in this regard, I think there is
a perception in California that our problem has been of land use
policies.

And I think that has been the main problem.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

We just commented on that.

I have

heard that rhetoric time and time again and to an extent I agree
with it, but I want to tell you about a factual matter in San Diego
county.

The major tracts of land are owned by about six major owners.

And there's some indication that they're doing what the DeBeers do
with their diamonds.

They just simply feed it out as they can see

the market absorbing it.
MR. ROSEN:

I think that there certainly could be something

there in terms of supply of land.

In the San Francisco Bay Area which

is the one I am most familiar with, it's definitely local public policy.
It's proven by at least a half dozen studies that that really has
been the major cause of this rise in prices.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

I simply want to remind the members that
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our hearing is really not on all the problems in the housing market
but simply on creative financing.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Mr. McAlister.
That's very true, however, if we

really were to strike a blow for truth and justice it may well be
that the best blows we could strike would be at these restrictive
land use policies.

In doing so, we may have to run counter to some

other values that many of us cherish, such as local control, as well
as the still strong political attachment by many segments of the
state to restricted growth, or no growth and environmental values,
and so forth.

At some point we may have to decide which are the most

important values.

I tend to agree that these land use restrictions

that are largely imposed on the local level are the single most important
factor in the skewing of the situation in California as related to
the rest of the country.

You can travel through the country and there

are only a few other parts of the country that in anyway resemble our
ridiculous real estate situation.
MR. ROSEN:

In 1970, house prices in California averaged

the same as the rest of the country.
about 60 percent higher.

At the present time they are

And it's coincident with land use controls.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

I think

the Bay Area it's more

than 60 percent.
MR. ROSEN:

Double.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

To get that you include places like

Dinuba and Needles.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Needles is not in the Bay Area.

Reapportionment might bring Needles though to
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

I'm not sure

only because CEQA (California Environmental Qual
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Area.
's local control
Act

the map

act and the general plan requirements are all state imposed mandates.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

You left out the Coastal Act, Mr.

Stirling.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
responsibility.

The state bears a share of

The Supreme Court of course interpreted CEQA more

restrictively than I think the Legislature intended it to be applied.
I'm not sure what we do about all this, but seemingly this would be
a place to strike a blow.
MR. ROSEN:

I think a balance is needed clearly because

I think some of the positive features of land use controls and the
environmental movement have to be protected as well, but I think we've
moved to one extreme.

I think we might need to move back towards a

balance realizing that if California's economy is to grow and if we
are to provide housing at a reasonable cost for people, both new
and existing, we really need some sort of reversal in those policies.
I think there was a start last year by the Legislature in that regard.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. ROSEN:

Would that include rent control?

No.

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

I think that you realize now the futility

of trying to direct these types of discussions at one of these hearings.
We do appreciate your testimony very much, Professor Rosen.

We have

a bill moving now that would allow state chartered savings and loans
to use virtually all instruments that the federal government allows, so
that could very well, if it passes, encompass yours.

I think it's

probably likely at some future time that we would want to again ask
for your assistance when we review some of these instruments.
MR. ROSEN:

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Thank you.
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Here comes Mr. Gillies.

I

hate to say this Mr. Gillies, but the Commissioner of Real Estate is
here and he interrupted his vacation to be here.

I have agreed to

allow him to come on first, and then we'll take your testimony.
Commissioner ..•
MR. FOX:
my schedule.

Thank you.

I appreciate your accommodating

At the same time I think it's a little bit dangerous

letting Mr. Gillies speak after me.
To me, the term creative financing doesn't have any
precise meaning, and our meaning is any method to finance real estate
purchases other than long term fully amortized, fixed or adjustable
rate interest loans.

Basically, most creative financing transactions

have been built around three basic assumptions;

first, that mortgage

loans will be available to the buyer at lower rates when the balloon
payments for seconds or thirds mature in a short rate of time;

second,

that the buyer's income will increase sufficiently in this short period
of time to qualify for a conventional loan when the balloon payments
are due;

and third, that real estate will continue to rise at

substantially the same rate as inflation has occurred during the last
few years.
I believe that if any one of those three presumptions does
not come true, that thousands of home buyers that have bought their
homes recently and are buying them now through creative financing
mechanisms stand to lose their homes through foreclosure.

Also, the

creative financing business is conducted in often a nonregulated
environment and most of the buyers and sellers are unsophisticated.
They lack the fundamental benefits of full and detailed
of the true cost of financing, and what their respons
liabilities really are

these

sclosures
lities and

It seems to me that
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many of these buyers and sellers are basically, because of market
conditions, forced to gamble in a game of real estate roulette
where the house odds are stacked against them.

And this may come

to pass more and more in 1982 and 1983.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. FOX:

Excuse me, Mr. Fox.

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

You heard some of the previous

testimony, especially from the attorneys.

They indicated that the

realtors are in a really dangerous position now as people start
looking for scapegoats on the transactions that have gone sour.
They're going to be back after folks that you license.

Are you

recommending any corrective steps to either insulate the realtors
or improve their professionalism or their sustainability in a
law suit to kind of correct this problem.
MR. FOX:

Well, basically the realtors have the obligations

of making full disclosure of all material facts in a real estate
transaction.

That's an existing legal burden that they have.

And

we have found that in a vast majority of cases they are in fact,
complying with that responsibility.

There are some real estate

licensees that have acted in fraudulent ways and have engaged in
I

dishonest dealings through these creative financing schemes •..
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

The ones I am aware of are folks

that have been realtors for years and understand how to walk the
streets and get a listing and how to make showings and how to make
the sale.

But what's confusing to them and everybody else in the

entire world right now are the financial instruments that are
available to them.
to be an expert.

There's no way, I think, unless the person has
If they don't get many listings they are not going
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to be up on that.

So I don't think it's intentional.

I'm just

wondering if the professionalism and the licensure of the mortgage
brokers and those sorts of things, in-service training, bonding and
that sort of stuff are being proposed by your department to preempt
this problem.
MR. FOX:

We have examined some of those suggestions.

bonding is heavily opposed by the mortgage loan brokers.

The

And, we

had to delete that from some legislation, Senate Bill 391.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. FOX:

But you

propose

Yes, we did propose the bonding.

We also

proposed a separate endorsement on the real estate license for
mortgage loan brokers.

That was heavily opposed by the CAR.

And

so that was also deleted from the legislation.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

How about the arms length transaction

between the broker and the escrow agent?
MR. FOX:

We haven't made a proposal in that area yet, the

idea of the independent escrow, because I haven't seen enough evidence
that there is really substantial harm because there are broker owned
escrows in some of the transactions.

However, that's really the basic

problem, the terms of the creative financing transaction.

The independent

escrow company is there simply to facilitate the transaction, and they
don't have any authority over the terms of the transaction.
not sure if that would be appropriate.

So I'm

At the same time, to the

extent that the realtors feel that they need more guidance, they
have extensive legal staff of their own and they have very well re
legislative capacity to seek new legislation if
the best interest of the profession.
leadership in that area in terms of
48 -

So I am looking to
courses,

or some kind of estab

shed guidelines.

I haven't heard from the

realtors yet in that area.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Well, the question is whether, in

the public interest, there are problems emerging that, irrespective of
whether CAR

reco~~ends

further encroachment on their freedom, whether

the Administration's got recommendations.
MR. FOX:

You started talking about them as potential

scapegoats and whether or not they were in a disadvantageous position.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

My basic concern, I think, and

everybody else here, is about the public, the unsuspecting public.
And I'm not indicting at all the quality or motivation of every realtor
that I know personally.

I'm only alluding to the potential for these

balloons popping and then the realtors looked to for scapegoats.

Both

people lose, the realtor and the public.
MR. FOX:

I think that there is an issue of more disclosure

to the public about exactly what a home buyer and a home seller are
going to .•• about what the potential for harm is.

It might take the

form in some kind of a written disclosure that they have to sign off
on that they've read and considered.

But even in that area people,

in my experience, when they are buying homes or selling homes have
their minds made up and they go ahead and purchase and gamble even
if you tell them that the odds are against them.
to have a lot of impact.

It doesn't seem

We issue a public report on new subdivisions.

A lot of time we talk about the potential problems, and people have
been buying the homes and ignoring the problems without paying much
attention to them because they've decided to purchase.
And as I said earlier, they're gambling that interest
rates will reduce in the future, that their income will increase or
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ever been

or worse than
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could even come c

we

losure
1

better guide to get around

a home

to

have ever had, it seems to me,
think the problems are as

on

to

I

I

ler

s

want to.

That's part of the condition of
ASSEMBLYr~N

STIRLING:

sale.

The Department of Real Estate's

job is to regulate in the public interest.

Do you see a problem

in terms of the secondary or the creative financing?

If so, has

it manifested itself in complaints against your licensees and what
have you done about it, and what do you propose to do about it?
MR. FOX:

Okay, yes.

There are problems in creative

financing, and we have increased our scrutiny of the activities of
the licensees to make sure there is still disclosure of .•.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Have you gotten increased complaints

against your licensees?
MR. FOX:

We have had an increase in the number of complaints

over the last two years.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Are they stemming from creative

financing and failure to disclosure?
MR. FOX:

Some of them are stemming from that, yes.

We

have brought more actions against licensees to revoke licenses because
they didn't disclose the terms or the impact of the creative financing
elements in the transaction.
kind of a epidemic.

t

However it's not what I would call any

It is an increased problem and we are giving it

more emphasis.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Do you agree that it's only the tip

of the iceberg now and as the ballons start coming due in the next
three years, that this will mushroom into a serious problem?
MR. FOX:
don't come to pass.

I agree with that if those three assumptions
If we have lower interest rates, continued high

inflation, housing prices and people's income go up, then they can
refinance and we won't have the foreclosures, but if all of those three
- 151 -

don't come true, I agree that there

11 be a

as people buying a house on their creative
a two or three year balloon

terms today with

negative

z

really buying are trust deed time bombs

re

are

two or three, four years, and there will be, I
increase in foreclosures.

look at it

I

, a

The members of the

al
11

severely that are caught in that squeeze.

are new

instruments available that they can use
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

que

testimony here, it is basically a

at your
of

and

what the problems are, but I'm specifical

in what you
up here?

propose as a preemptive or first-aid as was
can we do instead of waiting around for this to b

up

What
s

our

to preempt it from becoming a problem from your
MR. FOX:

Okay.

One recommendation

Department of Real Estate has responsibil
report, the public report, which a

right

s

subdivided

sale of

out to

dwelling units, and in the Atlas Mortgage case,
, we

be a fraud, Atlas is now in receiver

were going

report disclosing that the financing ar
at a severe

to use for the sale of the homes put the
but we did not have the authority to withho
of this creative financing

potentially very detrimental to the buyers.

the f

go

t is

- 152 -

Estate

of

We could come

st.

s

s

f

package, if we

to be

our

One
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for your consideration is giving the

with the new subdivis

our approval

was

authority to review the

ic

issue a

the

1

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Couldn't you just have the Department

of Corporations or Franchise Tax go after them?
MR. FOX:
illegal.

You mean after the sak?

No, not really.

What they're doing is not illegal.

buyers a high-risk gamble.

It's not

They were giving home

What Atlas said, in effect, is we're going

to create a trust deed mortgage on the home which will cost you a $500
a month payment for two years, but after that you're on your own.

The

reality is in the third year the payment instead of being $500 went
up to $1,170 in today's market, which would wipe out most of the home
buyers, and the negative amortization was $12,000.

So they would

owe $12,000 more two years later than what they started with.

So if

we had the authority to review the financing and say, "That's not an
acceptable financing package.

We won't approve this for sale to the

public," I think that would be very helpful.

Of course, that only

goes for new construction.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

But the majority of the problem here

in terms of the creative financing is on existing transfers?
MR. FOX:

Yes, 85 percent of the home sales in California are fol

existing homes and what I'm talking about would only effect the 15 percent.
The existing homes is the larger problem.

There are, for example, in

existing homes, there are transactions that are taking place today which
are called cash-to-buyer kinds of transactions, which I think need to
be much more regulated than they are now.
the buyer makes

This is a situation where

a deal with the seller where a new loan is taken out

by the seller and the buyer gets a substantial amount of cash out of
the new loan;

$20,000, $30,000, $40,000, $50,000 and the seller takes

back a large second trust deed, maybe a $100,000 or 60, 70, 80 percent
of the value of the property.

The reality is that when the transaction
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is consummated, the buyer has bought the house

no cash down.

He gets $20,000, $30,000, $40,000 in cash and walks
house.

The seller is left with this huge new

him by the buyer.

p

These cash-to-buyer trans

It's not a major problem.

from the
what's owed
are

te dangerous.

It doesn't happen that

to the

extent that this is going one, I think we need some

s

prohibiting that kind of transaction.
ASSEt1BLYMAN COSTA:

As head of

Department of Real Estate

and the issuer of the license to those

that

or 75 percent of those transfers of sales, I

probably 70
it s

s

20 percent today of transactions between two
MR. FOX:

s.

Yes, approximately.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Twenty to 25 percent, so 70 to 75 percent

of these people are licensed through your office to make these transfers
of sale.

What can you do to prevent that

occurr

under the

sanction of the license that you issue them?
MR. FOX:

Well there again full

sc

is one

for the seller ...
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Full

sc

really amount

to a lot.
MR. FOX:

The other possibility on

-buyer is some

sort of legislation that restricts the sale of the

to a transaction

that reflects the fair market value of the home

an

lated
home.

value, without new loans that are beyond the actual va
This is not a major problem.

It's one of

financing, but I don't think you have

of
transact

s

more than one half of one percent of the home s
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

You mean on
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te

one

witness suggested that it was much more than that.

Now there's a

book out by Robert G. Allen that advocates this type financing, and
maybe that will increase the number.
MR. FOX:

Yes, it's possible, although people, real estate

agents that have gone to the seminars on no-cash-down transactions,
when they try to put those transactions together they take it to another
broker.

On behalf of the seller, we often get a call to the seller's

broker asking us, "Is this legitimate?

Is it legal?

responsibilities in terms of disclosure?"

What are our

Our experience mostly has

been that the agents for the sellers are being responsible about making
sure their seller fully understands what is going on.
However, I don't know what the future holds, because there
are these seminars, and obviously it sounds good to buy with no cash
down.

I don't think it happens that often in reality.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

opinion.

The

pros~cuting

Well, we have a real disparity of

district attorney from San Diego County

indicated he thought intuitively that it was about 10 percent.
say it's half of one percent.

You

Isn't there some responsibility on your

part to investigate this or do a sample survey of a thousand transactions,
and let us know how it looks?
MR. FOX:

We can do it.

I'd be glad to do it, whether or

not we have the responsibility, sure.

If you going to do something

anyway, it's better to say you're glad to do it.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. FOX:

We're glad that your glad to do it.

Give us about 30 days, we'll provide you with

that information.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

I think that would be very significant.

I think it could be providing a real service to the district attorneys

- 155 -

and to the public.
MR. FOX:

I appreciate the suggestion, and we have a

mechanism to do that actually.

We have an education and research

fund available to fund research projects like that.

I'll even ask

Professor Rosen for some advice about how to do that, too.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
like to move on.

Well, unless there are other questions I'd

We very much appreciate you be

here, especially

since you had to interrupt your vacation with your family.

We have

your written testimony.
MR. FOX:

If any of the members have any questions in the

future, I'll be glad to answer them or respond.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Could you give the committee then a summary

of your report, findings when you've done that.
MR. FOX:

Absolutely.

Sure we'll have that done by the

end of August.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Can you contact the various district

attorneys and check with them to see what kind of stuff they're getting
into?
MR. FOX:

Yes, and I have a complaint about the district

attorneys by the way.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. FOX:

Okay.

enamored by the testimony.

Tell it to Judiciary.

Well, I just didn't want you to be too
In terms of the criminal aspects of

illegal conduct by real estate licensee, they're very slow to prosecute
criminally.

Wayne Burton, who heads Universal Financial has $100,000

invested in second trust deed investments, has yet to be charged with
any criminal violations.
light in January.

Now it's August and his scheme came to

We've already revoked
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s license,

s alre

receivership and the DA's office hasn't done anything.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
MR. FOX:

What county is that?

It's in San Bernardino County.

And I think that

that invites people who are interested in violating the law to go
ahead and make $50,000,000 and take a chance to fight it later criminally.
Thank you very much.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

There was some mention prior to your

arrival of the problems with the mortgage loan brokers strike force.
MR. FOX:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

You might want to indicate that you are

involved in this.
MR. FOX:

Sure.

We, the Business and Transportation and

Housing Agency has established a second trust deed mortgage strike
force.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. FOX:

I don't see what you're getting out.

Well we're coordinating our investigative efforts

with the Department of Corporations, Savings and Loans, Banks, and
receiving additional investigative help from other state departments.
The strike force has 43 cases under investigation with $100,000,000
invested in second trust deed and third trust deed schemes.

To

date, this year, the Department of Real Estate, as well as Department
of Corporations, has filed cases with over $250,000,000 at risk from
over 10,000 investors.

That's on the investors' side, and I understand

the focus of this committee is protection for the borrower.

However

the source of funds for the borrower often comes from these investments,
so we have been very active prosecuting licensees that are involved
in illegal conduct seeking the investors in the trust deeds.

That's

part of the problem, but I think the function of the committee here
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is on the borrowers' side.
CHAIF~N

MR

BOSCO:

Thank you, Commissioner.

FOX:

you.

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
from

Cali

We will now hear

Mr. Dug Gill

s

Association of Realtors.

MR. DUG GILLIES:
the

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen of

I am Dug Gillies of the Ca

Realtors,

as I

fornia Association of

the committee knows our Association represents

about 130,000 realtors and other associates who are deal
with buyers and

lers who are vitally concerned

you are

every day

th the topic that

availability or nonavailability of

for sale

of housing.

Almost 600,000 California famil

s

last year

creative financing was essential to the sale or

purchase of a home.

Therefore, the subject that you are dealing with

is a

one

if anything were done to,

creat

I

it

have prevented those 300,000

haven't heard anyone here today suggest

300 000 sellers; 300,000 buyers.
to sell or

so

because money was s

s,
cost so

not

was out of reach for them.

are not

le or
Special fiscal

to housing, of course.
a bit of time in creative f

s

government

of government itself.

finance

Mr. Costa has a

13,
ing to
11 this

assessment districts, which is a kind of

year on benef
f

These

ly could not have done so

f

because

effect, stop

ce

government.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
. GILLIES:

It's been called other things .

Creative financ
- 158 -

hous

seem to

encompass any innovative device, whether a loan or not, which makes
possible a provision of funds to facilitate the transfer of residential
property used generally when conventional methods of financing are
unavailable or unattractive.

The list would include:

installment

land sale contracts, which have been mentioned here today;
with option to purchase;

lease

land lease with a sale of improvements;

or seller take-back financing through a junior deed of trust.

Let

me stop at that point to say that each of the four that I have
mentioned earlier do not involve a loan.
is not a loan.
morning.

Seller take-back financing

Mr. Papan was inquiring quite a bit about usury this

The ursury law never applied, never applied to seller take-

back financing.

The courts have been very clear on that.

That is a

credit sale, an installment sale if you will, and it is the terms of
the sale, that are involved.

The parties may adjust the sale price

upward or downward in exchange for some term in the financing agreement.
You can not therefore isolate seller take-back financing as one item
without analyzing the entire agreement and the entire sale and what
the interrelationship of those factors might be.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Mr. Gillies would you define how

you're using "all-inclusive deed of trust."
MR. GILLIES:

Some all-inclusive deeds of trust are written

by institutional lenders and others are written by sellers.

Where

they are written by sellers, the terms of the all-inclusive also
might be varied in connection with some change in the price or some
other factor.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

It has been suggested that severe

restrictions be put on all-inclusive deeds of trust and that land
sales contracts be abolished.
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MR. GILLIES:

Well on the land

contract, if

to be abolished, and let me say, the witness this

were
who referred

to them in terms of horror may have looked at some cases
were great difficulties.

I assure you that

have

cases,

particularly in recent years, since normal

to

a trustee, where title insurance is granted on
forth, where they do not present these risks.

transact
At

so

same

installment and land sale contracts have
purchase of housing by buyers with no
afforded housing

any other way.

't have

A lot of run

0

for example, has been transferred on installment

sale contracts

because the seller wasn't willing to convey

th

down.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
lot of lawyers

I'm not a lawyer,

short tenure in this

I ve heard a

is

tuent

and colleagues, tell me that
both

contract

and that

s.
MR. GILLIES:
every day.

Half the lawyers

I can show you ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Does that

ce of

Court that decided Wellenkamp?

the

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

That half was

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR

GILLIES:

Now that was s

Professor Hetland,

the author of the book on financing which was
Education of the Bar, has written very
of us

state are wrong

an

contract
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to one.
of Law at

the title in trust and ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. GILLIES:

What?

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. GILLIES:

Recording.

Recording the contract.

Oh yes, yes.

So I mean there may be things

that could be done to further regulate the use of installment land
sale contracts, but their abolition I wouldn't agree with.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

All right, would you say the same

about all-inclusive deeds of trust.
MR. GILLIES:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Should there be regulations, should

there be requirements, impound accounts?
MR. GILLIES:

Yes, certainly in all the literature that I've

seen from Real Estate, and by the way, we are doing, and I'm sorry
Mr. Stirling stepped out, we are doing an educational job in this
area all the time.

Having to devise new courses as you pass new

bills, but •••
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Thanks to you we haven't been passing

too many.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

1

Incidentally not all the bills we pass are

done without your approval either.

I notice that you sponsor an

occasional one.
MR. GILLIES:

Yes, sir, and I'll be referring to some of

those where we've attempted to deal with some of these problems.

But

everything that I've seen that our organization puts out has been
proposed with respect to an all-inclusive or wrap that there be some
institutional servicer and things of that nature.
the package.

Maybe that should be in the law.
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That's part of

We'd like to examine

that and get back to you.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Would that inc

escrow?
MR. GILLIES:

Well, let me get to

when Mr. Stirling comes back because he asked me to re
specifically, but it's possible that some of
law.

s

be

As I might indicate to you, we've got a s

hope to come to you in January with some propos

on
s

se

areas, and this very well could be one.
Some of these instruments, are j
taken back by the seller;

are

other junior trust

by sellers and discounted and sold to investors; j
originated by banks; some of the
trust deed business now;

s & L's are

the

a lot of institutional seconds, some

originated through mortgage loan brokers and

another,

the so called bullet loan, which is the

year loan with

a 30 year amortization being written by
buy-down loans that were referred to by one

s

morning, which are the only things that are

to

unload some of their inventory, which is a very es
shared appreciation mortgages,

and

which Mr. Costa is

on

investor participation and down payment in

and

share

equity appreciation -- these are some of what we
financing in the market place today.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Mr. Gillies, I

creative financing is in part some of
transfers of sale in today's tight money market.
of us agree that no one wants to throw the
- 162 -

we

agree
f

all

water.

That certainly is not

as Chairman of the Housing

Committee, or I think the intention of any
committee.

I think what we

members of this

ly like to explore with you is

what do you really see are the potential problems.
with the lien sale contract about two years ago.

I mean we dealt
I remember when we

had some of the over-zealots getting people in situations involving
their houses that they shouldn't have been

in in terms of home

improvement type programs.

•

MR. GILLIES:

I wouldn't

those in a category of creative

financing.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. GILLIES:

No, no I don't mean that.
's

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

financing.
I know,

I used the example because

some people at that time indicated, "Oh, we ought to do away with
the lien sale contract."

The lien sale contract is a very valuable

tool and I'd never suggest that we should do away with that.
like creative financing
is the only way

•

s situation and sometimes

providing some financing.

I think, in hearing
specific problems

terms of

Just

What we're interested,

the realtors is, what do you think are the
deal

in today s tight money market with

transfers of sales where second, third and fourth deeds of trust are
used, when the financial

arrangements

equity left within the house, in which

are made in which there's no
only course of today's

current alternatives is simply buyer and seller beware.

Do you

think, furthermore, that we are going to have the problems next year
when the balloons come due on the principal on these arrangements
that were made two and three years ago, and what should we do about
that?

These are the same questions I'm asking you that we asked
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everybody else here today in terms of what are the
that can be taken, not only prospectively, but how

do you believe

the problem is going to be next year when these,
MR. GILLIES:

Let me talk about

into a survey we've done which I think will answer

s

of the committee as to what's going on out

was some

guesses by the San Diego District Attorney.

There were some guesses
We

by other people based on cocktail party
have some hard data for you which I think
you, and we are prepared to present it.

But let

st to

f

your question about what's going to happen two
from now and so on.

st to

0

now, a year

s

go

Let me say first that

to be a

problem if there isn't going to be take-out f
prices.

That problem is not created only by seller

deeds of trust.

That problem is created by

let

you

compare a second deed of trust taken back by a seller
with a bullet loan written by World Savings

$30,0 0

$9 ,0 0 as a f

st

deed of trust with a three year due date, your ta
1 lenders,

about a much greater problem created by

won't

it won't be a problem with take-out financ
be a problem with take-out financing, and let me

on

when you authorize an adjustable rate mortgage,
payments, without any cap on interest rates,

cap on

negative amortization and if interest rates go
five years or three years, and some of these are
you are going to have the same kind of

lem

that you have with the borrower of the
faster.

With the balloon,

knows
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s f

le,

whatever it is and he can plan

it, but

th an uncapped ARM, and

I'm not saying I'm against an uncapped ARM, but I'm just saying .••
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

That's a good point Mr. Gillies.

Were there bullet loans before the Wellenkamp decision?

Aren't

bullet loans .••
MR. GILLIES:

Practically none.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

.•. yeah, bullet loans kind of

evolved as the lenders' answer to the inability to predict the market
place

and the inability to get this legislature to address Wellenkamp.

They came up with their own little Canadian roll-over.

That's what

the effect of it is, isn't that true?
MR. GILLIES:

Well, I think it .••

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Well, I don't deny your right.

I

think there is a real potential for disaster coming from bullet loans.
MR. GILLIES:

I think it comes much deeper than that.

I

think it comes primarily from the volatility in the money market.

Let's

say we didn't have Wellenkamp, and let's say that interest rates were
17 percent.

How many accelerations would occur?

Very, very few

because very, very few sales would occur, because people couldn't
afford to sell and people couldn't afford to buy if they had to go
out and finance the whole transaction on a 17 1/2 percent loan.
the sale wouldn't occur.

So

The lender couldn't accelerate, and they

couldn't get their money back.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

The problem is volatility.
Mr. Gillies, on that point, as a

practical matter, if I were a lending institution and interest rates
were 17 percent and I could enforce my due on sale clause ... I want
to do business.

If I can't loan money out, then I'm not going to stay

in business any length of time.

Wouldn't I practically, as some
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institutions did prior to Wellenkamp, bump the rates up on a gradual
basis and give points for income level and credit

I wouldn't

refinance the loan at the existing 17 percent, but I

f

because I know the guy could pay 12 percent, or pay 13 percent.

I

mean if I were a smart institution and I wanted to

ess,

I know that I couldn't make the damn thing at 17

, but I

this guy could probably afford 12 percent and the existing
eight percent, and we'd settle some middle ground,

was

I could make

the transfer of sale and refinance the loan.
MR. GILLIES:

That's theoretically poss

does

happen in some cases, but I can give you instances where

lly

chartered S & L's, which have not until very recently been subject
to Wellenkamp or didn't think they were, have still bumped
interest rate to current market at the time of an assumption.
understand that under Federal Home Loan Bank Board

Now,

s they can't

accelerate on a residential owner-occupied one to

, but they can

bump the interest to current market.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

we

Well, it seems to me

to ta

about interest rates on assumable loans as divorced from the percentage
of the total loan that the assumable loan is.
MR. GILLIES:

Can I get into my survey and I

give you some data on that.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

I have data on that

I can

you.

I was going to ask if you

a survey
your f

on that, and will be waiting with baited breath to
conclusion on that.
Mr. Gillies has talked against ARM's

t them.

that we've had without ever coming out offic
MR. GILLIES:

I have asked
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three

di

may

1

doing so again Monday when we still have some conversations.

Let me

talk about ARM for a minute, and let me talk about Professor Rosen's
razzle-dazzle graduated payment adjustable rate mortgage.

This is

being offered or something very close to it by San Diego Federal
Savings, and again I'm sorry Mr. Stirling isn't here, but you call
up San Diego Federal Savings and say, "I'd like one of those loans."
"Well, come around about October maybe we'll have some money to make
them."

These new instruments are coming out, and we need new instruments.

I don't know if we need as many as are coming out, but we need some new
instruments.

But there is no money.

Great Western's got, you know, a

new instrument, but they only make the loans to their old established
customers.

The new couple who wants to buy a home, can't get one of

those loans.

The new couple who wants to buy a home, interestingly,

our survey will show you that of the transactions that we reviewed,
about 26 or 27 percent were for first time home buyers in 1980.
are still getting into the market.
financing.
of money.

How?

Assumed loans.

They

Creative

These new instruments must be combined with some source
Now, I'm not going to deny that there aren't going to be

some problems a year or two years from now if there isn't some new
source of money.
•

But the magnitude of that problem I don't think can

be perceived right now.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Mr. Gillies do you agree with some of

the other statements that were made about the lack of priorities that
capital investment has in the area of housing by this administration?
MR. GILLIES:
to comment on that.

Why I'm not sure that I'm totally competent

I've read commentary that seems to point in

that direction, but I am not an expert in that area.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Because it leads to the point that
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you're mentioning, that is there is no new money available.

It's

going to be a problem and obviously we're concerned about attracting
new money for housing, so that hopefully that this won't be a problem.
MR. GILLIES:
to be found.

Well, some source of money for housing has

I am convinced that even the federal government, even

this administration cannot
grows.

turn it's back on that problem if it

And it isn't going to grow any more in California than it

does anywhere else in the United States.

Lenders with Wellenkamp or

without Wellenkamp •••
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

But, you don't think the demand for

housing here is greater given the people that continue to come to
California and the increased population.
MR. GILLIES:
economist to come up.
on this survey as well.

I would like to ask Mr. Singer, our chief
He may be able to assist in answering questions
Joel Singer, the Director of our Economic

and Research Division and the gentleman who supervised at least
the preparation of this survey, but who may be able to answer your
questions as to whether housing demand increases at a greater rate
here than it does elsewhere.
MR. JOEL SINGER:

Well, certainly as some of the other

economists who were up here suggested, one of the best evidences for
demand looking backwards has been the extraordinary price rise in
California.

As we look at demand factors we see them somewhat in

excess of 300,000 units per year.

We know construction is averaging

less than half that.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

You would agree with HCD's

housing.
MR. SINGER:

I would.

A personal opinion Mr. Costa, I
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would tend to agree yes, that housing demand in California is greater
than the United States as a whole.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Do you know what the average cost of a

home was in California in 1973?
MR. SINGER:

I could check it back for you, a rough

estimate about $33,000.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. SINGER:

Thirty-nine, I think.

Thirty-nine.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Do you know what the national average

was?
MR. SINGER:

It was about $2,000 less at that time.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

That's about right.

Do you know what

the difference was seven years later?
MR. SINGER:

We're looking at a difference of about

$45,000 currently between California and the national average.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

What are the factors which increased

our cost of housing over 34 percent?

I know we're getting away

from the other thing, talking about new money.

You're talking about

dealing with balloon payments and creative financing.

We're talking

about trying to, as Tony Frank indicated, rearrange the deck chairs
on the Titanic.

I hope that's not what we're doing.

All of these

are my concerns as we try to address this issue.
MR. SINGER:

Well, certainly looking to California, one

would have to start with the assumption that the economy has been
much more buoyant than the economy in any other state.

The rate of

economic growth in California has been on the order of 30 to 40 percent
greater than the United States as a whole.

Immigration is far higher.

Population growth in terms of internal growth is much higher.
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Restrictions on development that some of the other

sts directed

their remarks toward certainly is one of the factors

price

appreciation.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. SINGER:
as of yet.

13?

How about

Frankly that's one that we haven

It would be worthy of some further re

sessed
I

admit,

but we have not looked at that very specifically.
MR. GILLIES:

Let me say first that as
ing.

there is a high utilization of creative f

reveals

s

An
tors

we believe that many if not most buyers and sel
would prefer a home transfer transaction without

f

to

I mean, the realtor doesn't want to have to run
suggest how this deal can be put together.

if

It's c

he can just send a person down to the S & L and
first that the buyer can afford, everybody wa
everybody likes it better.

a

1

out

But, you know, if you are a

on a ship and the ship goes down, you might want a
boat, but if there wasn't one there, you're
there is.

ing.

rst class li
to

whatever

And you're going to ride on it.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

We just want to

li

sure

don't have holes in them too.
MR. GILLIES:

Even one with a hole

than

is

none at all.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
MR. GILLIES:

That's debatable.

It will keep you go

for a 1

e

I think that's exactly what we've been hear
real fact.

One of you mentioned the fact that when a

to buy a home, they want to buy a home.
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horne.

And as a consequence if they can,

're going to buy that home.

And

they're going to reach out and find the tools that are available for
it, whatever financing tools are available for

And, I think

was you, Mr. Chairman, who mentioned that all forms of disclosure at
that point in time may have very litt
once the decision has initially

rational impact on the decision
made to buy.

Now, so as I say,

we believe that all parties prefer conventionally financed housing
transactions.

And when conventional financing that people can afford

is available, again, creative financing will diminish and fade.
will still exist.

It has existed for decades.

are being used are tried and proven instruments.
of experience with them.
that is important.
you have.

It

The instruments that
There's been a lot

It is just the volume of these right now

So now let's take a look at the survey each of

It's just been completed.

been dated yesterday.

It isn't dated.

It should have

First let me say that for 1981 based on six

months data the annual rate or number of housing resales in California
will be 379,000, down from 465,000 in 1980, and down from the all
time high of 605,000 in 1978.
an annual rate based on

first s

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
D

MR. GILLIES:

That data is not in the report.

That's

months.

So you

it's going to be 379,000.

Based on the first six months experience.

That's down from 465,000 resales in 1980 or an all time high of
605,000 in 1978.

This means that California homeowners, sellers

and buyers, are being sharply inhibited

their traditional housing

mobilityand in many circumstances in fulfilling their housing needs
by external conditions.
house.

Obviously one factor is the price of the

The median home price in California has risen from $71,500

in 1978 to $105,838 in June of 1981.
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It has leveled off.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
MR. GILLIES:
figure was $105,800.
May '81.

What was

7

The '78 figure was $71,500
It has leveled off.

This has occurred before.

'81

June '8

These

be

It is only six percent above June 1980, so

the

ise

price of resale housing in the past year at a rate
less than the CPI increase for the same period.
factor today is, of course, the financing.
50 percent above the historic levels.

the
s

f

Second,

or

Interest costs are

Now,

have

survey.

If, for example, if you look on page four,
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBiNSON:

Before we start

, Mr

llies,

It

ses

one thing I was reading was your paragraphs on
me that only 15 percent of those sampled

to return the

naire even though you were willing to pay

po

I

than that in my district.
MR. GILLIES:

You ask easier ques

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. SINGER:
higher than that.

s.

I'm not sure

I think the survey return

There were 30 returns we

they arrived too late for us to get even

s

I'm afraid that also reflects the business succes

o

many

f

members and thirdly, it ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

You think

had no transactions during that period?
MR. SINGER:

A much more significant

than I would like to see reported that
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
800 samples

s

And they're not

were returned.
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ly,

hands.

s

f

our

MR. SINGER:

No.

No, there ••.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

In order, statistically though to

make some comparison we, I'm not a statistician -- I'm just trying
to somehow figure out a way then to interpret this material.
MR. SINGER:

Given the population we're dealing with, the

330 ballot response given us, I would have to calculate it, but plus
or minus 7.5 percent in terms

of the range of each of those percentage

figures.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

How much of a return is usually necessary

to have a balanced sample?
MR. SINGER:

It's not really the return.

It's the number

of meaningful responses relative to the universe you're dealing with.
Assuming the respondent pattern is random.

And again we are making

that assumption and there's reason to believe ••.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. SINGER:

How did you determine your randomness?

Well, we selected at random first.

We pulled

approximately 2lOOrealtormembers and associate members, we pulled
them out every 30th number so to speak.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:
MR. SINGER:

8

Is this geographical area ..•

Yes, that was one of the factors because our

membership list is based on geography as well.

But, one of the

reasons we can say it's fairly random, it correlates to much of the
information we have.

The median price in our sample is $102,000;

the median price Dug just reported to you is $105,000.
at square footage that links up with many other surveys.

If you look
We look

at the bedroom sizes and so on, the age of the rooms, and so on.
It seems to work like a fairly random sample given other information
known to us.
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ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

The control factors seem to

low

along, a distinct pattern in other words ...
MR. SINGER:

Yes, it's close.

I'd like to see

a higher return and this was to a degree a pilot
go back and ask for higher return or may work

of course,
and we may

th an

institution in going for a larger sample, but I am very

th

what I see the accuracy ...
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

At a later date

to

1

I

s

this .•.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Why don't we just st

s a

little above the cocktail party chit chat that Mr ....
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Mr. Gillies, you can

for this one, this question's loaded.

Was the letter

the questionnaire soliciting responses in order to enab
the Wellenkarnp repeal bill currently before the

you to

islature

was any other type of dialogue, rhetoric, fact or

11

Or

used to

encourage a response.
MR. GILLIES:

I never saw the letter.

with drafting the letter.

to do

I

I did see the survey

t went

because Mr. Singer sent it to me to indicate
on aspects of it.

any

The purpose of the survey, was

for what we saw corning.

This hearing had not

cal

at the

We ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

No, I wasn't re

I was referring to the thousands of letters each one

to

s hearing.

us rece

as a result of all kinds of mailings going on.
MR. GILLIES:

It wasn't realted to those letter

Mr. Singer discuss the letter itself.
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let

MR. SINGER:

I did draft that letter.

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

You have to understand, Mr. Singer,

we are all politicians, we know how to skew •.•
MR. SINGER:

I thought that was only my Assemblyman.

be delighted to show you the letter.
sentences from it.
legislation.

Perhaps I could read a couple of

There was no attempt to relate it to any particular

That's, of course, not to say that our members are not

aware of what's going on in the Legislature.
•

I will

But what we suggested

here is that we were conducting research according to the types of
financing being employed to facilitate the sales of residential
properties in today's tight mortgage credit market.

With mortgage

interest rates generally exceeding 15 percent and the withdrawal
from the market many institutional lenders, the forms of financing
are rapidly changing.

This research project is designed to document

the types and characteristics of financing being used in the resale
housing market.

This study will examine the extent to which transactions

in the current interest rate environment are dependent upon the existence
of assumable first mortgage loans, and the availability of other
alternative financing arrangements.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

If there's a question about the letter,

why don't we just accept it in the testimony and you give us ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

I was going to request that, if we

could have the whole package just so we could ••.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
that in June '81 the

Before we go ahead, you mentioned

median resale price was $105,800 and you gave

some other figures and said that was only six percent higher than
June of 80 and said it was lower than June ••.
MR. SINGER:

May of '81.
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CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Lower than May of -- just a

before

Okay.
MR. GILLIES:

There have been some

dips in the mid-summer of 1980 for example.

s,

were some

We ve

occas

dips, but we have reached a plateau to some extent,
has leveled off.

1

rate of increase

For example, on page four,

you will note

that only 23 percent of homes are financed today in
manner with a down payment and a new unassisted f

1

st

loan.

And some of these will' be bullets and some

1

firsts taken back by the seller which we will discuss
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

a moment.

What distinction do you

relative frequency and adjusted frequency?
MR. GILLIES:

The adjusted frequency el

s

all

cash and the miscellaneous at the bottom and you jus
100 percent on those which involve mortgages.

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

I'm going to have to a

to really drastically summarize this.

you

We have

11

s,

us

we have other witnesses and I do want to bring

to a

close.
MR. GILLIES:

Well, sir, this same

shows that 70

percent of all sales required creative financ
involve assumptions.

most of
on sales

In other words the depres

ssed

which I have alluded to earlier would be mater
without creative financing.

This would be of obvious concern to
s and

our membership but would be a critical concern to
home sellers.

Page five illustrates convinc
s

financing typically is an assumed first plus a
dramatic savings for the borrower.
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r

l

ng

where it's indicated that the combination factor here produces the
equivalent of 12.57 percent interest rate on a conventional
loan.

30 year

That contrasts with 15, 16 plus interest rate offered on

conventional firsts if the borrower had to go out and finance the
entire transaction that way.
course, involve balloons.

Now understand that most of these, of

And that, therefore, the interest factor

won't change after the second has matured or the third has matured.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

What is the standard practice among the

professional realtors statewide in conducting such a transfer of
sale when you issue a second or third that has a balloon on it when
you are talking to the seller in those circumstances?

Obviously we

know the disclosures and the contract, we all talked about how
sometimes meaningless disclosure ... What do you say when you got this
balloon at the end of three years that you're going to have to pay,
and you're going to have to pay it at whatever conventional financing
is?
MR. GILLIES:

You are going to have to pay it and generally

speaking the party would require some takeout financing or could in
some circumstances go out and acquire another second in the
institutional market or from another private investor.
I

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

What I'm driving at is, is it a concern

of your statewide organization that the realtors try to make as clear
as possible the conventional

financing?

I mean to say, hopefully

interest rates will come down, but there is no guarantee that they
will.
MR. GILLIES:

Absolutely.

That would be a basic disclosure

you would have an obligation to make.
facts of the transaction.

It is one of the most material

Under the law, under the ethics of the
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industry, and under the ethics of our association,

sclosure

would have to be made.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Your realtors, your

are

1

buyer beware.
MR. GILLIES:

You say, "Buyer this is

s

the end of three years, or at the end of five
to owe 'X' dollars on this loan.
cash or refinance it.

II

At

s you're

And you have to come up

Certainly a very

transaction.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Mr. Gi

s,

s morn

from Mr. Fohrman, the attorney from Riverside.

we

He gave us some

examples of, I guess you'd call some kind of a
where there were several deals all pending, all

upon the

secondary financing, creative financing, and he bel
anyone of these collapsed at some point, that
cards would collapse.

that if

who

house of

Do you think his concern is justif

Is

he over doing it?
MR. GILLIES:
testimony in context.

I found it difficult to

's

the

He testified, for example,

s.

that went through escrow, they were all on
contrary to all evidence any place.

s

It must

is

the most

situation in the world, if that occurred.
the real property section of the State Bar pub
alluded -- and I hope you all read it, it's kind of arnus

-- it s

based on conversation that he primarily gathered at
from talking to doctors who were interested
and the other thing.

f

Dr. Filante had the best answer to

If you start asking him about a medical
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, he

s,
one.
f

take off your clothes and I'll examine you."

But, it is obvious

that there can be situations where a person is both a seller taking
back a second and then going into another property and utilizing a
second as a means of purchasing.

It is conceivable that in some

circumstances a pyramid effect could be created.
done.

I think it's over

We've seen certainly no evidence of it yet, as I've indicated

to you creative financing is not new •••
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

We realize that.

But yet in this

tight market, if the only way you can sell your home is by offering
some sort of credit to your buyer and you're dependent upon receiving
that, not because you want to move, but because as you stated and I
think as all of us are aware, you're forced to move.

You have your

job, or something like that, and so you're dependent upon getting
them to that next home, financing it, and it seems to me that it's
wider spread than maybe .••
MR. GILLIES:

If you are so capital short that all the

money, all the equity that you have available in the first home must
be used to get into the second home, you're not going to be able to
take back a second.

•

Now, an approach to that is to originate a

second and to discount it in order to put the deal together.
all kind of combinations.

There's

All I can say about the so-called pyramid

effect of the gentleman's testimony is we haven't seen it yet.
can't say it won't happen in isolated circumstances.

I

We don't look

forward to it, you know, in a huge number of circumstances.

It seems

to me that some of this cry of doom kind of prediction is like recent
statements of another state official with respect to what could
happen if you were sprayed by malathion from an airplane.
to hysteria.

It doesn't contribute.
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It leads

ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

I think we ought

correct one

thing, if my notes are correct, and it is certa
are not.

s

The gentleman, the lawyer from

was

that all of the cases sampled involved

ng.

were not always all inclusive deeds of trust.
MR. GILLIES:

That certainly could be the case

We have 70 percent creative financing as

shows

The question was asked earlier as to what, how much
assumable loan contribute to the deal.

Can

s

f

that

Joel?
MR. SINGER:

Table five will give you an

the

interest rates are under the various as
you'll see they vary quite dramatically among

s

assumption and the degree to which the buyer also
a third.
as I

a second and

In terms of the down payments, I

understood it.

was

In the situation where

cash to that loan assumption the loan to va
The case where the second was also employed
loan to value ratio was 74 percent.

a

In the case

third were both applied with an asurnption the

was

l

percent.
MR. GILLIES:

Well, the chairman

t

and unless you have some further questions on

s

on

we

or want

us to pursue it, I will leave it with you for your

I

commend it to you.

that

I think it answers

of

were raised today about what's going on out there
Now, a point ...
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

I have one ques
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Gillies, about the Table five, "Cash and New First Mortgage Loans
13.5 percent."

Now that would suggest that in the real world the

interest rates are not as high as we've been quoted.
MR. SINGER:

Well, I think the reason for that, Mr. McAlister,

is, of course, that 35 percent of those were originated by sellers.
And sellers were originating loans at interest rates at about 12 percent,
if my memory serves me,whereas institutions were originating them at
14.77%.

So the reason that figure looks so low is because you are

now having, and this is a very unusual phenomenon in terms of history,
that sellers are also getting very heavily involved in the issuance
of first trust deeds.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

And becoming their own bankers.

Their own lenders.
MR. SINGER:

To a degree, in this market with a withdrawal

of institutional lenders, that is becoming more essential.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

So some of them have had commitments,

haven't they, from the past too?
MR. SINGER:

average transaction sampled, I would

estimate, was about 120 days old at this point.

So we're talking

about commitments that were written six months ago when the rates
were in fact in the high 14/low 15 range.

And that's why I'm confident

as to the survey reliability.
MR. GILLIES:

Just one point that I do want to make and

that is that in this survey there were only two transactions in
which there was no down payment and no transactions in which there
was cash to buyer.
MR. SINGER:

If I might comment further on those two.

was a straight, no down payment deal, with no cash to the buyer;
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One
the

other involved a $10,000 financing price over the
So they certainly don't seem to resemble

pr

si

r

previously.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

But

very straight with each other, those types of s

are

being reported by your members too, to the var

not

about to give you those situations in a
MR. GILLIES:

We have learned of

from our members who have ...
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

You don t

don't occur.
MR. GILLIES:

They have been comp

that they have been presented to them as

se

s

they have been irate about them.
ASSEMBLYMAN ROBINSON:

Those

ls

members,

what I'm saying, Dug, those individuals
are not about to report those types of transact
voluntary questionnaire.
MR. GILLIES:

Possibly not, a

hope perhaps that most of the people of
state who are engaged in this kind of trans
but it is conceivable that there are some of
talked to brokers, and if they think they've real
deal, they're proud to tell you about it.

I

r

whoever he is, in San Diego who's peddling
the greatest thing since dirt.
about it.

He

s

i

He wouldn't have any hesitation to te

So, our survey does not

sc

se
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signficiant activity.

Now, you know, your reservations are perhaps

warranted, but in any event, let me comment on the situation of a
buyer getting a loan out of a transaction.
reason for that.

There can be a legitimate

Even Fannie Mae writes a loan which is a combination

rehab purchase loan, where you're purchasing a property and you're
going to at the same time rehabilitate that property.

In fact, you

enter into one long transaction and you get cash in addition to
the purchase price which you use for the rehab.

So there are some

circumstances when a cash to buyer loan arrangement would be appropriate.
We are very concerned about this, however, and I promise you that by
January we will have some thoughts for you on possible controls,
disclosures, whatever it may be in relationship to that part of the
problem.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Mr. Gillies, you responded to, I guess,

the first part of my question, and that is that you don't believe
that these pitfalls of creative financing will be a problem unless
refinancing isn't available or one of those two conditions that we've
mentioned, so I guess you've answered that part of the question.
The other part of the question was, if financing isn't
available, what do you think we ought to do next year, vis-a-vis a
moratorium, if that becomes a problem

in terms of the long term, and

I know you're going to make recommendations in January, but we'd like
you to give us a clue as to what the thinking of your association is
as to what you do with those that are already in the problem, and
to try to prevent or avoid, in terms of the long term, the others
from getting into such a problem.
MR. GILLIES:

Well, let me say first that the organization

has no position on a moratorium.

The question has not been submitted
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to them.

I will see that it is, and I will have a

on that question.

you

I personally feel that that

have to be dealt

with very, very carefully because of the

unless there was a

proven need for the person to get the loan

are

to have persons taking advantage of this and just not

their

balloon, even thought they have the perfect

l

do so, merely to continue a favorable interest rate

to

use

to go to Vegas.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Then you agree

Mr.

different reasons?
MR. GILLIES:
cautiously.

I think you have to

, very

I think I agree with Mr. Robinson

reasons as well.

But what do people do?

some of
are peop

who find that they cannot continue to afford the

they have

Some

These circumstances arise all the

to default.

A few lead to foreclosure.

what

General

s

the term

have had the benefit and the use of that home
Whatever they

s
case

the house is sold, and they seek other hous

which they have occupied it.

job, divorce,

st the

purchased, some other circumstances occur, they
whatever.

same

pa

in lieu of rent, and if there is an equity availab
sold it, they will collect that equity and have
It is a harsh fact of life, but it is not one that

they

at
for
s

purposes.
to

present world and the present situation.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
I'll end my points.

I have two other

One, you and I have discus

concept of applying the blended rate formula that
currently using, as it relates to some sort of a
- 184 -

st
Mae is
a

middle of the road solution between the problems affecting or what
were perceived as affecting Wellenkamp in terms of allowing the lending
institutions that participate primarily in housing to upgrade their
portfolios and to maintain a source of investment capital for housing.
I am submitting those amendments into that measure of mine, and would
like to understand whether or not you think that's an approach that
has some middle ground that we could explore from the standpoint of
your association .

•

MR. GILLIES:

Certainly, I would be happy to explore it.

have preliminarily explored it.

We

We would like to see these specific

language that you are considering.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. GILLIES:

Do you think it's a possible solution?

It has possibilities, yes, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Do you think your association could

possibly support it?
MR. GILLIES:
you by January.

I will certainly ask and have an answer for

Let me say of course, Mr. Costa, as you know there

is nothing in the world today that prevents a lender from makirtg that
offer to a buyer at the time of the loan transaction.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

I know.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
MR. GILLIES:

We've discussed that.

By making what offer?

He can offer to refinance that property at

that time with a blended rate.

He can say to the buyer, "I don't

have the right to accelerate, but I'd like you to consider this.
can avoid a short term second, you can have a new 30 year loan,
a normal loan evaluation with a blended rate."
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

What if he's not brought into the

transaction?
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You

MR. GILLIES:

That lender?

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. GILLIES:

Yes.

He could advise all

have anything in mind the offer stands.

that if

s

Some of them have.

Maurice McAlister -- I think you know him

of

He

has made all kinds of offers to borrowers to get
low paying loans in his portfolio.

You know

s

of some of

He's a very

man.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
understand.

There must

s than

more to

reason

If a person can assume at the lower rate,

would he have for agreeing to pay more.
MR. GILLIES:

makes

Well, if he can get an

unnecessary a second, the second might be

at 18

this way he gets a totally new loan at 12 1/2 or 13 or 13
whatever the mix dictates.

He doesn't have to worry

He's got a fully amortized new 30 year loan that meets
purchase.

It's attractive to many buyers.

2

lloon.

a

s needs

As I s

is
Mr. Costa is

to prevent lenders today from offering them,

of

suggesting I think is that it may be some form of
acceleration.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

The final question is do you believe

that the implications of the Tucker vs. Lassen case

was ci

in terms of its relation to liability ..•
MR. GILLIES:

Oh, no that was Wyatt vs.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Wyatt vs. Union.

association believe the impact or potential
are to realtors who may engage in such trans
find that the buyer or the seller seeks 1
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s the

of
s or sales on
as a result

to
f

the fact that they were
MR. GILLIES:

with the
Well, s

of the contract?

I

1

you'll read Wyatt and if

you want, when you get up there next

f

you' 1 call me I'll

get you a copy, but I'm sure Mr. Melnicoe can get one for you very
easily.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. GILLIES:
unbelievably horrible.

I'm sure we can get a copy.

The fact situation
It was gross.

Wyatt looks just

To try to translate that ... I

think the gentlemen who suggested that it
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. GILLIES:

extended ...

You don't think

's a threat.

Oh, I'm sure somebody's going to be sued.

That keeps another industry going, you know.
to be some suits, and they will revo

I'm sure there's going

I think around the fact

situation.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

What do you think really are the

responsibilities of the realtor.

I know that

Fox mentioned earlier that you oppo

way, that we have

Mr.

bonding concept that was

proposed and another measure that was up
MR. GILLIES:

was mentioned.

slature.

Yes, and I do want to mention to you by the

our industry

ng which now the bar has,

but which real estate had before the bar.

We have what we call a

Recovery Fund, which is financed from license fees, and if a person
has an unsatisfied judgment against a broker for acts arising out
of his license, he can recover from the Recovery Fund up to $100,000
against a broker.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. GILLIES:

Have there been any recoveries?

Oh, yes.

About $200,000 or $300,000 a year

are paid out of that fund on such recoveries.
- 187 -

And so we have always

considered that to be a substitute for bonding.

Now I don't know if

you want to get into a long discussion on bonding or not.
We are supporting -- Mr. McAlister is

a bill of

his which, I understand, will relate to mortgage loan brokers' activities
which, coupled with SB 391 by Senator Watson, will deal
disclosure to lenders.

further

Mortgage loan brokers are now

disclosure to borrowers.
rather specific terms.

to make

This will require disclosure to lenders
reports,

It will deal with appraisals,

with credit activity, many other factors.

so called

11 1

I

a certified

self-dealing, will require annual financial

to the department and deal with mortgage loan brokerage
ways.

And we will be in support of that

of that legislation.

a number of
We are·

slat

So that activity, and

reporting

certa

public accountant furnished to the department,

support

which have

se

so forth, hopefully

arisen from the Atlas case and the Universal case
will become law this year.
SB 391 {Watson) is, I presume,
has passed the Senate.

It

s

, we in

As I mentioned to Mr.

sclosures

1967 sponsored a bill, SB 330 by Senator Wilson, to

ng to the sale.

re

by sellers to buyers of a number of condi

the details

One of those disclosures related to take-back
of it and the facts about balloons and all
was bitterly opposed on the Assembly floor on

s sort of

That

basis

we were

trying to make a transaction so complicated everybody would have to
hire a realtor to do it.

So we didn't get the

reintroduced it in 1979 as AB 932.

It came to

it didn't come out of this committee.

So

a trimmed down version, AB 888 by Mr. Dave
- 188 -

11 that
s

We
ttee, and

s year we
It came out of

Judiciary, got on the f

, and

l

just before the roll-call, we
It's on the inactive file.

the

of an expl

out we didn't

We can use

bill.

the votes.
We'd be happy to

put back the disclosure with respect to take-back financing into
that bill as a fourth item.
some of the members of
complex and

s

We are getting flack on the floor from
co~~ittee

about that

11 being overly

burdens you're putting on people and so on.

things that have to be weighed.

We

These are

areas of appra

al,

the areas of loan evaluation, the areas of credit data, and many others
which were mentioned

today, and I can furnish the committee with

a list and read it to you now if you want, should be examined, but
they have to be wei

carefully.

eliminate creative f

would not,

We

our judgment,

ieve that some of them can be

written in a way to increase consumer protection without placing
undue burdens.
Mr. Stirling asked and Mr. Robinson
both of them are not here about

earlier, and

independent escrow aspect of the

thing.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

The arms

MR. GILLIES:

The problem

Yes.

District Attorney of San

provision?
that is that

County hasn't read the Escrow Law or

if he has he hasn't understood

Escrow Law, because if you read

the definition of an escrow, in that

, every item goes into a

realtor's trust account -- I take a depos

from you and I put it in

instead into my pocket or in my own bank account -- I'm precluded
from doing that by the law.

I must put it in a trust account, and

then it will go to escrow eventually when an escrow is opened.
everyone of those is an escrow as defined under the Escrow Law.
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But
So

So we would have to funnel all, you know, all our

ngs through escrow

with the costs involved and who's going to pay for those?
customer.

The

So you'd have to rewrite the definition and no one has ever

suggested -- this proposal has been made before, bills have been
introduced to do it before.

No one has ever suggested what that

appropriate new definition would be.

We believe

held

escrows can save customers money in some circumstances.
not too recently now, it's a few years ago, a

Recently,
Cal State

Fullerton, indicated that less than three

of escrows are

held by brokers, however, under their exemptions.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
MR. GILLIES:
time.

Can we continue then a

Well, Mr. Chairman, I don't want to take more

I say to you, I pledge to you that the intent of our association,

we have in addition to securing the background material which has
first step

been presented to you today and it's the same survey, is
to find out what is going on out there.

We have a

ttee and a

staff function ongoing to examine the al
the area of creative financing with the intent of
recommendations for legislation in this area.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. GILLIES:

Very well could, s

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. GILLIES:

concerns.

Maybe I could carry some of

s

Love to carry a

11.

We'd be delighted to talk to you about that

sir.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
MR. GILLIES:

All right.

Thank you.
you

Mr. Chairman, I want to

not to use

buyers and sellers and brokers would probably
and

there may be some

t,

ff

0 -

f

d

t have

creative financing, there would be an awful lot of people in this
state who would not be able to deal

their residential property as

they must, and until adequate conventional institutional financing
comes back into the market place, creative financing must not only
be sustained, it must be encouraged.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Now what will the situation be?

Starting very soon we very likely are going to have mostly variable

•

or renegotiable or fluctuating rates .
MR. GILLIES:

I would think that's correct, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

.•. and so aren't we in a different

ballpark then?
MR. GILLIES:

Yes, sir.

You'll recall that in the discussions

of the parity bills, for example, there were discussions of sunset on
the authority of the regulators to adopt these regulations with the
thought that the Legislature should re-examine that situation at the
end of three years.

That sunset is in place in AB 650.

It is my

understanding that Senator Foran is going to amend it into SB 809 and
hopefully in two and a half years, two years, three years when you look
at this again because of that sunset provision we will be able to have

•

a more stabilized climate and be able to more perceptively deal with
the issue.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
stable market.
in.

In theory that will lead to a more

It will presumably lead to somewhat lower rates going

It has the potential for some volatility as you pointed out, and

it makes some of us nervous.
MR. GILLIES:

Yes, no question about it, and you know Freddie

Mae authorized some instruments along about the end of May.

I have

seen data on the first two auctions that they had for those adjustable
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rate mortgages.

In the first one nationwide they sold $900,000 worth

of commitments for mortgages.

That's a drop in the

The second

one, $700,000 worth of mortgages ...
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
MR. GILLIES:

These are var

le?
mortgages.

These are the new adjustable

They wanted 16 percent, which isn't saving a lot of money
advantages the lender gets.

So I don't know whether

to be acceptable in the market place.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Only

se are go

11 tell

Well, if

s at 16

, I

suspect they'll have some difficulties.
MR. GILLIES.:

interest

That's an initial rate of 16, and

rate can move up coupled with, in that case, a contract rate index
without any cap on upward interest movement.

It's scary, but

's
sunset

the only world we're living in right now, and that's
is so vital on the parity legislation.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:

Has your

its

1

position yet on AB 650?
MR. GILLIES:

They're still trying to

a

e

1

amendments here.
ASSEMBLYMAN MCALISTER:
All right.

amendments.

a

Trying to

Thank you, Mr. Gillies.
MR. GILLIES:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Our next witness will be Robert L. Kemper,

the Vice Chairman of the Board of Wells Fargo Bank.
welcome back.

Mr.

I think you've testified before at one of our

MR. ROBERT L. KEMPER:

Thank you.

11
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st o

to

ize the

t

have

We

s

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Welborn and I will do
copies of our testimony and we

In

po

in just a couple of minutes in the interest of your time.
First of all, I'd like to congratulate the committee for
looking into this matter because we do believe that the kind of
creative financing that's been discussed today is a problem.

It's

going to be more of a problem as some of these loans come due, and
as Mr. Maisel said we don't believe that the interest rates are going
to be substantially lower in the very near term, and so they are going
to be a problem.
Creative financing has been accelerated by a couple of
factors:

(1) high interest rates; and (2) the Wellenkamp decision,

which repealed the due on sale clause.

There's no more concern that

anyone should have than the protection of the consumer be the borrower,
seller or private individual who is investing in junior liens.

We

feel there's a large difference between the consumer's safeguards that
are provided in a well structured lending industry and the high risk
environment of creative financing.
Home mortgage transactions in the traditional market place,
that is that provided by banks, savings and loans, and mortgage bankers,
are surrounded by a multitude

of federal and state laws and regulations.

And I'd just like to cite two of those that helped to protect against

•

some of the things we've been talking about.

One is the concern over

the borrower's ability to pay, and you've heard some situations of
the kinds of problems people get into because of their inability to
handle the mortgages that they have taken on.

Study by one of our

members shows that the average delinquency rate for loans assumed
without the review and approval of the lending institution is more
than double that of loans assumed with the credit approval of the
bank.

- 193 -

A second such type of protection is that

the traditional

market the lenders operate under laws that require the lender to
provide a good faith estimate of all costs relevant to
transaction.

real estate

So all parties or the borrower knows going in exactly

what is going on.

I think in some ways the point we're

to make

is that in the traditional regulated markets that we've had the
consumer has had protection.

Due to high interest rates and

of ability for people to qualify for those rates,

lack

e have looked

to creative financing, and that in itself creates a prob

If

someone cannot qualify for conventional financing, the odds are that
if you go to creative financing, particularly in some of the types of
situations that have been discussed today, you do find that people
are in over their heads and you are counting on lower rates in the
future inflation in the price of the house to bail them out.
those things do come true, fine.
going to have problems.

And if

If they don't, we believe you're

So basically, we feel that the problem of

creative financing has been and is caused by

st rates and

also the fact that under the Wellenkamp decision lenders do not have
the right to approve these transactions or look at them before they're
assumed.
And now Mr. Welborn would like to give you a

facts on

some of the things that they've seen.
MR. MICHAEL WELBORN:

I will try and be equally

I'm

Mike Welborn, Vice President of Government Affairs at Crocker Bank and
with me is Jim Hawkins, who manages our Home Products area, formerly
responsible for Crocker's residential real estate area.
In my testimony you'll find that we conducted, we tried
to gather our own data on what's going on in
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f

, so

that we could draw some conclusions from it to present to you as
opposed to coming here with hypotheticals.

What we did was survey

our entire branch system, our 375 branches as well as our mortgage
company operations.

I will anticipate the question Mr. Robinson

would ask if he were here, and I will admit that the introductory
letter over the questionnaire was probably somewhat biased and that
I acknowledged that we would use it in testimony in preparation for
this hearing.

Our branch managers are certainly well aware of our

efforts in support of Mr. Costa's piece of legislation.
I don't think it's really necessary for me to go into the
results of that survey because quite frankly some of the stories that
were referred to here today are quite frankly worse.

There are some

tear jerker types of case studies in that testimony, but what has
become apparent to me sitting in the back row all day is that the
cases we see as a lender are not at all the cases that are really
in jeopardy.

We get customers coming to us in situations of anguish,

frustration, despair, saying, "What can you do to help me salvage
this transaction?"

Quite frankly, at that point in time there's

very little we can do.

We are absolutely, totally frustrated by the

fact that we are not a party, cannot be a party, and are specifically

I

excluded in escrow instructions to not even be informed of this
transaction.

We don't find out until the house has changed hands

many, many times down the road or there's a problem, a serious problem,
and by that time it's too late.

In fact,

listeni~g

to the testimony

today, I jotted down these points which are also in my testimony, six
areas of abuse that I think are due nearly 100 percent to the lack
of presence of a financial institution in the process.

There are no

new ideas here, but if I might, I'd like to just list those six thoughts.
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First is that buyers do not need credit or underwriting
qualifications.

The second abuse is that the value of the property

is not independently evaluated, which often results
or over-encumbrance.

The third abuse is that homes are being sold

with little or no equity.
the part of the

a higher price

Very often there is little

st on

buyer to remain in that property.

we heard

tales of the buyer actually getting cash out of the transaction.
The fourth area is inadequate consumer protection and disclosure.
buyer is very often relying on the seller to provide disclosure.
seller has an interest in the transaction.
know the proper loan amount.

The
The

The buyer often does not

His payments are past due.

He relies

upon the seller or perhaps the realtor, and they are interested in
closing the deal.

The fifth area of abuse is that the buyer or the

seller are cornmiting themselves to positions that they would otherwise
not commit themselves to if they were aware of the risks.

They are

unaware of risks and they're taking positions they would not take
if they were aware of what's going on.

And the final abuse and perhaps

the one we least like to see is where there are situations of a more
knowledgeable individual taking clear advantage of an

1 who

is less involved, less knowledgeable with the transaction.
Now it seems to me that those six categor

s of abuse, and

I think that pretty much covers most of the transactions
the stories that have been told today, will not occur or

or most of
11 be

significantly reduced if there are financial institutions involved
in that transaction in one form or another.

Of course the solution

that we would prefer to see to get the financial institution involved
in that transaction is a repeal of Wellenkamp.
Now I won't go into the other reasons why we
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that it's

A

not
not
lenders .

•
0

cost,

to

that

back
And

in

loans, but, I'm

actually costs the average person with the assumability
And Mr. Gillies has through his survey,
we could argue for a long time over the methodo
ss he has at

that the presence of

creates overall about a 12.75 percent interest rate
is

ly below what conventional lenders

have any facts to
loon

spute that?

I mean I know

that has to be weighed in, but does your industry
of

that contradicts that, that tells us in number

where the average consumer is with or without the .•.
MR. WELBORN:
I

No sir, we don't have any data on that.

In

couldn't probably dispute that number off the top of my head.

sounds somewhat reasonable, but what I might point out is that
of your question is on rates.
as well.

And there's also a price

In other words the size of the loan times the

st rate is the size of the payments.
pr

If the price of the

of the financing were to decline, then borrowers

to qua

fy at significantly higher rates yet making the same
So the question really can't just entirely focus

the rate question.

I don't dispute that number, but I think

extreme

's

to consider that in the absence of

of homes will decline.

That's the way the market has to

And if the prices of homes are to decline, people will be
now
to

i

ify at higher rates than they otherwise would be able
So I think that if there's two considerations there,

we can't isolate just the rate question from the price question.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Are you saying then that my question can t
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quantified, that you probably never could come up

a formula

for answering that.
MR. KEMPER:

Oh I think that one of the things that you

pointed out was that you are talking about a situation that sometimes
is as short as one, two or three years, and if you look at a transaction
period that goes beyond that, when you are getting into refinancing,
you may find that you're talking about people that can't get the
refinancing, which gets into the problem itself.

•

CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

I think the frustration that I have, and

I don't know if it's shared by other members of the committee, is that
it's always possible to hear horror stories.

You could take the most

legitimate transaction of all time and over a period of a thousand
times that it was repeated you'd have five horror stories.

But I

don't really feel that I have a good picture for what's happening·
out there.

Some say three year balloon payments, seven year balloon

payments, 25 percent interest, 15 points, what you're going to be
charging today as opposed to what you're going to be charging a
year from now

How do we really make decisions based on that kind

of information?
MR. KEMPER:

I sympathize with your problem.

We are not

in a position to give you that kind of information because we don't
see that transaction

when the loans are assumed.

So we can't give

you that kind of data.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Do we just sort of have to wait till the

tidal wave either hits or doesn't hit to know what happened during
this period of time?
MR. FRED BIEL:
Bank.

Mr. Chairman, I'm Fred Biel from Lloyd's

I run the Residential Real Estate Department.
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Earlier this

year under a program that was sponsored by

Mae

they

offered to purchase lender loans if they were put

the

right way, we went into the marketplace on a trial basis
originate or to assist sellers in putting toge

to

some

finance deals where the borrower/buyer of the
underwritten by an institution with the eventual
loan could be sold to Fannie Mae to provide

at

time the balloon came due or some time when rates
was horribly unsuccessful.

moderate.

It

I think in a 90

areas generally spanning the state we created one
events that came up were what we saw.

Most of the

The transactions

we were

allowed to see showed, showed and really supported

Mr. Gillies

said, that the creative finance market runs around

12 to 12 3/4

area.

And we might say that is the interest rate set

mark~tplace.

That's what a buyer will pay and that's

seller carry back will accept.

least a

The marketplace set that rate.

To

then try to convert that, the seller almost upon

would

say, "What would you charge me to buy that loan

't want

to own it, I really never wanted to be a lender.
to place it?"

How

scount

And we would tell him what it would cost to take

to the current Fannie Mae yields.

In some cases 12, 15, 20 po

That of course came direct:'ly out of
an unacceptable transaction.

s equity.

become

And that's the reason that

that Fannie Mae put forth has not turned
we have since abandoned it.
But, the other point that would

come up on

that went the next step and said, "Well, okay I'll do
accept that."

In some cases then the
-
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would

I

11

say,

"Wait a minute.

If I have to be underwritten by a traditional lender,

I would have gone to him to start with.
credit problems.

I'm not lendable.

I'm short term on my job, or whatever.

I have had
And that's

one of the reasons I'm in creative finance, because there is no other
way for me to buy a home."

So you ask for numbers.

We're almost

blocked out, as they said, because we weren't there to start with,
and what little bit we've dabbled with shows us that maybe we didn't

•

want to be there to start with.

We think it's a time bomb because

we know the deal closed anyway.

And that buyer is going to be back

to us within a short period of time saying, "Well, I put my $10,000
into the property.

The balloon is here.

Somebody has to help."

And

we said, "We told you three years ago we couldn't help."
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Do you think that it is unlikely that

conventional lending institutions will be able to come to people's
rescue at that time?
MR. BIEL:

We are always seeing people at our door.

We have

people there as recently as yesterday, making application for loans
because the seller carry back was due.

And there is no way that a

regulated financial institution could originate that loan because of
the amount of credit that person needed because of negative amortization
on the seller carry back and the other terms that he allowed himself
to get into he just wasn't qualified.

We would have been imprudent to

make that loan.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

It might be wise to keep track of that

information.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Do you agree with the statement that the

practice of some of the financial institutions or lenders of making
a bullet loan with a short term balloon is no different than some of
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the problems we're talking about within creative
MR. HAWKINS:

I strongly disagree.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. HAWKINS:

Because the ...

Would you like to

stinctions?

I would disagree in the respect

at Crocker make a short term loan we're looking at

when we

borrowers ability

to be able to refinance or

rollover that loan at the

years, go to other assets.

We're basically looking for a

deal.

of

We will not extend credit solely based on the va

property.

We're always looking two, three, four, f

line for where that source is going to come.

of
years

So for

most

I

think we exercise more discretion and a 1
on that type of loan.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

You think there are some very clear

distinctions between comparing the two?
MR. BIEL:
borrower.

Oh yes.

on a

We require complete appl

We verify the significant entries on

and
now

it to normal underwriting criteria and say, "Three years
you are going to have

to do something.

What

11 be your

ility

we go to

pains

to handle that new debt?"
MR. HAWKINS:

I'd like to also add

years down

to educate our customer in respect to what will
the line.

the

We have printed notices where we do go

high

possible potential impacts, given high rates, more cont
rates, more disclosure.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Well, back to the s

you know there could be an argument made that
give people a little leeway and see what happens.
prudent in trying to predict what is
-
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to

i

three to f

re so

years from now, you deny people a very basic necessity, and who knows,
maybe if they could package together a loan on perhaps a less prudent
basis they may end up making it.

People do survive sometimes against

great odds, and I haven't ever noticed banks acknowledging that.
MR. HAWKINS:

I agree with your statement except for the

fact that our standards are set by past experience on what we see
as an individual's ability to handle certain levels of credit.

And

we we use ratios ourselves and I think we're just extrapolating

•

from past experience.

As a general statement, would you lend your

grandmother's retirement money on this?
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
standard

Maybe that doesn't always have to be the

though for an average home loan.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

To take the point maybe in a different

tact than Doug was trying to make.

You don't have the statistics

basically about the extent of the problem because for the most part
you're excluded from direct involvement in the problem, and I think
we understand that.

But, what do you think are the similarities

in terms of the change of economic climate, change of emphasis on the
national level from housing to other areas of investment capital which
you participate a lot in?
here?

Do you think there are any comparisons

I come back again to my concern about a source of investment

capital for housing.

What are the similarities?

Some person the other

day was trying to make reference to the 1920's and the fact that they
quit originating long term loans on residential property, and that we
are following a similar pattern.

I don't believe necessarily that

history always repeats itself, but

find it really tough out there

to find anybody interested in getting involved in investment capital
for housing.
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MR. KEMPER:

Well, I think that's true and the reason is

basically because we have had volatile interest rates.
inflation over the past few years.

We have had

You see the situation of lenders,

and it's most visible in the case of the

s & L's,

but

s

ly

visible if you look at the earnings records of the major California
banks who also are heavily involved in the housing market.

To rely

on the fact that in the future these things are going to come to pass
and we are going to have low interest rates and be able to do that thing
is just an enormous gamble.

It's been a tremendous problem to those

that have been involved in that industry.
And now you have new instruments that take some of that
problem away, and you will find that lenders would be willing to be
in the mortgage market if people can qualify.
qualify at the current high rates.

But the people can't

And if rates go down we all

applaud because we all make more money in a lower rate environment.
So we would be delighted, as I said in my testimony.
things that's the big problem is high interest rates.

One of the
High

rates force people in the housing market to have to pay much more as
a percentage of their income than they can really afford to do.
the problem we have.

That s

If you drop the interest rates, not you, but

if the interest rates in the country come down to a reasonable level
where people can afford the kind of instruments you have, you will see
institutional lenders back in the real estate market.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Do you believe that creative financing

has been a factor in the use of low interest loans and artificail
keeping up the cost of housing?
MR. KEMPER:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

When it maybe would have taken a down turn.
-
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MR. KEMPER:
ASSEMBLY~~N

to prove that.

I

s.
COSTA:

I would 1

don't know if you can.

made by a number of folks.

That s a

that's been

We don't have any proof of that.

One final

The

program on blended rates.

is

to see some

back

on the

Mae

If we offered that as I suggested to Mr.

Gillies as an option, some sort of a compromise

s, as

that

Mr. Frank mentioned earlier this morning, not one that's neces

•

ly

desirable or attractive to everybody, but it's maybe a means to the
end of trying to provide some

tal and

these portfolios and get away

some of the

some of
s of the creative

financing because you'd have a new mortgage in e

Could you

support a measure such as that?
MR. KEMPER:
beginning

I

Association.

First of all, I should have

the

am speaking today as the President of Cali
I

cannot speak for that as

addressed the issue.

Bankers
we have not

We'd be glad to take a look at it.

ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:
MR. KEMPER:

Please do.

I

one

that you have to

when we look at that is that we are
situation that is

ial

that does not go

low.

up

1

mind
a rate

And that means

home

the blended rate he is again subs

the people that have the blended rate.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

So

I

zing

you know you've got ...

What do you mean by that?

Let's back

up.
MR. KEMPER:

On the

of rate example that you were using

before this morning we were talking about a 12 percent rate, as
opposed to putting new money out at whatever the rate is.

-
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Although

it's better than what you've got now, you still have a lower than the
market rates, which means that the new rate in order to provide some
kind of profitability to the institution is artificially high to make
up for what you've got on the low side.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Maybe the interest rates will come back

to 12 percent next year.
MR. KEMPER:

That would be nice.

MR. HAWKINS:

Could I ask you a question on ... you referred

to this proposal a couple of times, and I guess I'm not totally familiar
with it.

Maybe you can clarify it.

a due on sale provision?

Would such a proposal also include

In other words, if there was not a method of

enforceability that we would go through, everyone would either go with
this blended rate, if it was to their advantage, so they would be
subsidized by the banks on their new money or they would all go "subject
to."

And then you would have all the creative financing abuses all

over again.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Probably with parity the new mortgage

would then have that adjustable factor and the due on sale clause
probably wouldn't prospectively be a problem.
MR. HAWKINS:

But I thought you were referring to a blended

rate for outstanding mortgages.

All the mortgage money that's out

there now.
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Well, it gives an opportunity to combine

the old with a new loan in the form of a wraparound.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:
MR. HAWKINS:

This would be on new transactions?

I understand.

My question is suppose an

individual said, "No we don't want to go that route.
still going subject'to.

In fact, we're

We're not even going to tell you."
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In other

are willing to offer

, and we said,

s

words, let's assume we

" but customers come to us

their advantage they take it and if

don't quali

a

If we don't have the teeth to enforce

it, if we don't have the due on sale

sion, to me, the blended rate

isn't really worth very much because you're

•

or all these

isted they don't want to go

lender and all these abuses occur.

's to

and if

's not to their

because they're not credit worthy,
other reasons we've

we

to have all

11

of these creative financing abuses .
ASSEMBLYMAN COSTA:

Obviously we'll have to take that under

consideration.
CHAIRMAN BOSCO:

Thank you

lemen, very much.

?

of you been given the testimony that you

Have all

Tomorrow we're

going to hear a bill by Mrs. Hughes having to do with the Cal
proposal.

I want to thank all the

testimony was excellent and enl

that came to

fy.

'd also l

to thank

Charlene Mathias, our consultant, and Pam
the job that they did in helping us to set up
sergeants who have been so
much.

as always.

We will conclude this hearing.

-
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e Mae
The

leer, our
s

and the

Thank you all very
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Note and Trust Deed to contain the Acceleration Clause set out on £xhibit: "A"
attached hereto and approved by all parties, Trust Deed to contain the following
recital: "Thie Deed of Trust is given as a portion ot the purchase price of the
.•. herein descri~ed property,~aqd is second and aub~quent in lien to that first
Deed of Trust bein& reco-rded concurrently herewith."
As further security for herein described note, it is understood that buyers shall
execute in favor of sellers, an additional Deed of Trust on other property for
an amount not less than $70,000.00. Escrov holder shall be handed further written
instructione.dn regards to oth~r property and ~cordation of said trust deed.
Escrov holder is hereby authori~ed and instructed to draw and record a Request
for Notice for the benefit of sellers on the first trust deed, and to charge
aellers' account for drawing and recording fees for same,
TERMS AND CONDITIONS:
A) Eacrow holder is hereby authorized and instructed to charge sellers' account
and credit buyers' account, at close of escrow, with the sum of $13,000.00.
B) Sellers shall furnish a current structural pest control certification per
attached addendua.
C) Buyers shall obtain a new fire insurance policy covering subject property,
11118eting nev lendar'a requiraaenta, and &hc.Ying sellers as second l!lOrtgagee.
Escrow holder is instructed to charge buyers' account for payment of first year
premium for aame, per billing deposited herein.
D),Buye~

are aware that there are annual Seven Oaks Commu~ty Center du~~ of
subject property. Escrow holder is instructed to .obtain a state:;,ent
fro111 said center, charge sellers 1 account w1.th ·~ny deli:~quencies, ADd pro-rate
said dues to close o~ escrow.
$'6S.

ocr· b'n

E) Escrow holder is instructed that in lieu of the issuance of a CL!A Standard
Coverage policy of title insurance, to have issued a CLTA Interim Binder, Form A,
binding Commonwealth Land Title Ccmpany to the buyers for a period of not to
exceed ~o years to the issuance of s policy in favor of a purchaser from the
vestee herein. Buyers shall deposit sufficient funds herein to cover the ten
per eent additional charge for said binder fee.
F) Buyers to receive copies of the Covenants, Conditione, and Restrictions
affecting the rights to subject property.

EACH OF THE UNDERSIGNED STATES AND DECLARES THAT HE 'HAS READ THE FOREGOING
INSTRUCTIONS AND UNDERSTANDS THEM AND DOES HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A
COPY OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS.

SIGNATURE

100
----------~--_.,__........,.

.-·

.·

--··--·---

-2h

____ --

~--

.

·~

....

ESCROW DIVISION:

"'I BO

My

in the above numbered

Cash

1re

escrow from new First Trust Deed loan •••

2) Purchase

,300.00**

Trust Deed and Note ••••••••••••••••••••

3) TOTAL CONSIDERATION ••••••

I

e~erow

·········~···$·

.................

.900.00
@8

..$97,900.00

Item No. 4.
One of
escrow instructions is
to show
a First Trust Deed in the amount of
300
tather than
and
are aware that
of title insurance, to be issued at close of escrow,
shall reflect a first trust deed in the amount of
,300.00.
**It is understood that lender's
shall be deducted from said
,300.00
to their disbursement herein. and escrow holder is
instructed to
charge
'·account
said
, per new lender's instructions.
'It is further understood that after the $13,000.00 credit to
and after
.·the deduction of the
,
second trust deed sellers shall
. $25,000.00 (less closing
excess funds
-·escrow hofde:r is instructed to disburse to·
at close
escrow.

ALL OTHER TERMS AJ{D CONDITIONS REMAIN THE SAME.
End of Amendment.
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-2accounts at savings and loans, commercial banks, and credit
unions have been tied to market interest rates in the initial
deregulation phase.

By 1986 at the latest, deposit ceilings

on all deposit account types and maturities are scheduled
to be removed.
In addition to this deregulation of liabilities, in the
Spring of 1981, Federally chartered savings and loans and
commercial banks have authority to make a wide range of variable
rate and graduated payment mortgages.

Essentially, for federal-

ly chartered institutions, the mortgage instrument has also
been deregulated.
It is in this context of volatile and difficult market
conditions, coupled \vith deregulation, that "creative financing"
has become a significant factor in the mortgage market.·
In the remainder of my testimony, I would like to outline
the extent of "creative financing," the changing sources of
mortgages, and a new mortgage instrument which may solve both
the lenders' and borrowers' problem concerning high and volatile
interest rates.
A.

Extent of "Creative Financing"

The phenomenal growth of "creative financing" arrangements
involves essentially two major mechanisms.

The first is the

"buydown" of mortgage interest rates for a 2-5 year period by
a new home builder.

Essentially, the builder is reducing his

buyer's cost for a period of time by paying the interest for
the buyer to the financial institution.

Presumably, after this
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Table I

Mortgage
Originations
Existing Homes
(1)

*
Home Sales '''Price''~='
Loan to Value

Ratio(2/l)

(2)

(3)

1970 -1978

581 Billion

692 Billion

.84

1979

127 Billion

176 Billion

.72

1980

83 Billion

154 Billion

.54

1981:1

22 Billion

52 Billion

.42

*

These are national figures. Presumably, because of
the California Court's decision on "due on sale," the
numbers would show an even greater disparity between
new mortgage origination volume and Column (2).
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Table II
Sources of Net Extensions of

Home Hortgage Credit
(Percentage)
1978

1979

1980

8.1

7.5

6.7

.1

3.1

9.3

8.5

8.5

9.4

Mortgage Pools

15.0

22.2

26.0 "~7'0~1.

Commercials Banks

21.0

17.6

14.0

Savings and Loans

43.2

35.7

30.4

0

1.6

2.1

.5

.5

1.0

3.6

3.3

1.1

Households
State & Local
Governments
Sponsored Credit
Agencies

Life Insurance
Pension Funds
Other

,.<j.l-tJ,-

~p.~L

Page 220

f '

c.

Rate

erest rate

f

been

rna

30 years

t

s

0

s in the

ent

interest rates and

•

bili

cris

vo

tion

" for

t

rates crea

"profita-

an '

s

crisis" for

1

In

home
payment-f

t rate

serves ne

borrower

nor lender well.
On the 1

tus

s s

e

come from changes in f
rates.

est
t the 1980s wi

These changes assure
depository

in which
for liabi

t

a

s

two other var

the MMC and

rate certi

ectrum of maturi
s

issue concerns

It

cates
near

s

rate

d move a

es

on all
a

eti

t, a

ab

market returns on assets
of institutions.

rates for

e term 1

ly that var
1

s means

to

nearly all short

the

rate cer

titut

that the

te 1

a

to

only way financ

afford to pay market rates on liabil

mas

caus
t

s

es
t

can

if they are

221

0

-8-

allowed to receive market rates on all their assets.

As

a result, the movement toward market rates on liabilities
has required regulators to introduce a fully

le rate

mortgage instrument.
Thus, from the lender's perspective a fully variable
rate mortgage is essential to lenders with a fully variable
rate liability structure.
From the borrower's perspective, high inflation rates
have also made the fixed payment-fixed interest mortgage
outdated.

The interest rate on the mortgage loan is crucially

affected by the rate of inflation.

The mortgage interest rate

is a function of the expected inflation rate and a real interest component.

The high inflation rates of the past several

years have raised the contract interest rate and so raised
the monthly carrying costs of a conventional mortgage by over

100%.

Compared with a 1-2% inflation world, the present month-

ly carrying costs of a conventional mortgage are over five
times higher than would be expected in a low inflation economy.
This rise in mortgage payments, and the corresponding rise
in the initial yearly payments/income ratio is of course the
genesis of the "affordability crisis".

In fact, it is not

high nominal mortgage rates that have created the crisis but
rather it is high mortgage rates juxtaposed with the archaic
institutional mechanisms of the mortgage market that has
created the problem.

If the institutional arrangements of

the mortgage market were flexible, then as long as the"real"
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-10sets two interest rates, one for the accrual rate by lenders
on the mortgage debt, and one that determines the borrower's
payment rate.

The difference in the two rates

he added

or subtracted from the principle balance of the loan.

To

handle the lender's problem concerning the volatility and
trend of interest rates, the accrual rate could be variable
with changes in the rate tied to changes in a short or
medium term Treasury obligation.

To handle the borrower's

problem, the payment rate could be set on a graduated

is

starting at say 10% and then rising 100 basis points per year.
Depending on the time path of the accrual rate, the graduation
period might last for five to ten years.

In essence, the

DIM mortgage is really a variation of the Graduated Payment
Adjustable Rate Mortgage authorized last month by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board.
In summary, the DIH mortgage by solving bo

the lender's

and borrower's problem would alleviate the need for much of the
creative financing now occurrinB.
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Yet, regardless of one's position in the debate
e has been a
paucity of hard information available as to the precise financing
techniques engaged in today's housing market. This survey is directed
toward partially filling this absence of meaningful data.

A.

Survey Objectives

In addition to providing generalized informat
financing techniques, specific prima
survey
include:

n on present
jectives

0

Ascertaining the frequency of various alternative methods,

0

Assessing the volume of

0

Gauging the degree of seller involvement in real estate
financing and the opportunities for maintaining liqu ity.

ort-term financing arrangements.

I

B.

0

Differentiating the consumer impact of institutional vs.
private financing arrangements.

0

Evaluating the market dynamics and demographic
utilization of traditional vs. alternative financing
approaches.

0

Relating different financing approaches to the
marketability of properties.

Research Methodology
The selected survey approach consisted of a 2,100 member
random sampling of 800 REALTOR® and 1,300 REALTOR-ASSOCIATE®
members.
Questionnaires (and prepa
return enve
s) were
mailed in two separate waves with three weeks all
for
response. Over 330 valid questionnaires were received prior
to specified deadline dates (an add tional 30-plus
questionnaires were received late and thus not utilized in
the analysis). Responses were edited
consistency, coded
and keypunched prior to computer processing.
The questionnaire requested detailed information as to the
survey participant's most recent sing e unit residential
resale transaction. Transactions occurring more than 12
months previously were eliminated from the ana
is.
In
total, 113 bits of information were elicited (including a
brief policy assessment section and participant demographics) in the course of the six page survey instrument.
Most questions required closed-ended multiple choice or
fill-in responses; several open-ended questions were also
posed.
- 2 -
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Table ·2

Final Sales Price

less than
$ 50,000 $ 75,000
$ 90,000
$105,000
$125,000 $150,000
$200,000 +

5.

B.

$ 49,999
$ 74,999
$ 89,999
$104,999
$124,999
$149,999
$199,999

4.6%
14.4%
17.2%
16.3%
13.8%
12.5%
12.0%
9.2%
100.0%

Downpayments - Downpayments ranged from 0 (in two
cases) to a max
of $300,000.
For the sample as a
whole, the average downpayment was $36,000 (median
downpayment equalled $24, 0 ).
The great majority
(82.4 percent) of downpayments were in the $50,000 or
under category.
On the average, the
cal
downpayment was 24.1 percent of sales price.
As a
percentage of final sales prices, downpayments varied
from 20.7 percent to 43 percent.

Financing Characteristics: General
Perhaps the clearest conclusion to be drawn from the
preliminary data concerns the extent to which the current
market is dependent on alternat ve approaches.
The
traditional 80 percent institutional first now accounts for
a rather small proportion of activ ty, with assumptions and
owner participation being far more s gnificant.
Generalized approaches to financing are summarized in
Table 3.

Table 3

Types of Financing Utilized
Type of Financing

Cash and new first mortgage loan
Cash and new first mortgage loan plus
2nd and/or 3rd
Cash and assumption of existing first
mortgage loan
Cash and assumption of existing first
mortgage loan plus a 2nd
Cash and assumption of existing first
mortgage loan plus a 2nd and 3rd
Wrap-around (AITD)
All Cash
Other:
Installment sale/land contract
FNMA resale program
All others

Relative
Frequency

Adjusted
Frequency

23.1%
5.2%

25.3%
5.6%

14.6%

15.9%

27.1%

29.7%

14.6%

15.9%

7 0%

7.6%

•2
1. 5%
1. 5%
4. 2%
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·Table 5:
Median
Interest
Rate:

Median Interest Rate by Financing Type

14.03%

14.0 -+--

13.50%

13.0 - 12.46%
11.52%
12.0-11.0

11.44%

-+-9.79%

10.0 -+--

Type of
Financing:

Cash and
New lst
Mortgage
Loan

Cash and
New 1st
Mortgage
plus a
2nd

Cash and
Assumption
of lst

Cash,
Assumption
of lst
plus 2nd

Cash,
Assumption
of 1st plus
2nd anbd 3rd

AITD

Predictably, the lowest median interest rates were found in the instance
of a cash downpayrnent to an assumable existi
loan; whi
a new first
mortgage and a second produced the highest rates.
E.

~

Traditional vs. Alternative Financing Approaches
1.
Newly originated mortgages - Slightly more than 3 out of 10
transactions (30.9 percent) in our sample utilized a newly
originated first mortgage loan.
Less than one-fifth (18.3
percent) of these were accompanied by the use of junior trust
deeds.
Although firsts were written up to $400,000, 79.3
percent fell below the $98,500 purchase limit of the
institutional secondary market. The typical loan-to-value ratio
for newly originated mortgages was 76 percent.
Not surprisingly, newly originated mortgages were based on
relatively high interest rates aver ing 13.78 percent
(rnedian=l3.99 percent).
Interestingly, 40.8 of new mortages
were originated at rates below 13 percent, while 32.9 percent
bore 15 percent or higher rates.
Typical loan terms also
reflected the impact of high inflation and economic
uncertainty. The traditional 30 year period was featured in
only 61.4 percent of newly originated loans, nearly one-fifth
had terms of five years or less.
Although detai ed
tion
is not yet available, seller car
e ibited
ency to
be short-term arrangements.
-
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Amounts assumed ranged from $8,100 with an average figure of
$58,815 (median=$56,140).
A more detailed breakdown is
presented in Table 6.
Table 7

Remaining Balance on Assumptions
$ 24,999
$ 25,000
$ 50,000
$ 65,000
$ 80,000
$100,000

or less
- 49,999
- 64,999
- 79,999
- 99,999
or more

13.3
2 .6
23.9
19.4
8.9
8.9
100.0

percent
percent
percent
percent
percent
percent
percent

For assumptions as a whole, the average first mortgage
loan-to-value ratio was 47.3 percent.
This relatively low
figure required fairly substantial downpayments (averaging 30.4
percent of final sales price) and extensive use of secondary
financing (see below).
I

c.

Interest Rates - Given adequate fund availability, the
principle advantage to assumption lies in the preservation of significantly lower interest rates.
The average
rate on existing formally assumed firsts was 9.97
percent.
Even with interest rate adjustments accompanying
formal assumptions, all first mortgages assumed carried an
average rate of 10.4 percent (median=lO.O percent).
Although the advantage of these below market rates was
often reduced by higher cost secondary financing, overall
payments were generally held well below the levels of
newly originated loans.

d.

Assumption Procedures - Although analysis in this area
has not been completed, it appears that "subject to"
assumptions were accompanied by only nominal charges and
procedures.
The most common charge was for a beneficiary statement with lender record changes also being
frequently required.

e.

Secondary Financing - With the soaring appreciation of
the last several years, the relatively low loan-to-value
ratios attached to assumption possibilities frequently
necessitated secondary financing.
Only 25.9 percent of
all assumption based transactions were completed without
junior trust deeds.
In nearly one-half of the cases (48.1
percent), an assumed first was accompanied by a second,
while 25.9 percent required both second and third trust
deeds.
Although seconds (accompanying assumptions) ranged
in amounts from $1,600 to $161,000, over 50 percent fell
below $24,300. Thirds were generally of lower dollar value
and ranged from $3,500 to $73,000 (median=$14,000).For
both types of junior deeds, interest rates varied from 8.5
percent to 21 percent (with averages in the 13-14 percent
range).
The great majority of junior loans involved owner
participation. (More detailed analysis on secondary
financing and its implicatio
follow n a s para e
section.)
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associations, commercial banks and credit unions. Only 6.5
percent of second TD's were financed through loan brokers or
third party investors. Twelve percent of the owner-carry-backs
were discounted and sold to a third party investor.
Although
seconds were originated in amounts up to $261,000, 75 percent
were for $40,000 or less, with the average-sized second being
$31,397.
The average interest rate on se
trust deeds was
13.81 percent.
Only 10.5 percent of second trust deed monthly payments were
structured to cover less-than-interest-only. Slightly more than
46 percent had monthly payments covering principal and interest.
The remainder, 43.1 percent, had monthly payments which covered
only interest. Because more than half of second trust deeds
involved interest-only or less-than-interest-only monthly
payments, and because the average term of seconds (6.3 years) was
not sufficient to allow for full amortization, 79.6 percent of
seconds involved a balloon payment at maturity.
Nearly half of
all seconds, 47.7 percent, were assumable by subsequent buyers.

I
2.
Second Trust Deed Characteristics varied by the source of
financing.
Owner carried-back seconds tended to be smaller than
those originated through institutional lenders, $22,289 compared
to $30,050. Seconds originated through loan brokers or third
party investors averaged $18,100.

Interest rates on second trust deeds also varied by source of
financing.
(See Table 9: Second Trust Deeds:
Interest Rate by
Source of Financing.) Owner-carries averaged a 12.9 percent
interest rate; interest rates on owner carry-backs ranged between
8.0 percent and 18.0 percent.
By contrast, institutional seconds
had an average interest rate of 16.13 percent with rates ranging
between 10.75 percent and 18.0 percent.
Second trust deeds
originated through loan brokers carried an average interest rate
of 14.1 percent, and ranged between 8.5 and 18.0 percent.
Second Trust Deeds:

Table 9

Owner

Percent
of 2nd's:

Interest Rate By Source of Financing
Institutional
Lender

ITO

Loan
Broker

36.3
30.5

32.3
30\

20\

10\

Interest
Rate:

<

10\

1011.99\

1212.99\

1314.99\

10

1515.
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Second Trust Deeds:

Table 10
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Table 11

sties of Second Trust Deed Loans
Loan
Owner
k

Institutional
Lender
Investor

Amount (median)
Interest rate (median)

•

$30,050

$22 289

Interest-onl
Principal a
Interest
Less-than-interest-on

$18,100

12.9%

16.13%

14.1%

48.0%
36.3

15.2%
84.8
0

77.8%

5.7
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12 0

22.2%
0
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Median Term

3.9

Balloon payment

92.1%

44.0%

100 0%

21.0%

51.4%

60.0%

81.8%

94.4%

8 .3%
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0
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3.5

Source of Third Trust Deed:
0Hner carry-back
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3rd Party

Other.
Number
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Second Trust Deeds

13.6%

5.6%

4.5%

0

105

35

16.7%
0
10

Third Trust Deeds
Thi
trust deeds were originated or assumed in
y 19 7 percent
of all transactions
The major
thirds, 87
per ent, were
owner carry-backs; 10.2 percent were originated
loan
s or
ird party investors. None of the third trust d
s
were originated
institutional lenders.
irds ranged in size up to $73,000, but
e majority were less
an $14,500.
e average sized third trust deed was $14,400,
and carried an av
e interest rate of 13.96 percent. Interest
rates on thirds rang
between 10.0 and 21.0 percent. Monthly
nts on third trust deeds were most often structured as
either interest-only (44.7
ent) or as less-than-interest
y
(40 4 percent).
Only 14.9 percent of third trust deed monthly
payments were structured to include principal and interest.
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The. term to maturity of third trust deeds averaged 3.0 years,
though ranged as high as 10 years.
The vast majority of thirds,
95.7 percent, involved a balloon payment at rna uri
F.

Consumer-Impacts - Buyer and Seller Demographics
Though further analysis of the data is required, general
information on the characteristics of all buyers and sellers is
available, and presented below in Table 12.

Table 12

Buyer and Seller Demographics

Percentage of properties to be occupied
by buyer as primary residence
Percent first-time buyers
Median age of buyers
Median age of sellers
Median income of sellers
Percent of sellers occupying property
when originally listed or sold

77.6%
28.8%
35.4
43 1
$ 33,595

63.8%

Perhaps the most unexpected finding, the percentage of buyers
purchasing a horne for the first time accounted for fully 28.8
percent of all buyers. This is in sharp contrast to earlier
studies which placed the percentage of first-time buyers at
less than 18 percent nationwide, and at less than 17 and 14
percent in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas respectively.
Table 13 presents the differences between first~tirne and repeat
buyers, although financing strategies and dernograhic
characteristics were similar among both groups, first-time
buyers typically purchased lower priced (and smaller}
s with
less down.
First-time buyers were generally younger, and
d
lower incomes on the average than did repeat buyers.
Table 13

First-Time Buyers vs. Repeat Buyers
First-Time
Homebu~ers

Final sales price (median

$89,025

$110,000

Downpayrnent (median)
percent financed

$16,200
81.8%

$ 26,10
76.3%

Median age

30 years

37 9

Median income

$31,904

$41,025

G.

Marketability
The analysis of the impact of the various
on the marketability of
rtics is incompl
Initial findings, however, sugg st th t prope
assumption of an existing first was invo ved
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t
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Further a
es examining these and other issues
of mar tabili
are forthcom g.
III.

Preliminary Conclusions
Though more in-depth analyses of
i format on
forthcomi
, some very
nary conclusions can
this time.

are
e at

First, it appears t
t
curre t market is d
ndent to a
great extent, on the availabili
of a ternative financing
approaches. With the effective wi
rawal from
market of
institutional lenders, and the exorbitant interest
tes
involved ¥Jhen new first mortgages are originated, alternative
financing has been critical in maintain ng even
e present
reduced transaction volume.
I

Second, the most common
of alternative fin ncing involves
e assumption of an existing first mortgage loan and the
origination of a second trust deed.
General
,
t is the seller
who originates the second
gh institutiona lenders account
for 23 percent of these loans.
Third, to some extent alternative financ
approaches appear
to enhance the flexibility of the transaction, and
us, the
marketability of the proper es
ith which these
aches are
used.
Finally, first-time homebuyers appear to
se a more
significant share of
e rna
t than has
g
ral
believed.
e extent to which var ous factors can ex ain
finding is under st
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